

# The End of Nation-State?

## Nationalism vs. Transnationalism and Islamic Identity

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Islam considers believers to belong to one global community, the *ummah*. Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a community (*ummah*). In Maududi's view, nationalism is inconsistent with Islam, because it divides man from man on the basis of nationality. "The notion of nationalism is a pre-Islamic and backward notion, which denies religion, and any religion, Islam or other. Islam strongly denounced tribal *asabiyah* in the strongest terms.

### From Empire to Nation-States

#### Strains Between Religious and Political Authorities in Europe:

Christianity was established as the basis of political legitimacy in the fourth century. That was when Constantine, one of several heirs to the Roman imperial title, recognized that by championing the cause of the suffering Christians he could garner sufficient support to outdo his competitors. He could also make use of the Christian hierarchical system already in place throughout the Mediterranean lands to rebuild a basis of unity for Rome. Christian Rome was divided into four prefectures, each subdivided into twelve dioceses that were administered by vicars who looked to the bishop of Rome for guidance.<sup>1</sup> These positions were civilian, carefully separated from the military to avoid possible rebellion. The only institution that transcended the localism of classical Rome's agricultural economy was the church. Thus, in the vacuum of power left by the crumbling classical empire, representatives of the church became the most respected local authorities.<sup>2</sup>

#### Revolt against Catholicism:

In 1526 German princes were given religious autonomy within their territories—where Luther had sought refuge. They were allowed to enforce or not, at their own discretion, the Edict of Worms<sup>3</sup> (1521) against Luther. This revolutionary sanctioning of territorial autonomy became the basis of the Peace of Augsburg<sup>4</sup> (1555), which declared *cujus regio, ejus religio*: The ruler of the land gets to determine the religion of the land.

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Nothing could have been more significant in the developing history of regional autonomy. The Peace of Augsburg became the model for other regions as well, such as Switzerland. Switzerland was at this time a loose confederation of autonomous cantons, some of which had accepted Protestant teachings. Those who remained loyal to Roman Christianity clashed with the Protestants until 1531, when a treaty confirmed the right of each canton to determine its own religion. Thus Protestant Christianity,<sup>5</sup> i.e., religious protest, became the vehicle of political protest. It removed from Rome the last possible claim to universal authority—the authority to judge spiritual rectitude. As in England, where Henry VIII had broken with Rome (1534) by declaring himself head of the Church of England, political and religious authority were still one. But authority was no longer “catholic” in the literal sense of the term: universal. It was geographically limited, at least in principle.

In short, two things were developed from European history:

- The emergence of sovereign territoriality.
- Separation of church and state.

### **The Emergence of Sovereign Territoriality:**


The catalyst for the transformation of the heteronomy of the medieval period was the crisis of Christianity known as the Reformation and the religious violence and wars it spawned. The Reformation was a revolt against the Church by those who considered it corrupt, more concerned with maintaining its power and privileges than with guiding the spiritual salvation of Christendom. At first, reformists were members of the clergy. Soon the reform religions, such as Lutheranism, Presbyterianism, and Calvinism, spread throughout Europe, especially among the bourgeoisie, but also among some of the nobility. Reformers, known as Protestants (from the “protests” against Charles V at the Diet of Speyer<sup>6</sup> in 1529), argued that salvation depended on faith alone. Protestant religious practice emphasized the private, personal relationship between the individual person and God. A personalized relationship, they argued, obviated the need for the Catholic Church’s liturgy, sacraments, and official hierarchy of priests, bishops, and pope. Indeed, Protestants argued that the Catholic Church’s statues and images of its saints amounted to false gods; some even viewed the Catholic hierarchy, including the pope, as the Antichrist. Protestant sects taught that if a ruler commits impious acts or undermines “true” religion, the people over whom rule was exercised had a right and duty to resist.

The Catholic Church tried to suppress Protestantism with military force by encouraging monarchs who remained loyal to the Church to attack those who had converted to one of the new Protestant religions. Fighting between Catholic and Protestant monarchs was ended by the Treaty of Augsburg (1555), which recognized Protestantism as one of the two religions that could be practiced within Europe, the other being Catholicism. The Treaty of Augsburg recognized the right of the monarch to establish the religion of his realm. The monarch's choice was binding on his subjects and those who did not accept his choice were obliged to worship in secret or emigrate. The Treaty of Augsburg "enhanced the powers of state rulers within the Holy Roman Empire and directed growing attention to those states as discrete territorial units."<sup>7</sup>

The Treaty of Augsburg was soon violated. State began to advance the religions of their rulers by attacking states whose rulers professed the opposite faith. Those wars, known as the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), began in German-speaking kingdoms, principalities, and dukedoms and pitted Catholic and Protestant rulers against each other. The fighting was extremely bloody because the combatants thought they had God on their side and that the enemy was the instrument of Satan.

It is estimated that about one-third of the population of German-speaking Europe died as a result of the fighting. Eventually, exhaustion and the desire to end the bloodshed and the resulting economic devastation led to a new concern with peace in Europe. Peace treaties, signed at Münster by Catholic kings and estates and Osnabrück by Protestant kings in 1648, known collectively as the Peace of Westphalia<sup>8</sup> (1648) (see map), sanctioned the division of Europe into Catholic and Protestant states.

*Map of Europe after Treaty of Westphalia 1648.*



The Peace of Westphalia recognized the principle of state sovereignty and enshrined the concept of secure and universally recognized state borders in law. It accepted the principle of nonintervention in the territorial space of other states for any reason. After the treaty was signed, Europe experienced a period of peace and stability that helped normalize the principle of state sovereignty. From this point onward, a commitment to the right of individual rulers to exercise absolute control within their own territory took hold and the territorial state began to “crowd out competing conceptions of how power might be organized to the point where the sovereign territorial [state] became the only imaginable special framework for political life.”<sup>9</sup>

The treaty also encouraged further development and use of diplomacy; that is, the art and practice of conducting relations among states through embassies and ambassadors, which had begun in the sixteenth century. Increasingly, the political “other” was conceived of as a state, with a specific geographic location, rather than heretical religious group, a rival noble family. The ideal of territorial sovereignty arose, then, in good part as a historically contingent resolution of a spiritual crisis of Christianity. By sanctioning the division of Christendom into sovereign territorial states, the Peace of Westphalia also consolidated and gave a new political form to Europe. After Westphalia, an interstate society was gradually created that had at its core a commitment to the right of individual rulers to control all matters within their own territories.

### **Nation, State and Nationalism:**

Europe’s Age of Religious Warfare is a fascinating laboratory of the dynamics of emerging nationalism and civil religion.

The distinction between nation and state is to understanding the process Europe underwent as the Holy Roman Empire disintegrated. A nation—from the *nasci, natus*, “to be born”—is a sociopolitical configuration based on common birth or something analogous to common birth. Its distinguishing characteristic is that membership in the nation is based on something that transcends territory: common ancestry, common religion, etc. As a result, the boundaries of the nation are fluid. They ebb and flow with the inclusion or exclusion of peoples participating in the national identity (by converting to the legitimating religion, for instance, or confederating with the legitimating tribe).

A state, on the other hand—from the Latin *status*, “position”—has geographically fixed boundaries. It is defined first and foremost by territory.

Theoretically, at least, anyone born within a given set of territorial boundaries is a member of that state. A nation-state is a combination of these two concepts: it is nation or group of people with a common identity who accept territorial limitations, or it is geographically limited territory whose inhabitants have developed some sense of common identity.

The basis of the claims for new autonomy in Europe were religious; religious claims remained the political language of the realm. But these claims were not univocal. There were many formulations of protest, and each identified itself as a mini-nation. Germany became Lutheran, Switzerland was Calvinist, England was Anglican, France was also Catholic, and Spain was Catholic. Before the fighting within and among these new entities could stop, their internal order had to be altered to accommodate somehow the claims of all within the territory, and the geographic boundaries of the new autonomous groupings had to be determined. In short, new nations had to become states.

Separation of Church and State:

Dr. Fazlur Rahman known as the most moderate of Islamic modernists, said: "Secularism destroys the sanctity and universality (Transcendence) of all moral values....Secularism is necessarily atheistic."<sup>10</sup>

The Treaty of Westphalia finally ended the war in 1648. It would take over two centuries for Germany to transcend the fractured religio-political condition ratified by the treaty, and France and Spain would remain at war over their borders until 1659. But the agreement did mark the end of the Holy Roman Empire. It also officially denied governments the right to indefinitely expand their borders with religion as their only justification. The treaty ratified the principle of geopolitically limited state and, in so doing, liberated political from religious thought. It raised the question: What is it that gives all Christian communities in Europe the right to autonomy, regardless of sectarian orientation?

This question, more than any other, characterized Europe's Age of Enlightenment. Finally released from the conflicts that had drained their resources for so long, Europeans could assess their progress, consolidate their gains, and develop the theoretical or philosophical apparatus to explain the new reality. It was never a question of jettisoning the values that had shaped the archaic structures; indeed, the structures had to be altered to preserve the values. The process required distinguishing the essential from the accidental: Europe's intellectuals had to figure out which aspects of the defunct Holy Roman imperial order were necessary for Christian life and which were simply

a function of the changing socioeconomic context. The challenge was to determine what were truly Christian values and how best to preserve them in the new socioeconomic milieu.

Since the Reformation, intellectuals had been trying to break free of the church's grasp. Thomas Hobbs is probably the most important of this group. Hobbs was heavily influenced by Calvinist views on social order. Calvin had taught that individual piety lay in the common effort to transform society morally. In a growing recognition of the nature of religious commitment, Calvin asserted that Christians simply do not have the leisure to sit idly by while society is directed in an ungodly way. He described the ideal human society as a commonwealth, based on a covenant among the populace to obey a ruler elected from among those best suited to rule. He also taught that, ideally, religious and political control should be separated. The church and state are two kinds of society, distinguished by their tasks. The former is supposed to guide the latter, for the goal of the state should be ensure civil and economic justice, i.e., to prevent gross social inequality. The role of the church is to guide the conscience of citizens and leaders, to make sure the laws they devise are in accordance with the laws of God.

Hobbs can therefore be called the first political philosopher of the Christian world, because he definitively extricated political thought from theology. He taught that all actions have political consequences, even the actions of people oblivious to politics. Therefore, human beings must be properly trained to work in concert for the betterment of society. The greatest human power lay in the collective or the commonwealth, in "which people are united by their consent in one all-powerful person." Such a commonwealth was to be the source of political authority, he said, not the church.<sup>11</sup> Hobbs' articulation of the separation of religious from political authority is what allowed the development of the more advanced work of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Montesquieu. Locke opposed the belief in absolute authority. He held that all people are equal and independent and that no one had the right to harm another "in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."<sup>12</sup>

Accordingly, in Locke's view, whenever the preservation of people's life, health, liberty, or possessions is threatened the government automatically forfeits its position. "The trust must necessarily be forfeited and the power devolves into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they think best for their safety and security."<sup>13</sup>

This was, in effect, a theory of just revolution, a provision for orderly change of government over which people had conscious control. Montesquieu went even further. He taught that freedom from despotism can only be assured by a balance of power among a monarch, an aristocracy, and commoners and by constitutional limits to the power of the state overall. In biting satire on the triviality of religious warfare, he claimed that societies' strength lay in solidarity of common interests, not religion. But whereas Locke had emphasized separation of church and state, Montesquieu emphasized their cooperation. In his view, the people must be well imbued with religiously inspired principles of justice and equality to truly ensure good political order. Rousseau's major concern was freedom. There is true freedom only in democracy; the only legitimate political order is that formed deliberately by thinking people. As it had in the work of his predecessors, religion played an important role in Rousseau's theories. So he developed the idea of civil religion. But he rejected the standard Christian hierarchy that placed intermediaries—earthly or otherwise—between the individual and God. He taught, instead, that individuals achieve salvation by fully participating in a moral society. Indeed, the strength of the state depends on the morality of its citizens, rather than on sheer force.

Toynbee tells us about the development of nationalism and its consequences in non-Western countries:

“During the last century and a half we have seen our Late Modern Western political institution of ‘national states’ burst the bounds of its birthplace in Western Europe and blaze a trail of persecution, eviction, and massacre as it has spread abroad into Eastern Europe, South-West Asia, and India—all of them regions where ‘national states’ were not part and parcel of an indigenous social system but were an exotic institution which was deliberately imported from the West, not because it had been found by experimentation to be suitable to the local conditions of these non-Western worlds, but simply because the West political power had given the West’s political institutions an irrational yet irresistible prestige in non-Western eyes. The havoc which the application of this Western institution of ‘national states’ has worked in these regions where it is an exotic import is incomparably greater than the damage that the same institution has done in Britain, France, and the other West European countries.”<sup>14</sup>

Toynbee considers nationalism a negative force which has appeared as a result of the rise of new social forces under the impact of democracy and industrialism in the context of parochial state. The Western society was in a



happier posture in the “pre-nationalist age” of the eighteenth century but then the world economic and political order was subverted by political and economic nationalism. He considers the internecine warfare aroused by nationalism as a “time of troubles” for the Western civilization. He notes: “Mid-way through the twentieth century of the Christian era, the Western society was manifestly given over to the worship of a number of idols; but among these one stood out above the rest, namely the worship of the parochial state....The restraining influence of a universal church had been removed. The impact of democracy in the form of nationalism, coupled in many cases with some new angled ideology, had made the warfare more bitter, and impetus given by industrialism and technology had provided the combatants with increasingly destructive weapons.”<sup>15</sup>

“Nation-State” is a governmental and administrative apparatus of a bounded national territory. The term is often used as a synonym for “country,” the most recent way in which human politics has been organized, and now thought by some to be under considerable threat.

A glance at a map of the world shows that the globe is divided over virtually all of its surface into nation-states. Benedict Anderson argues, that “nationness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.”<sup>16</sup>

This legitimacy of the idea of nationhood manifests itself in two key ways:

First, the actors who constitute the political world see themselves as in some way representative of or affiliated to a national identity. Politicians may go to the negotiating table in international bodies such as the United Nations or the European Union to defend their perceived national interest.

Second, it is fair to say that nationhood is the primary way in which the world has been conceived through the lens of modern political analysis.

### **The Present State of States: Sovereignty Challenged**

Before it is possible to address these questions, we need to pay attention to the concept of sovereignty, which underpins the whole idea of nationhood.

“Sovereignty” is the idea of ultimate political authority. A body is fully sovereign if there is no higher power. Sovereignty has been the basic ground rule for the conduct of the business of international relations. The widespread

legitimacy of the idea of sovereign statehood has hindered the development of authoritative institutions above the nation-state.

Sovereignty is one of the most written about political concepts. It is the subject of both philosophical discussion and political jousting. Sovereignty is in essence about the power to make laws and the ability to rule effectively. The concept throws up the obvious connotation of rule by a monarch (a sovereign) who would be, as D. Held puts it, "invested with an authority which confers the force of the law upon whatever he wills."<sup>17</sup> This perspective of the all-powerful sovereign was given its most powerful theoretical justification by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbs in the seventeenth century. Hobbs's sovereign need not be a single person; what he is really advocating in *Leviathan* is that the state be invested with absolute power. Hobbs reason that left to a situation of individual self government, people would engage in the relentless pursuit of their own interests. This would lead to a perpetual power struggle, a "warre of every one against every one" as Hobbs puts it.

In recent years the idea that nation-states are able to be sovereign has been the subject of serious challenge. For increasing numbers of analysts, the study of a nation's politics in isolation from the broader global environment has become impossible. This is based on observations such as the view that a country's politics may be affected by political events in other nations. Obvious questions about the external sovereign status of nations are raised. A further observation is that forms of authority above the nation-state have come into being and, as we just noted, politics takes place in various forms above the nation-state. Again, the external dimension of sovereignty appears to be threatened by forces apparently beyond the control of national governments. One of the principal political theorists of this transformation is David Held. He points out that:

"There are disjunctures between the idea of the state as in principle capable of determining its own future, and the world economy, international law and military alliances which operate to shape and constrain the options of individual nation-states."<sup>18</sup>

Much of this bound up with the processes of globalization which we have discussed above. Here we need to identify the kinds of things which threaten the external sovereignty of nation-states and which might also help our understanding of the creation of international and potentially supranational bodies which exercise authority above the nation-state.

The most obvious of these factors is the operation of the world economy. With the increases in multinational production, the rise in the global

flows of goods and services, advances in communications and information technology and the growth of global financial exchange, serious doubts have been raised about the ability of governments to maintain control over the economic determinants of their countries' well-being. These dilemmas are expressed well by the Will Hutton:

"The world financial system is spinning out of control. The stock of cross-border lending now exceeds a quarter of the GDP [Gross Domestic Product] of all industrialized countries. International Bank assets are double the value of world trade. The volume of business in the currency futures markets exceeds even that generated by daily trade flows....Not even the US, German or Japanese governments have the financial clout to deal with the new volume of speculative flows—while many developing countries lack enough reserves to cover the purchase of eight weeks' imports."19

In addition there exist a range of global institutions which appear to promote a particular international economic orthodoxy and therefore allegedly force governments to pursue particular patterns of policy. The operation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank provide a good example. Walter C. Opello, Jr. and Stephen J. Rosow write the future of sovereignty:

"The modern territorial state is a unique historical creation of relatively recent vintage. It is not eternal, and no form of it is universal. Moreover, it now exists within a world order in which managerial states dominate; indeed, most people live in states whose lives are regulated and disciplined by powerful managerial states, and through these states the norms of the states-system, as well as the organizations of the global capitalist economy. Military, economic, and social forces are into question the state's territoriality, as well as the modern state's insistence on a politics of control from the center. The ability to represent the state as territorially sovereign is diminished by changes in warfare, the globalization of capitalism, the proliferation of international managerial institutions, and the tremendous mobility of people around the globe. Present developments not only seem to be challenging the current form of the state, but are also questioning the possibilities of territorialized, sovereign politico-military power. This is not to argue that the nation-state is disappearing, but that state sovereignty is facing serious challenges. Territorial states have always had to confront forces that overflow the representation of a sharp claimed to be 'in control' and in which the subject population was pacified—and sovereignty outside, that is, the state's independence in a system of juridically sovereign states in a world of perpetual violence and war. These forces are, at a minimum, intensifying in the global order. Now we examine four forces that recently have challenged nation-state sovereignty: 1. Changes

in warfare; 2. the globalization of capitalism; 3. the fracturing of national identity; 4. the emergence of 'hypermedia' networks."20

The decline in sovereignty of the nation-states which has taken three forms:  
An increase in the political power of globalizing capital within the nation-state.  
The emergence of super state political authorities and regional authoritative institutions in the European Union.

An expansion in the mandate and scope of operation of multicultural agencies such as the Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization.

Capital has now outgrown the nation state. It needs a state, which de-legitimizes citizen's national sovereignty. The focus on human rights, toleration and pluralism is a means for achieving this de-legitimation of the citizen's national sovereignty through a weakening of the nation state.

### **Nationalism: Will the Curtain Fall?**

A critical question in the future of nationalism, and indeed the course of world politics, is whether nationalism will significantly weaken or even die out. The answer is unclear. The existence of divergent identities based on language and other cultural differences extends as far back into time as we can see.

It must be said that group identification and nationalism are not synonymous. The sense of sovereignty attached to cultural identification is relatively modern. "Nationalism and nations have not been permanent features of human history," as one scholar puts it.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, nationalism, having not always existed, will not necessarily always be the world's principal form of political orientation. Rourke and Boyer say:

"Socio-political scientists expect nationalism to eventually cease to be an important political phenomenon. Also unclear is what would follow if state-centric nationalism were to die out. Some scholars believe that it will be replaced by culture, religion, or some other demographic characteristic as the primary sense of political self."<sup>22</sup>

### **Nationalism and Islamic Identity:**

Islam considers believers to belong to one global community, the ummah. The distinctions of race, language and colour, according to Islamic view, are accidental and for facility of reference only. It recognizes shura (mutual consultation) in the community as the hall-mark of its political system but sovereignty belongs to God rather than to the king, or the dictator, or even

the people. Hence, the ummah's freedom to make its decisions is circumscribed by the set of principles laid down in the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon him). Justice is the key criterion for the society's socio-economic life.

Islam's world-view, in Muhammad Iqbal's opinion, is based on two basic assumptions: 1. the principle of Tawhid—that God is one, and 2. that man is God's representative on the earth and a special trustee.

"Islam is non-territorial in its character, and its aim is to furnish a model for the final combination of humanity by drawing its adherents from a variety of mutually repellent races, and then transforming this atomic aggregate into a people possessing self-consciousness of their own."<sup>23</sup>

Iqbal emphasized to the Muslims that ethnic, racial, and territorial differences have limited utility and are recognized in Islam for purposes identification only. Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a community (ummah). Iqbal's verdict against nationalism is forcefully expressed in the following verses:

"Of these new deities, the biggest is the fatherland—the deity whose garment is the coffin of religion. The rivalry of nations is due to this. The subjugation of nations through commerce is due to this. If politics is devoid of honesty, it is because of this; if the home of the weak is ruined, it is because of this. It is this divides the creatures of God into nations; it is this which strikes at the root of the nationality of Islam."<sup>24</sup>

In Maududi's view, nationalism is the inconsistent with Islam, because it divides man from man on the basis of nationality. Nationalism simply means that the nationalist should give preference to his nationality over all other nationalities. Even if a man is not an aggressive nationalist, nationalism at least demands that culturally, politically, economically and legally he should differentiate between one who belongs to one's nation and the others to ensure maximum advantages for his nation; to preserve with tenacity the historical traditions and traditional prejudices and to generate the sentiments of national pride:

"He [nationalist] would not admit with him members of other nationalities in any walk of life on an equal basis. Whenever there is a chance of obtaining more advantages, as against each other, his heart would be sealed against all sentiments of justice. His ultimate goal would be nation-state rather than a world state; nevertheless if he upholds any world ideology, that ideology would necessarily take the form of imperialism or would domination, because members of other

nationalities cannot participate in this state as equals, they may do so only as slaves or subjects.”<sup>25</sup>

Sayyed Qutb strongly believed in the universality of Islam’s message. He wrote:

“Islam came to evaluate man and save him from the bonds of earth and soil, the bonds of flesh and blood. There is no country for the Muslim except that where the Shariah of God is established, where human relations are bonded by their relationship to God. There is no nationality for a Muslim except his creed which makes him a member of the Islamic ummah in the abode of Islam.”<sup>26</sup>

Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi says that:

“The notion of nationalism is a pre-Islamic and backward notion, which denies religion, and any religion, Islam or other, denies it. That it is pre-Islamic, is because it revives chauvinism, which is one of the special features of the pre-Islamic period, and from which Islam and its Prophet distanced themselves completely as the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: ‘There is no one from us who advocated chauvinism, there is one from us who fought for chauvinism, and there is no one from us who died for chauvinism’.”<sup>27</sup>

Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari believes that Islam is international and its message is universal:

“To start up with, it needs to be emphasized that it is not for the first time in its history that Islam has wrestled with the problem of competing loyalties. At the very time of its inception, Islam was faced with the challenge of asabiyah, the moving spirit of the pre-Islamic social order. Asabiyah was an idea which greatly resembled nationalism since it signified boundless and unconditional loyalty to the tribe or clan. The two bear striking resemblance in so far as while asabiyah denotes supreme loyalty to the tribe, nationalism denotes supreme loyalty to the nation. Significantly enough, the motto of the sixth century Arabs was: “Help your brother [clansman]: right or wrong”. Could any thing be closer to the motto of the nationalists in the present century: “My nation: right or wrong”? Islam strongly denounced tribal asabiyah in the strongest terms. Whoever fights for or invites people to asabiyah, according to the Prophet (peace be upon him), is “not from me.”<sup>28</sup> Rather than the tribe, Islam itself became the main rallying-point, the major unifying force, the primary basis of communal cohesion. Thus, Muslims were held by the Quran to be

nothing but brothers to one another and were declared by the Prophet (peace be upon him) to be “one hand” against all others.<sup>29</sup> ..... Unlike a tribe, or a nation in the ordinary sense of the term, the Muslim ummah has not been raised to pursue its group interest, or to seek the fulfillment of its economic and political ambitions. It is an ummah which, rather than exist for its own sake, has been raised “for all mankind.”<sup>30</sup> Moreover, they are an ummah with a mission—the mission to uphold the word of God, to be witnesses of truth and justice, to constantly endeavour to promote good and oppose evil.”<sup>31</sup>

Shortly, “Nation-State” is a governmental and administrative apparatus of a bounded national territory. “Sovereignty” is the idea of ultimate political authority. The widespread legitimacy of the idea of sovereign statehood has hindered the development of authoritative institutions above the nation-state. Obvious questions about the external sovereign status of nations are raised. Moreover, it now exists within a world order in which managerial states dominate; indeed, most people live in states whose lives are regulated and disciplined by powerful managerial states, and through these states the norms of the states-system, as well as the organizations of the global capitalist economy. Military, economic, and social forces are into question the state’s territoriality, as well as the modern state’s insistence on a politics of control from the center. Socio-political scientists expect nationalism to eventually cease to be an important political phenomenon. Also unclear is what would follow if state-centric nationalism were to die out. Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a community (ummah).

## REFERENCES

<sup>1</sup> The term pope was used in the Eastern Church from about 250, the bishop of Rome didn't start using the title until Pope Leo the Great (r. 440-461), and it wasn't until 1073 that the bishop of Rome asserted exclusive claim to the title.

<sup>2</sup> See for detail: Hayes, Baldwin, and Cole, *History of Western Civilization*, (London: The Macmillan Co., 1970), vol. I, pp. 53-61, Eugene G. Bewkes, Howard B. Jefferson, Herman A. Brautigam, Eugene T. Adams, and J. Calvin Keene, *The Western Heritage of Faith and Reason*, (London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 349-360, Opello, Walter C. Jr., and Stephen J. Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order*, (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Ltd., 2005), pp. 28-31, Sonn, Tamara, *The State and Islam, The Challenge of Political Legitimacy in the Muslim World*, (Lahore: Pak Book Corporation, 1990), pp. 3-4, Sonn, Tamara, *Between Quran and Crown, the Challenge of Political Legitimacy in the Arab World*, Oxford: Western Press, 1990), pp. 3-4, The name of Tamara Sonn's books although different but their contents and material is totally same.

<sup>3</sup> A convention of the estates of the German Empire convoked by Emperor Charles V and held in the town of Worms (Germany) to hear the case of Martin Luther who had already been excommunicated by the Pope. Asked to retract his writings against the papacy, Luther declared: "Unless I shall be convinced by the testimonies of the Scriptures or by clear reason....I neither can nor will make any retraction, since it is neither safe nor honorable to act against conscience." Referred to the authority of the Church, particularly to the Council of Constance with which he was at variance, Luther insisted, "The Church universal is the number of elect." According to tradition, Luther concluded his self-defence with the words, "Here I stand. I cannot do otherwise. God help me. Amen." Luther's courage won him admirers, but the Diet adopted an edict declaring him an outlaw. Edict of Worms was issued by the famous Diet of Worms, 1521, in condemnation of Luther's position. It was notable for its comprehensiveness in denouncing Luther's views, the severity of its penalties, and for its practical ineffectiveness. It also attempted to subject the press to the rigid ecclesiastical censorship. See *Encyclopedia of Religion*, edited by Vergilius Ferm, p. 830.

<sup>4</sup> In 1530 the German scholar and religious reformer Melanchthon drew up a conciliatory statement of the Lutheran tenets, known as the Augsburg Confession, which was submitted to Emperor Charles V and to the Roman Catholic faction. Although it failed to reconcile the differences between Roman Catholics and Lutherans, it remained the basis of the new Lutheran church and creed. Subsequently, a series of wars with France and the Ottoman Empire prevented Charles V from turning his military forces against the Lutherans, but in 1546 the emperor was finally free of international commitments; and in alliance with the pope and with the aid of Duke Maurice of Saxony, he made war against the Schmalkaldic League, a defensive association of Protestant princes. The Roman Catholic forces were successful at first. Later, however, Duke Maurice went over to the Protestant side, and Charles V was obliged to make peace. The religious civil war ended with the religious Peace of



Augsburg in 1555. Its terms provided that each of the rulers of the German states, which numbered about 300, choose between Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism and enforce the chosen faith upon the ruler's subjects. Lutheranism, by then the religion of about half the population of Germany, thus finally gained official recognition, and the ancient concept of the religious unity of a single Christian community in Western Europe under the supreme authority of the pope was destroyed.

<sup>5</sup> On the importance of the Protestant revolt for the rise of the current global order of sovereign states, see Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

<sup>6</sup> The peasants were defeated in 1525, but the cleavage between Roman Catholics and Lutherans increased. A degree of compromise was reached at the *Diet of Speyer* in 1526, when it was agreed that German princes wishing to practice Lutheranism should be free to do so. At a second Diet of Speyer, convened three years later, the Roman Catholic majority abrogated the agreement. The Lutheran minority protested against this action and became known as Protestants; thus the first Protestants were Lutherans, the term being extended subsequently to include all the Christian sects that developed from the revolt against Rome. The term Protestantism was given to the movement after the second Diet of Speyer (1529), an imperial assembly at which the Roman Catholic majority withdrew the tolerance granted to Lutherans at the first diet three years earlier. A protest was signed by six Lutheran princes and the leaders of 14 free cities of Germany, and Lutherans in general became known as Protestants. The term Protestant has gradually been attached to all Christian churches that are not Roman Catholic or part of the Orthodox or other Eastern Christian traditions. In the late 1990s the world had about 400 million Protestants (including some 64 million Anglicans), constituting about one-fifth of all affiliated Christians.

<sup>7</sup> Marphy, Alexander, B. "The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations," in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 86.

<sup>8</sup> By 1618, however, the religious peace collapsed, resulting in a series of destructive conflicts known collectively as the Thirty Years' War. The long war ended in a draw, finalized by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. By the terms of the treaty, reminiscent of the Peace of Augsburg, each prince could determine the religion of his German state, choosing among Lutheran, Catholic, or Calvinist. More significantly, the sovereignty and independence of each of the 350-odd states of the Holy Roman Empire was now at last formally recognized, making the emperor powerless. Despite a few fiscal and diplomatic prerogatives, the Holy Roman Empire thus continued mainly in name, having lost all claims to universality or effective centralized government. In practice, it was now little more than a title passed on by the Habsburg rulers of one German state—Austria—with its future tied to the fate of the Habsburg dynasty.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>10</sup> Fazlur Rahman, Dr., *Islam and Modernity*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 15.

- <sup>11</sup> Hobbs, Thomas, *Leviathan*, ed., Richard Tuck, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 86.
- <sup>12</sup> Locke, John, ed., T. P. Peardon, *The Second Treatise of Government*, (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), ch. 2, sect. 4-6, pp. 4-6.
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- <sup>14</sup> Toynbee, *The World and the West*, pp. 70-71.
- <sup>15</sup> Toynbee, *A Study of History*, pp. 312-13.
- <sup>16</sup> Anderson, B, *Imagined Communities*, (London: Verso, 1991), p. 13.
- <sup>17</sup> Held, D., "Democracy and the Global System," in Held, D., (ed.), *Political Theory Today*, (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), p. 210.
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- <sup>19</sup> Hutton, Will, "The world financial system," in *Financial Times*, 25 January 1995.
- <sup>20</sup> Opello, C. Jr. Walter, and Stephen, J. Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order*, (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Ltd, 2005), p. 245.
- <sup>21</sup> O'Leary, Brendan, "On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism," in *British Journal of Political Science*, 27:191-222.1997, 221.
- <sup>22</sup> Rourke, T. John and Boyer, A. Mark, *International Politics on the World Stage*, (Boston: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004), p. 104.
- <sup>23</sup> Iqbal, Muhammad, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam*, edited and annotated by M. Saeed Sheikh, (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 6th edition, 2006), p. 169.
- <sup>24</sup> Iqbal, Muhammad, *Bāng-e-Dirā*, (Urdu), (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1994), pp. 173-174.
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- <sup>26</sup> Qutb, Sayyed, *Al-Adalat al-Ijmaiah fi al-Islam*, (Arabic), [Social Justice in Islam], (Cairo: Al-Manar, 1994), p. 119.
- <sup>27</sup> Al-Qaradawi, Dr. Yusuf, *Towards A Sound Awakening, Renovating Religion and Promoting Life*, trans. Dr. Abderrafi Benhallam, (Rabat: ISESCO, 1997), p. 105.
- <sup>28</sup> See Muslim, *Al-Sahih*, chap. "Imarah," no. 57.
- <sup>29</sup> Abu Dā'ūd, *Al-Sunan*, (Arabic), (Riaz: Dar al-Salam, 1999), chap. "Jihad," no. 147.
- <sup>30</sup> Al-Quran 3: 110.
- <sup>31</sup> Amin, Tahir, *Nationalism and Internationalism in Liberalism, Marxism and Islam*, foreworded by Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari, (Islamabad: IIIT, 1991), pp. xiii-xiv.