Revivalism, Reformism and Pan-Islamism: The South Asian Experience

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Abstract: "The colonial encounter in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries resulted in a total eclipse of the Muslim military, political and intellectual life and consequently weakened the Muslim unity. In the Indian context, this condition produced a wide range of responses. The Deobandīs, regarding the Western threat primarily as an onslaught against Islām as a religious and cultural entity, took up the task of defending the Muslim faith and its traditions as the means to Muslim unity. The Aligarh and the Pan Islamic movement emphasized the acquisition of scientific and technological knowledge and skills. The *tajdīd* movement of Iqbāl, Mawdūdī and others called for a comprehensive reform along Islamic lines and for a "League of Muslim nations," and a universal Islamic revolution. Yet, the unity of the Muslim world remains elusive. The most noticeable aspect of the South Asian struggle for Muslim unity was the distrust and disunity between various Islamic movements as well as factionalism within each organization".

Introduction

Muslims, according to the Qur'ān, "are nothing else but brothers" (49:10). They are commanded to form themselves into an *ummah*, a community of believers, bound by a common faith and with a commitment to the creation of a just society through the implementation of *Sharī'ah.*[1] The Qur'ān reminds them that the *ummah* is "only one, united and integral"(21:92). The word *ummah* occurs some 64 times in the Qur'ān in the sense of a religious community. Being part of the Muslim community is a central part of being a Muslim. The Islamic era begins not with the birth of Muḥammad (SAW) or with the first revelation of the Qur'ān, but with the *hijrah*, the point when Prophet Muḥammad (SAW) and the Muslims left Makkah for Madīnah. This was the point when the Muslims of the tribe of Quraysh opted to place their loyalty to Allah (SWT) before the ties of kinship. In Madīnah, the *ummah* was advanced as the best of all communities. Muslims believe that it is through belonging to this -

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community that their lives become significant.[2]

Muslims have always had a special feeling for the idea of their community, their *ummah*. At one level this is acknowledged in the *salām* (greetings) to neighbours during the act of prayer. At another level community might be understood in the fact that all Muslims belong to a community created by the grace of Allah (SWT). All affirm their faith with the same formula, the *shahādah*. They acknowledge one book, and with minor differences follow one law. All pray, *salāh*, in basically the same way and are urged to pray communally whenever possible. They give alms, *zakāh*, to support the community; they endure the privations of the fasting (*sawm*) in the month of Ramadan as one; and they look forward to the ultimate celebration of communal identity and responsibility in the company of Muslims from all over the world during the annual pilgrimage, the *hajj*. All focus on Makkah and *ka'bah*; and they don two white sheets, the *ihrām*, in recognition of the equality of all men before Allah (SWT).

This *ummatic* unity was strongest in the early phases of Islām. In Makkah and Madīnah, the Prophet (SAW) and his companions promoted an activist socio-political ethic, and the community they created exhibited a shining example of unity. In little over a hundred years it came to rule a huge swathe of rich and fertile lands from Central Asia and the Indian Ocean in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west. For the following thousand years, from the eighth to the eighteenth century of the common era, the unity of the Muslim world helped to underpin the authority of God's revelation to man through Muhammad (SAW).

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the waning of Muslim unity. Among the many causes, the assertion of western power throughout the Muslim world was decisive. The symbolic beginning was made in 1757 when a military force led by Robert Clive defeated the forces of the Nawāb of Bengāl, Sirāj-ud-dawlah, at the Battle of Plassey and took over the province of Bengāl, followed in 1799 by the snuffing out of Mysore, the last significant Muslim opponent of British power in India. Between 1800 and 1920, the British, the French, the Russians, the Dutch, the Italians and the Germans annexed or asserted influence over almost the entire Muslim community. In 1920, the only areas largely free of European influence were Afghanistan, the Yemen, the Hijāz and Central Arabia. Iran also enjoyed a much-qualified freedom. Atāturk was fighting for Turkish freedom and self-respect in Anatolia.

The onset of western power in Muslim societies, and the continuing blows it has delivered to Muslim self-esteem, has led to a major process of

self-questioning and reflection. How could Islām, which for 1,200 years exercised unrivalled power, become divorced from its exercise? Was it, perhaps, because Muslims had not been good enough Muslims? Was it because they had not tried hard enough to relate Islām to changing human circumstances? Was it because they are disunited, hence dissipating their power in internal fighting and squabbles? These questions were as relevant in an independent Egypt, Iran or Turkey, as they were in India ruled by the British. The Muslim analyses of historical reverses and their prescription for remedial action produced three different perspectives referred to by Khurshīd Aḥmad as traditionalism, modernism and *tajdīd*.

The traditionalists advocated holding fast to Islamic tradition and its legacy and a total withdrawal from the processes of Westernization. The Westernizing Muslim modernists, like Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, even if they meant well in their desire to defend Islām, in effect presented a truncated and deformed Islām. The interaction between the two viewpoints has given rise to a vibrant and modern interpretation of Islām, known as *tajdīd*.[3] In the South Asian context, traditionalism was represented by the *'ulamā,* of Deoband and their offshoots. The exponents of modernism were the luminaries of the Aligarh movement and the pan-Islamism of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī. Sir Dr, Muḥammad Iqbāl, Abul 'Alā Mawdūdī and others belonged to the *tajdīd* category. This study analyses the approaches these three different movements adopted in South Asia for the unity of the Muslim world.

Religious Revivalism and Muslim unity

Muslim thinkers and activists since the 18th century have elaborated upon the various means of converting the Muslims into a united, integral *ummah*. The earliest response, traditionalism, in this respect came from the *'ulamā',* those learned in traditional subjects and religious education. The revivalism arose out of the need felt by the *'ulamā'* to combat the threats of Christian missionaries to convert Muslims, of western education to subvert them, and of the imperial state to loosen their control over the faithful by introducing a secular system of criminal and procedural law. The *'ulamā'* were also seriously concerned about the impact of Hinduism on Muslim life. Muslims worshipped relics and made sacred their leaders' gravesites. Aspects of the Hindu caste system were also assimilated, as well as certain marriage practices and other Hindu ceremonial appurtenances. Observing these influences, Moḥammad Iqbāl, the illustrious Muslim poet of the twentieth century, exclaimed:

> We have out-hindued the Hindu himself; we are suffering from a double caste
> system—the religious caste system, sectarianism and the social caste system,
> which we have either learnt or inherited from the Hindus.[4]

The *'ulamā'* could not and did not accept Muslim religious community in the form that they found in the nineteenth century. They set about through movements of religious revival, through the establishment of networks of educational institutions, and through political action to unify the Muslim community, to educate the Muslim masses in Islamic beliefs and rituals and to persuade them to avoid non-Islamic religious practices. Most of the religious societies formed to defend Islām in the nineteenth century adopted explicit goals of unifying the Muslim community. The Anjuman-i-Himāyat-e-Islām, founded in Lahore in 1885, for instance, established as one of its goals the creation and preservation of friendly feelings and concord between the different sects of Islām. The goals of educating the masses to a common understanding of proper Islamic beliefs and practices were also clear in the missionary activities of some of the societies which were designed to reach "ignorant Muslims" as well as non-Muslims.[5]

The most influential advocate of traditionalism was the Deoband school of thought.[6] Known formally as *Dārul 'Ulūm* Deoband and named after its location in the Delhi region of northern India, the school is considered by some to be second only to Al-Azhar in Cairo as the most important center of traditional Islamic studies. Deoband was established in 1866 by Muhammed Qāsim Nānautawī (1248-1297/1832-1879) and Rashīd Ahmad Gangohī (1245-1323/1829-1905) for teaching and providing both practical and spiritual guidance to their followers. Armed with their studies of Qur'ān and *hadīth*, the Deobandīs, for example, deplored a range of customary celebrations and practices, including what they regarded as excesses at saints' tombs, and practices attributed to the influence of the *shī'ah*.[7] The movement advocated the purification of those aspects of Islamic spirituality that had become in their view overly Hinduized. They wanted a purified, reformed Islām firmly based on the Qur'ān but separate from Hindu culture as well as the state.

Contrary to prevailing belief, the Deobandīs do not oppose literature or poetry, nor even sufism as such. In fact, most Deobandī divines were themselves active Sūfī shaykhs who followed the path, or *tarīqah*, within the confines of the *Sharī'ah*. They, however, condemn the "cult of the saints", i.e. seeking the saint's intercession for the believer with God. The Deobandīs argued that the relationship between a believer and his God is direct and that salvation can be achieved only by right action in this world.

To assist Muslims to live according to *Sharī'ah*, they made basic works of scholarship on Islamic way of life, available to the public through the use of printing press. They published books in Arabic and Persian and also translated many of the essential books into Urdu and other Indian languages. They also wrote pocket guide books on how to be a good Muslim; how to pray and how to achieve salvation in the hereafter.

Teaching was at the centre of the strategy of this reformist movement. They are *Sunnīs* and belong to the *Ḥanafī* school of jurisprudence. The Deoband reformers encouraged the development of a network of schools. After years of studies, graduate students, known as *mawlānā*, would come back to their place of origin, either joining an already existing *madrasah* (religious school) or founding their own. These *madāris* (pl. of *madrasah*) were able to provide not only education, but also boarding school and sometimes a small stipend to poor students.[8] The Deobandīs also made effective use of the media to propagate Islamic norms. In particular, the Deoband School's legal department (*Dār al-Iftā'*) used the media to propagate its legal decisions, the *fatāwā*, which sought to answer questions on whether or not any act or view was *Sharī'ah* compliant and whether it was acceptable, permissible or mandatory from the perspective of the *Ḥanafī* school of law. As of 1976, the Deoband issued 439,336 *fatāwā* which serve as a guideline for correct religious practice for Muslims in general.[9]

Strategically, the founders and early leaders of the Deoband movement displayed loyalty to the government.

> The Deobandis made sure that they conformed in every way to a posture of loyalty. Rashīd Aḥmad, for this reason, refused to accept a grant of 5000 Rupees a year from the Shāh of Afghanistan for fear that a political link might be suspected. And the school celebrated ceremonial occasions like coronations with appropriate pomp, and observed times of crises, like Queen Victoria's last illness, with fitting prayers and messages.[10]

A more radical section of the seminary's teachers who emerged after the turn of the century, like Maḥmūd al-Ḥasan (1267-1339/1851-1921) and 'Ubayd Allah Sindhī (1289-1363/1872-1944), however, considered the British rule as an impediment to the profession of Islām in India and allied with M.K. Gandhi (1869-1948) in the broad-based but unsuccessful Khilāfat movement. The Deobandīs were never a political party as such, but, organized as the Association of the *'Ulamā'* of India or Jam'iyyat 'Ulamā-i Hind in 1919 "for the exclusive purpose of safeguarding the *Sharī'ah*."[11] The Jam'iyyat was quite explicit in its goals of persuading

"all the Muslims of India to give up the unnecessary, useless and wasteful practices and ceremonies which are against the commands of God and His Prophet."[12] It also took the lead in demanding governmental enforcement of Muslim personal laws and in opposing any legislation on matters of personal and family law perceived not to be in conformity with the *Sharī'ah*. Jam'iyyat al-'Ulamā-i-Hind developed the theory of "composite nationalism" arguing that the Muslims of India belong to the same nation as other Indians, and India constitutes a nation despite its religious diversity. The Jam'iyat thus accepted the idea of territorial nationalism and justified their stand by referring to the covenant of Madīnah, in which the Prophet (SAW) agreed to the inclusion of non-Muslims in the same nation with Muslims. Additionally, they urged Muslims to cooperate with the Indian National Congress to expel the British from India and to achieve independence. Another political organization, Jam'iyyat al-'Ulamā-i-Islām, was created in 1945 which subscribed to the "two nations theory" of the Muslim League, which formed the ideological basis of the Pakistan movement.

An offshoot of the Deoband movement is the Tablīghī Jamā'at, known also as the "Faith Movement," that began in the late 1920s specifically to reform peasants who were nominal Muslims being targeted by a Hindu proselytizing movements as the Shuddhi and Sangathan, which launched massive efforts in the early twentieth century to reconvert those Hindus who had converted to Islām in the past. In some ways, the Tablīghī Jamā'at represented an intensification of the original Deobandi commitment to individual regeneration. Mawlānā Ilyās Kāndhlawī (1885-1947), a religious scholar of the Deoband, launched the Tablīghī movement in 1926 to call "Muslims to become real Muslims." The Tablīghī Jamā'at's strategy is to persuade Muslims to go out in groups, approach Muslims including the *'ulamā,'* and remind them to fulfill their fundamental ritual obligations. Participants are assured of divine blessing for this effort, and they understood that through the experiences of moving outside their normal everyday enmeshments and pressures, in the company of likeminded people bent on spending their time together in scrupulous adherence to Islamic behaviour, they themselves would emerge with new accomplishments, dignity, and spiritual blessing.[13] They stayed away from politics and political controversies. Even though there are publications specific to the movement, the stress in the movement was not at all on book learning but rather on face-to-face communication. Instead of publishing books, they go door to door and invite people to join their work. They invite Muslims to spend one night a week, three days a month, 40 continuous days a year, and ultimately 120 days at least once in their

lives to engage in *tablīgh* missions. They invariably present their message in the form of the following six-point formula: (1) *shahādah* or the confession of faith, its correct recitation and understanding of its meaning, (2) *salāt* or performing the obligatory five-time prayers regularly as an act of submission to the will of Allah (SWT), (3) *dhikr* or ceaselessly remembering Allah (SWT) to cultivate piety, (4) *ikrām al-Muslim* or respect for Muslims as a religious obligation and an effective strategy for preaching, (5) *da'wah* or propagating the word of Allah (SWT) in groups and away from home, and (6) *ikhlās* or inculcating honesty and sincerity of purpose in *tablīgh* activities.[14] With no formal organization or paid staff, Tablighī Jamā'at is the largest non-political group devoted to the cause of Islām through what Jansen calls "moral rearmament."[15]

There were rival Islamic reformist schools in the quest for true Islamic practice. One group, the Ahl-i Hadīth, for example, in their extreme opposition to such practices as visiting the Prophet's grave, rivaled that of the Arabians typically labeled "Wahhābī."[16] Another group that emerged in the same years was popularly known as "Barelvī" and although engaged in the same process of measuring current practice against *hadīth*, was more open to many customary practices.[17] All these diverse movements shared an overriding emphasis on encouraging a range of ritual and personal behavioral practices linked to worship, dress, and everyday behavior deemed central to *Sharī'ah* - divinely ordained morality and practices.

Thus, the response of the *'ulamā'* to the falling fortune of Muslims was to make the Muslims more religious. They redefined the Muslim community of India in religious and legal terms. The primary symbol of Muslim identity was Islām in which adherence to the *Sharī'ah* was an indispensable aspect. There was a running attack on all innovations and on indigenous customs which had come to be incorporated into Islamic practice. A Muslim community which was going to sustain itself needed teachers and scholars to transmit knowledge and make it work in society. The Deoband *madrasah* was founded for this purpose as a model and its affiliated *madrasahs* spread throughout India.[18] They used Persianized-Arabicised Urdu as the *lingua franca*, enhancing links among students from Bengal to Central Asia to the south. This was the most useful vehicle both to provide access to traditional Islamic literature and to communicate with ordinary Muslims. The *'ulamā'* used these mechanisms to reform the society so that its members could live as true members of the global *ummah*.

The pan-Islamic sentiments of the *'ulamā'* reached a new intensity as the 'Usmanly (Ottoman) *khilāfah* came under the final assault before and during World War One. The lead came from the radical section of the Deoband seminary teachers including Mahmūd al Hassan, Husayn Ahmad Madanī and 'Ubayd Allah Sindhī. Abu'l Kalām Azād launched *al-Hilāl* and spurred the foundation of organizations such as the Anjuman-I Khuddām-i Ka'bah to protect the Holy places of Islam, and tried to persuade Ottoman armies and frontier tribesmen to attack British India through the Khyber Pass. These feelings reached their peak in the Khilāfat movement which was primarily designed to prevent the allied dismemberment of Turkey after World War One. British India was declared *dār al-harb* (the abode of War) and thousands of poor Muslims migrated to Afghanistan but were turned back at the Frontier, entailing disaster and disillusionment for the prospective migrants. The Khilāfat movement, which was joined by Indian National Congress, was the greatest mass movement India had yet seen. The *'ulāmā'* of Deoband, including Mawlānā 'Uzair Gul, Mawlānā Kifāyatullah and Mawlānā Habībur Rahmān, as members and office bearers of the Khilāfat committees, toured the country to mobilize the masses to the movement. The Suspension of the movement by M.K. Gandhi after brutal Chaurī Chaurā incident in which a score of policemen were killed by the crowd and eventually Atāturk's abolition of the Turkish Caliphate in March 1924 brought the movement in large part to an end which led the *'ulāmā'* to pay attention to the affairs near home. In 1926, the Jam'iyyat passed a resolution demanding total freedom for India.

Muslim Unity through Science and Technology

Another group of Muslims concerned about the sorry plight of Muslims in India were the Islamic modernists, those Muslims tied to their traditions yet desirous of importing certain Western ideas which they justify by constant reference to Islam.[19] Its able representatives include Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān (1817-1898), Jamāl al-Dīn Asadābādī alias al-Afghānī (1839-1897), and their intellectual disciples. They denounced *taqlīd* (blindly following tradition), advocated adoption of Western scientific knowledge and technical know-how, and placed reason at the crux of Islamic thought. Their notion of reason was highly secular, positivist, and divorced from the intellect as traditionally understood in Islam.[20]

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān was very much disturbed to see that the Muslims had isolated themselves and turned away from the opportunities that their English superiors offered in return for their loyalty. He believed

that the Muslims would not be able to retrieve their lost position without the support of their English rulers. He also realized that the conservatism had made the Muslim community prisoners of outmoded ideas and that they could not be infused with new life and vigour without a rationalistic reinterpretation of old Islamic values in tune with modern conditions.[21] He viewed the social degeneration of Muslims as a temporary phase which could be overcome by constant endeavour in two distinct directions: the adoption by the community of western learning and education, and a rapprochement between the British and Muslims.

To impart modern education, Sir Sayyid founded the Aligarh Movement, which was primarily an educational venture. He established the Gulshan School at Murādābād in 1859, Victoria School at Ghazīpur in 1863, and a Scientific Society in 1864. The Society published translations of famous English works on history and political economy in Urdu to acquaint Muslims with the knowledge and literature of nations of the West. When Sir Sayyid was posted at Aligarh, he started the Muḥammadan Anglo-Oriental School in 1867 which became a college in 1875 and was granted the status of University to be called Aligarh University in 1920. Many of the individuals who would stand in the vanguard of the later Pakistan movement are identified with this university.

Like many other Muslim thinkers of the nineteenth century, Sir Sayyid was convinced that Muslims need to acquire Western science and he attempted to show that modern science is in perfect harmony with Islām. To that end, Sir Sayyid went ahead and re-interpreted Islām with the help of modern *'ilm al-kalām*. He insisted that Islām was completely compatible with reason and with "nature" and that the "work of God" (nature and its laws) was in conformity with the "word of God" (the Qur'ān). In short, he was very much a 19th– century advocate of science and positivism.[22] Sir Sayyid was severely criticized by the *'ulamā'* and others for he had no training in any natural science or in philosophy of science and he had never finished his traditional education. Yet, he made a foundational contribution to the spread of modern education and rationalist thought among the Muslim elite in India. The intention of Sir Sayyid was to enthuse young Muslims to imbibe modern science and remain Muslims. His motto was: "The more worldly progress we make, the more glory Islām gains." [23]

Sir Sayyid constantly pleaded Muslims to remain loyal to the British government. He advised them to shun active politics and not to participate in the Congress movement. He felt that the Muslim community should

remain aloof from all kinds of political agitation because by taking an active role in the Indian Mutiny of 1857, they had already placed themselves in danger by arousing British antagonism. In his attempts to dissuade the Muslims from forming an alliance with the Hindu-dominated Congress, he cited the Qur'ān and said that "the command of God was that Musalmāns could not be friends of non-Muslims. It can be plausibly maintained that the "two nations" theory, the rallying cry for the creation of Pakistan, can be traced back to the work of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān. Sir Sayyid insisted that Muslims could cooperate with Christians who were people of the Book. "If they could be friends, it could only be with Christians."[24] He was of the view that Muslims should have friendship with the British if they want to take their due rights. He tried his best to convince the British that Muslims were not against them. The Aligarh College Committee at the inauguration ceremony declared that "The British Rule in India is the most wonderful phenomenon the world has ever seen."[25] Throughout, he fought to preserve the Muslim interests in education, in jobs, and in the government. He constantly hammered upon the theme that the best chance of preserving Muslim interests in India lied in allying with the British. Though Sir Sayyid wished to see Turkey as a powerful independent Muslim state since Turkey "is the last of the great powers left to Islām," he would not allow any pan-Islamic loyalties to hinder this purpose.[26] After the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, he felt that Muslims might make much of their loyalty to the Turkish *khalīfah*, he was adamant that loyalty was owed to the British.[27] He encouraged the Indian Muslims "to accept an emotional espousal of the 'colonial sociology' of India in which Indian Muslims - of all classes and all regions - were a corporate group, marked by their past as rulers and their present as a minority in need of protection."[28] Indeed Sir Sayyid was rewarded by the British in many ways. In 1878, he was nominated as a member of the Vice Regal Legislative Council;[29] in 1888, he was knighted as the Knight Commander of the Star of India; in 1889, he received an honorary degree from the University of Edinburgh.

There were many others who followed Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and built upon his work and ideas. Prominent among them were Nawāb Abdul Latīf Khān (1828-1893), Mawlvī Muḥammad Ḥusain (1846-1904), Justice Sayyid Amīr 'Alī (1849-1928) and Justice Badruddīn Tyabjī (1844-1906). Justice Sayyid Amīr 'Alī rose to great eminence, was an intellectual, lawyer, and government official. His principal objective was to reconcile classical Islām with modern needs. Amīr 'Alī contended that Islām was a positive force, adaptable to contemporary conditions and necessary for spiritual enlightenment and practical advancement. His theme emphasized

that the Muslims of India had strayed from the teachings of the Prophet (SAW). Were they to recognize this, correct their course, and apply themselves to progressive tasks, their religious and temporal life would be renewed. Unlike Sir Sayyid, he favoured political activity on the part of the Muslims. He believed that "... unless their (Muslim's) political training ran on parallel lines with that of their Hindu compatriots they were certain to be submerged in the rising tide of the new nationalism."[30] It is these endeavours, among others, that made the Aligarh movement to pay increasing attention to the unity of the Muslim world. In 1906, the Aligarh school sent a telegram to the Viceroy stating that "The Mohammedans of Aligarh have heard the news of the British ultimatum to Turkey with profound grief and alarm, and request Your Excellency to use the influence of the Government of India in persuading the British Government to avoid an Anglo-Turkish war, and earn thereby the gratitude of the entire Mohammedan population of British India."[31] From 1910 onwards, the dominant feeling among Muslims, including those educated at Aligarh, was that the old policy of loyalty to the Government was of no use to the Muslim community.[32] Pan-Islamic sentiments captured the imagination of the Muslims. Aligarh graduates, Maulānā Shawkat 'Alī and his brother Mawlānā Muḥammad 'Alī, provided the leadership to the Khilāfat movement and suffered imprisonment. Subsequently, Aligarh movement supported the two nations theory of the Muslim League and helped in the struggle for Pakistan. The first prime minister of Pakistan, Liaquat 'Alī Khān, was an Aligarh graduate as was the first Military President of Pakistan, General Muḥammed Ayūb Khān who ruled from 1958 to 1969.

Another Islamic modernist who championed the Pan-Islamic movement was the charismatic leader, Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asādabādī (known as Al-Afghānī). He established the movement in its political form, striving to achieve the political unity of Muslims to fight against colonialism and the colonial powers. His was an age of European expansion into the heartlands of Islām, and of a frenzied search by Muslims for ways to ward off foreign conquests. As a vocal critic of Western imperialism, Afghānī called for a revival of Islamic civilization to counteract European domination. He traveled widely throughout Muslim lands in the Middle East and Central and South Asia, attempting to mobilize the masses in a pan–Islamic movement against the imperial threat.[33] His diagnosis of the situation consisted essentially of two parts dealing with the conditions of Western domination and a call for Pan-Islamic unity and reform.

Sir Sayyid adopted the policy of absolute loyalty to the British with his vision of Muslim revival territorially limited to India, Afghānī with his universal outlook for Muslim revival, perceived the protection of the Muslim *ummah* on a Pan-Islamic scale and argued for taking up the challenge of the Western onslaught. He had warned about "the danger of European intervention, the need for national unity to resist it, the need for a broader unity of the Islamic peoples [and] the need for a constitution to limit the ruler's power." He ascribed the decline of Muslim power to a combination of European imperialism, autocratic Muslim rulers and a retrogressive *'ulamā'* that saw no place for Islām in the modern world. Afghānī called for engaging as well as confronting the West.[34]

One hurdle, among many, on his way to pan-Islamism, was nationalism. Muslims among other peoples around the world have increasingly become conscious of their own separate languages, cultures, ethnic and national identities. Afghānī, therefore, argued that a Muslim is required to abandon his/her "rooted identity" and his/her "created identity" in favour of a sacred identity, that is, the sense of belonging to the *ummah* whose master is not a human being, but Allah. But giving up these identities does not mean abolishing them altogether because Allah created human beings as "nations" and "tribes." He explains that:

> ... a strong feeling of ethnic identity must be counted as integral to human nature. However, if necessity has created this sort of individualistic racial solidarity, there is no doubt that such solidarity can disappear just as it can arise. When men recognize the existence of the supreme judge . . . [they] no longer . . . have any need for an ethnic sentiment which has lost its purpose and whose memory has been erased from their souls; judgment belongs to Allah, the Sublime, the Magnificent.[35]

Afghānī's political program of pan-Islamism (*ittihād-i islāmī*) sought to mobilize Muslim nations to fight against Western imperialism and gain military power through modern technology. Muslim unity according to his thought can only come about if Muslims were strengthened militarily through modernization, just like the West. Pan-Islamism was an idiom of resistance directed against European military, political, economic domination and missionary assault on the Muslim world. Afghānī used this as an ideology to save the Muslim world from European domination. He called for the independence of individual Muslim nations. He regarded it the religious duty of Muslims to reconquer any territory taken away from them by others. In case of failure, they are advised to migrate to a land where Islām can be fully preached and practiced. Resistance to aggression was the duty not merely of the Muslims of a particular region or only of those who are colonized but of all Muslims. The cause of the

decline of Islām was that it was no longer politically integrated and all-embracing. Afghānī did not resort to mass movements; he worked through kings, emīrs and rulers of Muslim world to achieve the objective of Pan-Islamic unity. In the very beginning, Afghānī's project of the alliance of Muslim countries envisaged an agreement between Afghanistan, Belujistan, Kasghar, Yarkand, Bukhara, and Kokanda, with the approval of the Sulṭān of Turkey and with financial support from Indian Muslims. Later, while staying in Egypt (1871-79) after his expulsion from Turkey, Afghānī for a time lost interest in Pan-Islamism. In Cairo a group of young patriots gathered around him and started to publish newspapers in which they criticized the regime of the khedive and the colonial policy of the British. In private as well as in public statements, including the press, Afghānī agitated for opposition to foreign oppression and for the necessity for political reforms. His followers organized the so-called National Lodge on the basis of which a year later 'The Free National Party of Egypt' emerged with its "Egypt for the Egyptians." Accusing the khedive of collusion with foreigners and of betrayal of national interests, Afghānī and his companions demanded the limitation of the khedive's power and the introduction of the constitutional parliamentary system. Afghānī's antigovernment activity resulted in his deportation from Egypt. Soon after, he realized the futility of attempting to overthrow the colonial regime with the help of one country. Consequently, he returned to the idea of a political alliance of the peoples of the Muslim world. The mouthpiece of the Pan-Islamic propaganda became *Al-'Urwah al-Wuthqā* (The Inseparable Link) which Afghānī, together with Muḥammad 'Abduh, started to publish in March 1884. Pan-Islamic agitation directed the struggle against colonial rule, in particular against British oppression. Afghani's ideas on Muslim unity, modernist reforms through the opening of the gates of *ijtihād*, and the liberation of Muslim lands from foreign domination have been the key factors in the subsequent development of Muslim nationalism and the liberation struggle.

Afghānī was touched by the sheer power and supremacy of Western powers that were increasing their encroachment upon the Muslim world. He concluded that the European countries were prosperous and powerful because of their scientific and technological superiority. In a "Lecture on Teaching and Learning," given in 1882 in Calcutta, Afghānī said that:

> ... science is that noble thing that has no connection with any nation, and is not distinguished by anything but itself. Rather, everything that is known is known by science, and every nation that becomes renowned becomes renowned through science...[36]

Since Western power thrives on modern science and technology, reasoned Afghani, it had to be possessed by Muslim countries deliberately and urgently. This was considered to be the only way to stop the further decline and disintegration of the Muslim world. Afghānī argued in *al-'Urwah al-wuthqā* that Muslims, who were superior in all fields of human endeavor, "are stagnated in their education and knowledge." The reform suggested by some Western educated individuals, like Sir Sayyid, was not successful in treating the malady of the *ummah*. For these individuals, reform meant taking pride in emulating the West in their dress, food, and furniture, belittling the indigenous culture and people, and running to the service of the foreigners. The solution was a return to the fundamentals of Islām. The Muslims must realize that their strength in the past was due to their adherence to Islām.[37] Islām declined because of the weakening of the solidarity among Muslims and the division of Islamic territories into different kingdoms ruled by despotic and whimsical rulers. Muslims should unite and learn from the ex perience of other nations.[38] It was the time for them to wake up to the bare essentials of their humanity.[39]

Afghānī defended Islām's compatibility with the spirit of inquiry saying that "The Islamic religion is the closest of religions to science and knowledge, and there is no incompatibility between science and knowledge and the foundation of the Islamic faith."[40] He, however, argued that religion should be reformed in cases where it contradicts reason and modern science. He identified himself with Martin Luther.[41] He urged Muslims to adopt those Western sciences and institutions that might strengthen Islām. Thus, for Afghānī, "the centre of attention is no longer Islām as a religion; it is rather Islām as a civilization. The norm of human action is no longer the service of God; it is the creation of a human civilization flourishing in all its parts."[42] By this subtle shift of emphasis from the spiritual aspects of the Islamic community to its political and cultural success in comparison with other "civilizations," Afghānī opened the doors to a wholly secular interpretation of the history of the Islamic world and of its constituent parts. Afghānī has aptly been described as the leader of Islām's "Liberal religious reform movement."[43]

Afghānī, it must be noted, was a rationalist but "he did not agree with the extremist rationalism of at least some of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān's views, and regarded his new *'Ilm al-Kalām* as a heresy in so far as it seemed to falsify the words of the Qur'ān."[44] Likewise, he criticized socialism, communism, and nihilism. His fierce criticism, however, was directed toward Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and the Aligarh movement. Reading the two thinkers, it appears that Afghānī's views on Islām was as much

radical and provocative as that of the Aligarh, and there was not much in his philosophical view that could not be reconciled with that of Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and his associates. Yet, Afghānī found the naturalism of the Aligarh movement wanting and suspected their commitment to Islām. The reason for this scathing criticism is to be found not so much in the rationalism of Sir Sayyid but in the fact that the Aligarh movement was very much subservient to the British which ran contrary to Afghānī's project of pan-Islamism as the most effective way to combat imperialism.

Muslim Unity through Islamization

Jamāl al-Dīn al- Afghānī's idea of pan-Islamism and Muslim modernism was, as discussed above, a blend of Islām, secularism and nationalism. Pan-Islamism advocated by that sensitive and remarkable thinker, Muḥammad Iqbāl (1877-1938) was different.[45] Afghānī's appeal for Muslim unity and solidarity has a rather weak link with Islām as a faith; Iqbāl's pan-Islamism was squarely based upon Islām. Yet, Iqbāl expressed great admiration for Afghānī calling him a *mujaddid* (renewer) and "one of the most advanced Muslims of our time."[46]

Like Sir Sayyid and Jamāl al-Dīn al- Afghānī, Iqbāl admired the accomplishments of the West, its dynamic spirit, intellectual tradition and its science and technology. He would like to see Muslims emulate the West in these respects. The knowledge of things, according to Iqbāl, elevated the West. Further, "the extension of man's power over Nature has given him a new faith and a fresh sense of superiority over the forces that constitute his environment."[47] Iqbāl, however, was critical of its excesses such as European imperialism and colonialism, the inequitable system of capitalism, the divisive nationalism, and the moral bankruptcy of secularism. To Iqbāl, "The mistaken separation of spiritual and temporal which has largely influenced European religion and political thought... resulted in a set of mutually ill-adjusted states dominated by interests not human but national."[48] Thus, all the problems the capitalist society faced were the inevitable consequences of the lack of spirituality and absolute values, which resulted in the spread of nationalistic ideas and of the separation of church from state. Iqbāl did not see in nationalism any progressive content, and he reduced it to the odious Machiavellianism which justifies any means for achievement of the end.

Islām, on the other hand, was an ideal which, if fully realized, should suffice for humanity to live in harmony and free from evils arising out of modern capitalism, imperialism, nationalism and the like. Nevertheless, Iqbāl saw Muslims all around in a miserable plight. He desired the values of Islām, of international brotherhood and a sense of social justice and

humanitarianism to be made relevant and applicable to modern times. This task of reinterpretation could not be undertaken by Muslims because of their deplorable condition under British rule and Hindu hostility. He advised Muslims to avoid the Congress party for the same reasons offered by Sayyid Aḥmad Khān. He pleaded with Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāh to take over the mantle of leadership of Indian Muslims. In 1930, in his famous Muslim League presidential address, Iqbāl made the first clear demand for the "formation of a consolidated Muslim State" in or outside the British empire, "in the best interests of India and Islām."[49] In his letters to Jinnāh dated May 28 and June 21, 1937 Iqbāl wrote: "To my mind the new constitution [the Government of India Act 1935] with its idea of a single Indian federation is completely hopeless. A separate federation of Muslim provinces... is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of Northwest India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are?"[50] However, Iqbāl's vision encompassed the unification of the entire Muslim *ummah*, as he advocated a pan-Islamism based on his belief in One God.

It would be erroneous to interpret Iqbāl's demand for a Muslim state as limited nationalism for, in the same speech, he says, "if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim."[51] He requires his country men to free themselves not merely from Western colonialism but they would also have to avoid fragmentation that came as a result of divisiveness of nation-states. He condemns racialism and limited world outlook. Islām is neither nationalism nor imperialism. Islām is violently opposed to the idea of racial superiority, which is the greatest enemy of human race and an obstacle in the way of international unity and cooperation. Islām, to Iqbāl, has already solved the color question "which modern European civilization, with all its achievement in science and philosophy has not been able to solve. Pan-Islamism, thus interpreted was taught by the Prophet and will for ever. In this sense, every Muslim is a Pan-Islamist and ought to be so."[52] When Iqbāl realized that Muslims were in danger of giving up the universality of their ideal in favour of a narrow patriotism and false nationalism, he felt it his duty, as a Muslim and a well-wisher of humanity, to remind them of their true role in the drama of evolution.[53]

Iqbāl argued that in order to fight against the enemies of the "human race," it is necessary to cultivate and revive the original culture enjoined in the teachings of Islām and exemplified in the life of the Holy Prophet. The

Qur'ān, he argued, is a book emphasizing deed rather than the idea. In order to keep pace with modern times, the teachings of the Qur'ān as a living force must be projected in the light of modern thought. The *ummah*, to Iqbāl, is a compact universal entity and any attempt to divide it into sections and parochial entities is against the mission of the Holy Prophet. Muslims must, therefore, unite by shunning un-Islamic practices, by returning to pure Islām, and by adapting the canons of Islām, through *ijtihād*, to meet contemporary exigencies.

Iqbāl was convinced that the survival of Islām and the unity of Muslim *ummah* were dependent on the centrality of Islamic law. This law, however, has to be reconstructed in the light of modern circumstances. Iqbāl distinguished between the eternal, immutable principles of the *Sharī'ah* and those regulations that were the product of human interpretation and thus subject to change. He believed that the restoration of Islamic vitality required the "reconstruction" of the sources of Islamic law. The conservatism and respect for tradition that had characterized Islām since the fall of Baghdad must be jettisoned and replaced with the right to *ijtihād*, to reinterpret and reapply Islām to changing social conditions. The right to *ijtihād* belonged to all qualified Muslims and not just to the *'ulamā'* and he suggested that this right be transferred from the *'ulamā'* to a national assembly or legislature. Given the complex nature of many modern problems, the legislature should seek the advice of experts from traditional and modern disciplines. This collective or corporate *ijtihād* would then constitute the authoritative consensus (*ijmā'*) of the community. Iqbāl believed that through reinterpretation, it would be possible to develop Islamic equivalents to Western concepts and institutions. Thus, for example, Iqbāl concluded that because of the centrality of such beliefs as the equality and brotherhood of believers, democracy was the most important political ideal in Islām. Though history, after the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, had prevented the community from realizing this Islamic ideal, it remains a duty for the Muslim community. It is the same ideals of equality and brotherhood that militated against Iqbāl's acceptance of the concept of nationalism. Nationalism, to Iqbāl, is not merely antithetical to the universal brotherhood established by Prophet Muḥammad (SAW), it was the tool used by the colonialists to dismember the Muslim world. The political ideal of Islām was a transnational community that transcended ethnic, racial and national ties; it was based on an inner cohesion that stemmed from the unity of the community's religio-political ideal. Islām "does not recognize the barriers of race and nationality or geographical frontiers. In

the sense of this humanitarian ideal Pan-Islamism ... does and will always exist."[54]

Iqbāl, it must be noted, was not suggesting that Muslims should politically unite under one government. Iqbāl implied the formation of an association of the Muslim countries to better their own lot and to uphold peace and justice in the World. His idea of pan-Islamism remains embedded in what he called "A Commonwealth of Muslim Nations" or "League of Muslim Nations." He understood that Muslims needed to be knit together by some kind of bond and overcome their subjugation by colonial powers through national self determination. However, they must avoid fragmentations that would come as a result of the divisiveness of nation-states. Iqbāl observes: "It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islām is neither Nationalism or Imperialism, but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only and not for restricting the social horizon of its members."[55] In a letter to R.A. Nicholson, Iqbāl attempted to explain the seeming contradiction between the Muslim's loyalty to his community and his commitment to a universal social order. He wrote:

> ... if you want to make it [universalism] an effective ideal and work it out in actual social lie, you must start ... with a society exclusive in the sense of having a creed and a well defined outline but ever enlarging its limits by example and persuasion. Such a society, according to my belief, is Islām.[56]

Iqbāl's notion of universalism postulated the superiority of Islamic principles and a world integrated on these principles.

Iqbāl's idea of pan-Islamism was further taken up by Sayyid Abul 'Alā Mawdūdī (1903–79), founder of the *Jamā'at-i Islāmī*, who added his considerable weight to its presence in Islamic thought on the subcontinent, and beyond. The core of Mawdūdī's *Weltanschauung* is formed by Islām, an Arabic word that "stands for complete submission and obedience to Allah."[57] Its fundamental postulate is the unity and the sovereignty of God (*tawḥīd*) who created man and the universe and whose all-pervasive law governs the universe. The scheme of life envisaged by Islām is known as the *Sharī'ah*, as prescribed in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet (SAW).

Mawdūdī believed in historical continuity in the sense that Islām has been continuously in existence since the human race began with Adam, the first prophet of God. Additionally, Islām is universal. It is not wedded to any particular race or region, nor is it the sole property of any particular group of people. It is the common legacy of the whole of mankind. From the beginning, the audience of the Qur'ān and Prophet Muḥammad (SAW)

was the whole of mankind. Those who surrendered to the will of God are welded into one community, *ummah*. This *ummah* is radically different from those communities/ nations, which are founded on the basis of race, color or territory.

Islām, wrote Mawdūdī, "actually is the name of a movement which started with a purpose and some principles. And the word Muslim was meant for the group which followed the movement and went forward with it."[58] The objective of the movement for Islamic revival is to establish the Islamic system of state rule characterized by the sovereignty of God. Man can only legitimately act as God's vicegerent, His *khalīfah* on earth, and to exercise the divine authority within the limits prescribed by Him. The term used by Mawdūdī to identify the Islamic state is "theo-democracy" which means "Kingdom of God" administered by the entire Muslim population in accordance with the *Sharī'ah*.[59] Clearly, this theo-democracy contrasts sharply with secular Western democracy, with the sovereignty of the people as its philosophical base. Islām repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and the vicegerency of man. Additionally, in Western democracy, the government undertakes to fulfill the will of the majority; in Islām, the government is obliged to fulfill the purpose of God.

The Islamic state is characterized by a total absence of nationalism which, to Mawdūdī, is antithetical to the idea of a universal *ummah*. It has no territorial restriction on its scope of activities. Its approach is universal and all-embracing: "Islām requires the earth – not just a portion, but the whole planet."[60] Islām clearly rejects the claims of racial and geographical factors to order the loyalties of Muslims. For such a notion disrupts the essential unity of mankind and narrows down the cosmopolitan outlook of Islām. The national idea produces a materialistic outlook on life and territorial and racial consciousness counteracts the humanizing spirit of mankind. Islām, to the exclusion of all other belief systems, came up with the alternative system based upon the conception of equality of men. "Even the worst opponents of Islām acknowledge that there is no religion apart from Islām that has succeeded in obliterating distinctions of race, color, language, place of origin and nationality in establishing universal brotherhood of men."[61]

The *ummah* of Islām is defined by spiritual traditions and inner consciousness. Mawdūdī even rejected the existence of Muslim nationalism as incompatible with Islām. In the sub-continent, the Muslim League was wedded to the concept of Muslim nationalism. The most noteworthy feature of the struggle for Pakistan is that its leadership came

almost entirely from the Western-educated Muslim professionals. Mawdūdī mounted scathing criticism against the Muslim League leadership. Mawdūdī was convinced that the western-educated element in the League's leadership would never be able or willing to establish an Islamic state as conceived by the *Jamā'at*. He stated that the aim of Indian Muslims should be "Islamic revolution," which meant educating the people in the spirit of Islām, training the true Muslim scientists, philosophers, economists, jurists, political leaders, etc. who would lead in the long run to the building of "the world society based on the true principles of Islām."[62]

Following the partition of India in 1947, Mawdūdī migrated to Pakistan and struggled to transform the new by born state into an Islamic republic. Thus, though Mawdūdī viewed Islām as a world-wide revolutionary movement, he subscribed to the "Islām in one country" (Pakistan) thesis. This he considered essential for two reasons: first, an ideology, to be useful, must have an empirical import and must make reference to particular cases or examples, for it is simply impossible to build a pattern of life merely in the abstract. Second, the ideology, to attract world-wide attention, must demonstrate its worth by evolving a happy and successful system of life and must present its theories and fundamental principles in operation.[63] Far from repudiating the principles of pan-Islamism, as Azīz Aḥmed had argued, Mawdūdī considered Islām in one country as a stepping stone to effect world-wide attention.[64]

The strategy chalked out by Mawdūdī for Muslim unity includes preaching the unity and sovereignty of Allah (*tawḥīd*). Earlier attempts at reviving Islām, to Mawdūdī, centered on piecemeal modifications of Islamic law and compromises between Islamic and un-Islamic principles which resulted in the dominance of Western ideas. It is the apologetic approach of Sir Sayyid Aḥmed Khān and others in India which made Western civilization "the judge of the merits and faults of Islām – not vice versa."[65] The correct approach is to re-establish pure Islām in the world of the twentieth century.

The preaching of *tawḥīd* entails, as well, first, scathing criticism of western ideologies and philosophies and exposing their fallacies and weaknesses; secondly, a critical examination of all kinds of innovations in religion and a careful delineation of the boundaries between Islām and un-Islām; and thirdly, a revitalization of the spirit of *ijtihād*, i.e., exerting one's utmost to show how Islamic principles can be applied to new circumstances and conditions. Mawdūdī would not permit the slightest deviation from the path of true Islām, which he considered as resting upon

the Qur'ān and the teachings of the Prophet (SAW). Even *ṣūfīs* and their practices had to conform to *Sharī'ah*. Mawdūdī reminded the Muslims that they belong to *ummatan wasaṭan* (a just and balanced community) and that they have a pivotal role to play in the service of mankind by enjoining what is right and forbidding what is evil. This is an invitation for a revolutionary movement to unify the whole of mankind. For this purpose, Mawdūdī founded the Islamic party, the *Jamā'at-e-Islāmī*, which, to him, is engaged in a continuing revolutionary struggle to establish the supremacy of Islam.

From 1920 to 1928, Sayyid Mawdūdī translated several books from Arabic and English into Urdu. In September 1932, he acquired the ownership of the journal *Tarjumān al-Qur'ān* from its founder and became its editor and publisher. From then onwards, the *Tarjumān* claimed a lion's share of Mawdūdī's time and attention, and became the vehicle for the articulation of his ideas, and the "mission of his life."[66] He continued to edit *Tarjumān* until the very last months of his life in 1979. In addition, Mawdūdī was a prolific writer and, according to one estimate, he authored more than 138 books and treatises on different aspects of Islam[67]

Mawdūdī was supported by a number of *'ulāmā'* who joined him in Lahore to form the new organization in 1941 including Maulānā Sayyid Abul Ḥasan 'Alī Nadvī and Muḥammad Manzūr Nu'mānī of Deoband. *Jamā'at-i-Islāmī* has been influential in the development of Islamic revivalism across the Muslim world in general and India and Pakistan in particular.[68] The vast majority of the *Jamā'at* participants were western educated, not seminary educated. They were engineers and others with technical training, lawyers, doctors, and university professors, and, generally speaking, they had little respect for the traditionally-educated *'ulāmā'*.

Conclusion

The quest for a distinct Muslim identity and Muslim unity has a long history in South Asia. It started long before the idea of Pakistan germinated in the minds of the intellectuals. The Deoband movement served as an example of one important model of contemporary Islamic thought and action, a major example of what can be called "traditionalist" Islamic activism. The *madrassahs* in Deoband, and the *Tablīghī Jamā'at* movement linked to it and other religious movements emerged to revive the Muslim *ummah*, 'imparting awareness about their distinct socio-cultural and religious identity. Together, however, for all their variety, these Deoband movements were, in fact, alike in regarding the Western

threat primarily as an onslaught against Islām as a religious and cultural entity. They were alike as well in an overriding emphasis on encouraging a range of ritual and personal behavioral practices linked to worship, dress, and everyday behaviour. These were deemed central to *Sharī'ah* and essential means to promote Muslim unity.

The Westernizing modernists, like Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, emphasized the acquisition of scientific and technological knowledge and skills as mandatory in Islām. Muslim unity can be attained if they are educated and if they are powerful. It is their failure in the realm of science and technology that has created an image of Islām being uncaring and unjust. Sir Sayyid equated the interests of Indian Muslims with an unquestioning loyalty to the British; Afghānī believed resistance to non-Muslim aggression and reconquest was the duty of Muslims all over the world. Afghānī pioneered the elite-based pan-Islamic movement in the subcontinent. These Westernizing modernists, even if they meant well in their desire to defend Islām, in effect presented a truncated and deformed Islām. In contrast, Iqbāl, Mawdūdī and others called for a return to the original message of Islām, to discover its relevance to the existing milieu and to strive to change the status quo to conform to the tenets and principles of Islām. Their primary concern was to elevate the principle of *tawḥīd*, the oneness of God and the unity of creation. They built models for distinctive polities that challenged the alternative systems such as nationalism, capitalism, and Marxism. They sought modernity in ways that simultaneously asserted the primacy of Islamic values and avoided the dark side of western modernity. The call of the *tajdīd* is for a comprehensive reform along Islamic lines in all aspects of life. Iqbāl called for a "League of Muslim nations," Mawdūdī, in addition, called for a universal Islamic revolution.

Given these efforts, religion, which under the impact of secularism lay dormant for a while, had re-emerged in Muslim politics and society. These movements have succeeded many Muslim states to declare their identity as part of the Muslim *ummah* in their official designation. Yet, the unity of the Muslim world remains elusive. The most noticeable aspect of the South Asian struggle for Muslim unity was the disunity between various Islamic movements as well as factionalism within each organization. The Deobandīs went their separate ways. The Deoband *madrasah* grew into a more modern school, exhibiting sharp differences with other Muslim traditionalists, and even with its own offshoots in other countries. Sir Sayyid was, of course, disowned by Afghānī. Iqbāl and Mawdūdī championed Muslim nationalism. The Muslim political

leadership, in their struggle for Pakistan, believed that the *'ulāmā'* were not capable of giving a correct lead in politics because of their exclusively traditional education and total ignorance of the complexities of modern life. The *'ulāmā'* remained, by and large, hostile to the idea of a Muslim national state led by the Westernized Muslims for their laxity in adopting Islamic code. In the final years of colonial rule, a minority group among the Deobandi *'ulamā'* formed the Jam'iyyat-i Ulāmā-i Islām to support the Muslim League and the demand for a separate Muslim state. In independent Pakistan after 1947, they became a minor political party with a fairly simplistic call for the primacy of Islām in public life. Like other Pakistani political parties, the JUI has been subject to factional splits coalescing around personalities more than issues, and there were perhaps a half-dozen factions and reorganizations over its fist half century. [69]

Despite the lack of Muslim unity, from the 1920s onwards, Muslim societies achieved their freedom from direct foreign rule. The end of Western rule, however, did not bring an end to transformative western influences in Muslim societies. In many cases their impact is redoubled. The process of meddling in the Muslim world continues. New elites, Bhuttos, Hoveidas, Bourguibas, continue to emerge to manage the new economic and political structures. Most of them are trained in the West, subscribe to Western values of secularism and nationalism, support Western culture, and happy to see it given substantial freedom to flourish in Muslim societies. Indeed, these new elites enjoy the support of the super powers who see in secularism and nationalism the germs that could disrupt the idea that the Muslims of the world constitute one, united *ummah*. Paradoxically, their efforts did little to erode the profound sense of the distinctiveness of being Muslim. On the contrary, more and more Muslims have developed a Pan-Islamic dimension to their consciousness; more and more have engaged imaginatively and emotionally with the fate of Muslims in far away lands. In South Asia this development was given a particular intensity because of the British colonization of Muslim lands and the consequent loss of Muslim power giving rise to the feeling of insecurity among South Asian Muslims. One development that led to Pan-Islamic consciousness was the increased frequency of travel undertaken by Muslims, since at least 1860, to Britain and to Europe to absorb Western learning and modern skills as well as to Cairo and Istanbul to pick up the latest in Muslim ideas.

Equally important in this respect was the increase in the number of Muslims performing *hajj*. While some settled in the Hijāz as scholars or traders others returned home with the stories of Muslims and their

conditions in other places. Lastly, it is necessary to mention the role played by the media and the press in influencing pan-Islamic consciousness. Indeed, there was a symbiotic relationship between the growth of pan-Islamic consciousness and the growth of the press. The more Indian Muslims discovered about the fate of their brethren elsewhere in the Islamic world, the more they wished to know. Each Muslim calamity gave birth to the booming of the press and the flourishing of great newspapers.

Notes and References

[1] Ismā 'īl Rājī al-Fārūqī, *Tawḥīid: its Implications for Thought and Life* (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute for Islamic Thought, 1982), p. 112.

[2] W. Montgomery Watt, *Islam and the Integration of Society* (Evansston: Northwestern University Press, 1961), p. 204.

[3] Khurshid Ahmad, "The Nature of Islamic Resurgence" in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, John L. Esposito ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 219-220.

[4] Quoted in Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (Lahore: Faber and Faber, 1950), p. 21

[5] Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 351.

[6] See Barbara D. Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).

[7] Deoband continues to thrive with over 3000 students enrolled. The seminary's web page displays a monumental marble mosque with links providing further information in Urdu, Arabic, Hindi, and English. See Dārul 'Ulooom Deoband, India, http://www.darululoom-deoband.com [Online] accessed on January 15, 2006.

[8] According to one estimate, in 1900, there were forty such schools in North India, and in 1967 nearly nine thousand.

[9] Sayyid Mahboob Rizvi, *History of the Dar al-Ulum Deoband*, trans. Murtaz Husain F. Qureshi, 2 vols. (Deoband: Idarah-e-Ihtemam, 1980), 2:242.

[10] Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India*, pp. 154-155.

[11] Zia-ul-Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963), p. 68.

[12] A.M. Zaidi, ed., *Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in India*, vol. III, *Parting of the Ways* (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1977), p. 686; See also Tahir Mahmood, *Muslim Personal Law: Role of the the State in the Sub-continent* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977).

[13] See Abdul Rashid Moten, *Political Science: An Islamic Perspective* (London: McMillan, 1996), pp. 133-34.

[14] Muḥammad Ayūb Qādrī, *Tablighī Jamā'at Kā Tārīkhī Jā'izah* (Karachi: Maktabah Mu'awiyah, 1971), pp. 92-3.

[15] Godfrey Hansen, "Islam in Asia Towards an Islamic Society," *The Economist*, September 4, 1982.

[16] The Wahhābis are the followers of the Salafiyyah movement of Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (115-1207AH/1703-1792CE). Ibn 'Abd –al-Wahhāb preached return to the Qur'ān, the *Sunnah* and the *Sunnī* legal positions that were worked out in the first three centuries of the Islamic calendar. He revolted against laxity and corruption among the rulers and the Muslim masses. For a comparative view of the contexts of such movements see William R. Roff, "Islamic Movements: One or Many?" in William R. Roff, ed., *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 31-52.

[17] They called the others "Wahhābi." These orientations, Deobandī, Barelvī or Ahl-i Ḥadīth, would come to define sectarian divisions among Sunni Muslims of South Asian background to the present.

[18] Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan*, p. 36.

[19] W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 60. Sharabi objects to using "Islamic modernism" to these thinkers because "the critical

consciousness which a genuine rationalism would have necessarily required failed to emerge" (p.37). Instead, he prefers reformism, because, for him, this movement was "tradition-bound"(p. 7).

[20] See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Ideals and Realities of Islam* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).

[21] His biographer Altāf Ḥusain Ḥālī wrote that Sir Sayyid, from the very outset, was moved by the belief in the reality of Islam and a passion for the community of Muslims. Altāf Ḥusain Ḥālī, *Hayat-i-Jawed* (Lahore: Isharat Publishing House, 1965), p. 293.

[22] L. Carl Brown, *Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 95.

[23] J.M.S. Baljon Jr., *The Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid* Aḥmad Khān (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1949), p. 88.

[24] Cited in Husain B. Tyabji, *Badruddin Tyabji* (Bombay: Thacker & Co., 1951), p. 204.

[25] *The Pioneer*, January 8, 1877. Sir Sayyid is reported to have said that the "feelings of affection and loyalty to her Majesty have been infused into us with our mother's milk." See Shan Muḥammad, "The Muslim Dilemma: Some Misunderstandings," *Aligarh Law Society Review*, Vol. 2 (1971): 62.

[26] Sir Sayyid remarked: "When there were many Muslim kingdoms, we did not feel much grief when one of them was destroyed, now that so few are left, we feel the loss of even a small one. If Turkey is conquered that will be a great grief, for she is the last of the great powers left to Islam. We are afraid that we shall become like the Jews a people without a country of their own." Cited in Theodore Morison, "Muḥammad an Movements" in *Political India, 1832-1932*, ed., Sir John Cumming (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), pp. 95-96.

[27] A. Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 60-61.

[28] Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India*, p. 334.

[29] Shortly after he was awarded the title, Sir Sayyid wrote: "Without flattering the English, I can truly say that the natives of India, high and low, merchants and petty shopkeepers, educated and illiterate, when contrasted with the English in education, manners, and uprightness, are like a dirty animal is to an able and handsome man." (*Musāfarān-i London*, Majlis-i Taraqqī-i Adab, Lahore, 1961, p.184).

[30] Sayyid Razi Wasti, ed., *Memoirs and other Writings of Sayyid Amir Ali* (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1968), p. 33.

[31] *The Pioneer*, May 10, 1906.

[32] Hirendranath Mukerjee, *India Struggles for Freedom: A History* (Bombay: Kutub, 1948), p. 97.

[33] See Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamāl al–Dīn "al–Afghānī"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

[34] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* (London: Oxford University Press 1962), 109.

[35] Sayyid Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, "Islamic Solidarity," in *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, ed. by John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 20.

[36] Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghānī, "Lecture on Teaching and Learning," November 8, 1882, Albert Hall, Calcutta, as reprinted in Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 107.

[37] "Madi al-Umma wa Hadirouha wa ilaaju ilaliha," (The Past and Present of the Ummah and the Treatment of its Maladies), *al-Urwah al-Wuthqa*, pp. 45-60.

[38] al-Wahdat al-Islami-yah" (Islamic Unity), *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa*, pp. 130-140.

[39] "al-Amal wa Talab al-Majd" (Hope and the Pursuit of Glory), *al-Urwah al-Wuthqah*, pp. 151-162.

[40] Ibid.

[41] N. R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialismh*, pp. 81–84.

[42] Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 114.

[43] Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt* (London: Unwin, 1907), p. 100.

[44] Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 55.

[45] Sir Dr. Muhammad Iqbāl, the descendant of a Kashmīrī Brahmin family, converted to Islām, was born in Sialkot in 1877. After schooling in the little township, he went to Lahore, England, and Germany for higher studies. Iqbāl had a Master's in philosophy from College, another Master's from Cambridge and a Ph.D. from Munich received for work on Persian metaphysics. He had also qualified as a barrister in London.

'Atāullah, *Iqbal Nāmā*, Vol. II (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1951), p. 231; Sayyid Abdul Vahid ed., *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbāl* (Lahore Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), p. 278.

[47] Muhammad Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1965), pp.7-8. Iqbāl's use of the term "reconstruction" is meaningful as it denotes an action aims at a new construction in the light of the requirements of the age, without changing the basis.

[48] *Speeches and Statements of Iqbāl*, compiled by "Shamloo" (Lahore: Al-Manar Academy, 1948), p. 224.

[49] The famous speech of Iqbāl reads as follows: "I would like to see the Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sind, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British empire or without the British empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me the final destiny of the Muslim at least of North-West India." See Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, *Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement* (Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1970), pp. 121-137.

[50] Muhammad Iqbāl, *Letters of Iqbāl to Jinnah: The Political Future of Muslim India* (Lahore: Ashraf, 1956), p. 24.

[51] Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, *Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement*, p. 123.

[52] Iqbāl's letter to K.G. Sayyidain in *Letters and Writings of Iqbal*, B.A. Dar ed. (Karachi: Iqbal Academy, 1967), p. 56.

[53] Quoted by Luce Claude Maitre, *Introduction to the Thought of Iqbal*, M.A.M. Dar trans. (Karachi: Iqbal Academy, 1956), p 20.

[54] Shamloo ed., *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1948), p. 204.

[55] Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 159.

[56] Iqbal to R.A. Nicholson, 24 January 1921 in Bashir Ahmad Dar ed., *Letters of Iqbal* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1978), p. 144.

[57] Abul Ala Mawdudi, *Towards Understanding Islam*, Khurshid Ahmad tr. (London: Islamic Foundation, 1980), p. 17.

[58] Abul Ala Mawdudi, *Come Let Us Change this World*, Kaukab Siddique comp. & trans. (Karachi: Salma Siddique, 1971), p.73.

[59] Abul Ala Mawdudi, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, Khurshid Ahmad trans. & ed.

(Lahore Islamic Publications Ltd., 1960), p.148.

[60] Abul A'lā Mawdūdī, *Jihad in Islam* (Malaysia: International Islamic Federation of Student Organization, 1981), p.6.

[61] S. Abul Ala Mawdudi, *Unity of the Muslim World*, Khurshid Ahmad ed. (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1967), p. 13.

[62] Abu Ala Mawdudi. Process of Islamic Revolution; an address delivered at the Aligarh Muslim University (Delhi: Markazi Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, 1970), p. 22.

[63] Abul A'lā Mawdūdī, *Tafhim al- Qur'ān*, vol. I (Lahore: Idārāh-i Tarjumanul Qur'ān, 1973): 36.

[64] Aziz Ahmed, "Mawdudi and Orthodox Fundamentalism in Pakistan," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 21, no.3 (Summer, 1967): 378.

[65] *Correspondence Between Mawlana Maudoodi and Maryam Jameelah* (Lahore: Mohammad Yusuf Khan, 1973), p. 57.

[66] Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī, *Tarjumān al-Qur'an* (August 1936): 483.

[67] Kazi Zulqadr Siddiqi, S.M. Aslam and M.M. Ahsan, "A Bibliography of Writings by and About Mawlana Sayyid Abul A'lā Mawdūdī" in Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, eds. *Islamic Perspectives: Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi* (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1980), pp. 3-14.

[68] See Abdul Rashid Moten, *Revolution to Revolution: Jama'at-e-Islami in the Politics of Pakistan* (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2002).

[69] See Sayyid A.S. Pirazda, *The Politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan, 1971-77* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000).