# Electoral Performance of Religio-Political Parties in Pakistan: An Assessment

#### Abstract

The interconnection and interdependence between religion, politics and the nation-state is the core behind the political legitimization and considers as the basic pillar of a state. The state like Pakistan, which emerged on the map of the world during the decolonization process in the name of religion, it is important to know either religion plays any role in religio-socialization or in the electoral cum political framework. Pakistan is the country rich with political parties, conservatives and liberal. The paper aims to investigate why religio-political parties did not succeed to achieve their goal of Islamization of the state and religio-socialization of the society. It will also seek why these religio-political forces did not succeed to win thepopular votes in the majority eventhen these were contesting the elections regularly. The paper will discuss the causes behind the declining electoral performance of these parties.

**Keywords:** Religio-political, electoral, Religio-socialization

# Religio-political Parties in Pakistan: A Historical Perspective:

A political party has centric role in the modern political system. It plays an important role in the socio-political transformation of the society and articulating the citizens' aspirations. Political parties reflect the public will in the state institutions and are responded in the elections by the masses on the basis of their agenda which manifests the desires and needs of the society.

Political parties became an inevitable instrument for the transformation of the public will into political will in the subcontinent after the British introduced democratic system. The role of political parties is very important in "interests articulation"," aggregation"and channel them in the political system for policies and decisions. Different political parties' channelized the "ideological abstraction", "cultural symbols and historical references" for creating and promoting political awareness among the masses. The parties used to mobilize the public availing the social realities and predefined ideologies through their election manifestos.

Caton illustrates four main objectives of the political parties. First, Political parties used to formulate policies and programs to uplift the socioeconomic conditions of the masses under the ambit of national interest. Secondly, the parties used to space the pubic popular demands in their electoral manifestos to get the maximum electoral support during the elections. Thirdly, political parties are the best leadership breeders. They used to recruit the individuals and trained them to run how to run the government. Fourth, The centrality of the all the political parties is to attract the electorates in maximum to win the election and gain the power <sup>1</sup>.

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Pakistan is the only country where political freedom is boundary less. Everyone has a right to develop political party either based on religious, secular or in any shape. Despite of checkless freedom, religio-political forces failed to Islamize the state and society. At the time of partition, there were only six religious political parties, including, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), JamiatUlema-e-Islam (JUI), Khaksar Thehreek, Tehreek-e-Ahrar, Jamat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith and Shia Political Party<sup>2</sup>. In 1948, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) formed. At the timeof the Soviet invasion at Afghanistan, the religious parties in Pakistan were numbered at thirty. However, the sharp increase recorded during the Zia regime and afterwards. In 2002, the religious parties rose to 239. However, the parties engaged in electoral politics numbered twenty four<sup>3</sup>. Religious parties manifest multiple agendas and almost difficult to categorize them. Rana is of the opinion that most of these group orbit around the major organizations that were active in the country in 1950's, mainly, JI, JUI, JUP, JAH and TNJ<sup>i</sup>. All other religious organistaions doing whatsoever jobs were either affiliated with or breakway factions of these five major organisations. However, the parent organisations used to penetrate on Islamization and affiliated groups or factions works on religio-socialization. The parent parties are the part of the Pakistan's mainstream politics and participate in electoral politics<sup>4</sup>.

Table 1: Classification of Religious Parties in Pakistan<sup>5</sup>

School of Thought	Political	Sectarian	Militant	Educational/ Missionary	Total
Deobandi	4	33	5	3	45
Barailvi	6	22	13	2	43
Ahl-e-Hadith	4	10	3	3	20
Shia	3	16	3	1	23
JI and its factions	3		4	7	17
Others	4	1	76	0	91
Total	24	82	104	26	239

### **Post-Independence Scenario:**

Most of the religio-political parties established before the emergence of Pakistan in united India. The majority among those was the opponents of the creation of Pakistan and strongly opposed the two-nation theory. They were the strongest supporters of "Pan-Islamic Identity" and a "global Muslim Community". However, after the independence, these pro-Islamic political forces focused to frame the constitution of Pakistan over the principles of Islam availing all the available channels inside and outside the constituent assembly. These Islamic forces succeeded to persuade the political forces to adapt the Objective Resolution in March 1949. The Resolution stressed that "Sovereignty would belong to Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated the State of Pakistan through its people." The resolution further stressed the state to formulate the laws to run the state affairs in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam. In 1950,

prominent religious scholars of different schools of thought succeeded to develop consensus over 22 points to be followed to frame the constitution of Pakistan so that the people of Pakistan would live their lives according to the teachings of Islam. However, the framers of the constitutions (1956, 1962 & 1973) never paid their heeds to follow what they laid down. All these constitutions only spaced the Objective Resolution in their preamble<sup>7</sup>. In fact, the religio-political parties never succeeded to secure the reasonable representation in the constituent assemblies through elections and so did not play their active role to implement their agenda.

# Electoral Performance of Religio-Political Parties: First Electoral Phase (1947-58):

In first electoral phase, Pakistan experienced four provincial assemblies' elections. The electoral atmosphere was occupied with such issues as the distribution of provincial seats in the constituent assembly, conflict and the power-tussle between Punjab and Bengal. All the major political parties stressed during the course of elections to defame one another. Charges and counter charges, statements and rejoinder filled the whole atmosphere with acrimony<sup>8</sup>. Although about all the political parties spaced the implementation of Islam in their electoral programs yet receding it to a secondary position and to win the electoral favors of voters. The religious parties did not succeed to electorally perform well during the elections and failed to win the favors of electorates<sup>9</sup>

## Second Electoral Phase (1958-69):

In second electoral phase, Ayub Khan introduced "Basic Democracy" to legitimize and lengthen his rule. Opposition parties, including JI formed an electoral alliance COP to contest the presidential election and nominated Fatima Jinnah against Ayub Khan. Ideological differences and criticism over the nomination of a female candidate from the religious parties did not succeed to attract the masses in favor of its candidate. Popatai disclosed that Islam was not an issue during the electoral campaign. Prominent religious leaders opposed the nomination by Fatima Jinnah as they referred that Islam did not allow any female to become the head of the state. Religio-political parties seemed to be failing to get their nominees elected in even BDs elections. Electorates used to electorally favor the nominees of ruling party and did not pay their heeds to support the nominees of religio-political parties.

# Third Electoral Phase (1970-77):

Pakistan witnessed its first ever direct election to elect the representatives of 300 members' house. Religio-political parties preferred to contest the election as a separate entity and not stepped in to form an electoral alliance. JI conducted its electoral campaign vigorously and spent lavishly. Jamat-i-Islami nominated its candidate in both wings of Pakistanii. It seemed that the party would win a large number of seats in the election. JUIiiii and JUPivplayed their electoral cards on sectarian grounds<sup>11</sup>. The majority of the religio-political parties criticized the socialism program of PPP and declared it against the spirit of Islam. Even then, some extremist religious leaders issued fatwa against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and socialism. JI, during the course of the campaign, targeted the Mujib six point agenda and termed it against the solidarity of Pakistan. Religio-political parties availed all the tactics to

intact their supporters and mobilized them<sup>12</sup>. Ironically, on the polling day, religious parties failed to win the favors of electorates in large numbers. JUI and JUP succeeded to win seven seats each while JI limited to only four in the house of three hundred members. JI and JUP succeeded to attract the voters in limited proportions from urban centers while JUI confined to specific areas of NWFP and Balochistan. Other religious parties failed to show their representation in the National assembly and nowhere be seen. People of united Pakistan in large numbers preferred to vote for the nominees of Awami League (AL) and PPP and showed their discontent towards the religio- political parties alleging that the parties had no constructive agenda.

Table 2: Showing Electoral Performance Comparison Between the moderate

and religio-political parties in Election 1970<sup>13</sup>

Party	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochi	West	East	Total
				stan	Pakis	Pakista	
					tan	n	
Jamaat-i-Islami <sup>*</sup>	1(4.7%)	2(10.3%)	1(7.2%)	0(1.1%)	4	0(6.0%)	4(6.0%)
Jamiat-Ul- Ulema-i-Islam*	0(5.2%)	0(4.3%)	6(25.4%)	1(20.0%)	7	0(0.9%)	7(4.0%)
MarkaziJamiatU lema Pakistan*	4(9.8%)	3(7.4%)	0(0%)	0	7	0	7(4.0%)
Awami League	0(0.07%)	0(0.07%)	0(0.2%)	0(1.0%)	0	160(74.9%)	167(38.3%)
Pakistan Peoples Party	62(41.6%)	18(44.9%)	1(14.2%)	0(2.3%)	81		81(19.5%)
Convention Muslim League	7(5.1%)	0(1.7%)	0	0	7	0(2.8%)	7(3.3%)
Qayyum Muslim League	1(5.4%)	1(10.7%)	7(22.6%)	0(10.9%)	9	0(1.0%)	9(4.5%)
Council Muslim League	2(12.6%)	0(6.8%)	0(4.0%)	0(10.9%)	2	0(1.6%)	2(6.0%)
Pakistan Democratic Party	0(2.2%)	0(0.04%)	0(0.3%)	0(0.3%)	0	1(2.2%)	1(2.9%)
National Awami Party (Wali Group)	0	0(0.3%)	3(18.4%)	3(45.1%)	6	0(1.8%)	6(2.3%)
Independents	5(11.8%)	3(10.7%)	7(6.0%)	0(6.8%)	15	1(3.4%)	16(7.1%)

<sup>\*</sup>Religio-Political Parties

Before the general election 1977, nine opposition parties fell into an electoral alliance in the name of Pakistan national alliance (PNA). The alliance was the platform of different ideological parties, dominated by right wing<sup>14</sup>. JI, JUI and JUP were the components of the alliance. PNA's slogans to implement the Nizam-e-Mustafa got popularity and it succeeded to gather a large number of people in its electoral processions and rallies. The leader of PNA criticized the PPP' policies,

especially socialism and called it un-Islamic. However, on the polling day the alliance failed to win the electoral favors of voters in large proportion. PNA managed to win 38 national assembly seats in the house of 216 members. Oppositionparties rejected the election results, alleging that elections were massively rigged and decided to boycott the provincial assembly election. Massive street agitation resultedthe imposition of martial law. Zia sacked the Bhutto government and declared election 1977 results null and void.

Table 3: Showing Electoral Performance Comparison Between the moderate

and religio-political parties in Election 1977<sup>15</sup>

Punjab Pakistan Peoples Party 61 Pakistan National Alliance** 35 Independent	% 107 5% 8
	5% 8
Independent	
macpendent	
Others	
Total	115
Sindh Pakistan Peoples Party 61.	.6% 32
Pakistan National Alliance** 32	.2% 11
Independent	
Others	
Total	43
NWFP/KPK Pakistan Peoples Party 39.	.6% 8
Pakistan National Alliance** 48	% 17
Independent	
Others	
Total	25
	.02% 7
Pakistan National Alliance**	
Independent	
Others 42.	.4%
Total	7

<sup>\*\*</sup>Electoral alliance religio-political and liberal/moderate parties

Jamaat-e-Islami supported the army chief move and joined the cabinet. Popatai is of the opinion that JI and JUI enjoyed political and financial benefits during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan<sup>16</sup>. Shah believed that Zia used the religio-political parties to keep the agitation against Bhutto alive and legitimate his rule. He is of the opinion that although Zia's constituency was the army, but he tactfully used the slogan of Islamization "both as a tool of legitimacy for the general public as well as to buy the loyalties of the religious spokesmen of the society"<sup>17</sup>.

#### Fourth Electoral Phase (1977-99):

Zia decided to conduct the election 1985 on the non-Party basis and sidelined all the major political forces. Opposition parties, alliance MRD decided to boycott the election. Whereas, JI and Nizam-e-Mustafa group, a faction of JUI, did their electoral participation and contested the election as "independents". Popatai (2014) said that "there was no exact number of winning candidates from religious parties/groups is available, but it was far from impressive<sup>18</sup>." Rizvi & Gillani

summarized the electoral trends settled during elections 1985 as "The absence of nationwide political and socio-economic themes and broad-based political alignments increased the role of parochial identities based on ethnicity, language, tribal identities, local community or "baradari" and Islamic sect. These trends intensified social division and greater fragmentation of the political and social process. This further weakened political parties that were already facing restrictions on their activities. Ethnic and Islamic-sectarian based groups gained strength in Pakistan in the 1980 because of the conscious efforts of the military government to weaken and undermine political parties and alignment that had nationwide standing. Instead, local, ethnic and Islamic sectarian identities and organization entered the political and social space created by the military government's policy of exclusion of nationwide political parties and leaders.<sup>19</sup>."

During the elections 1988, six religio-political parties contested as a separate entity and did not join any electoral alliance. However, it was JI, which decided to become the part of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). It is believed that IJI was developed to marginalize the PPP electoral strength. Gul admitted that "PPP could have got landslide victory in the 1988 elections, if IJI had not been formed." He further admitted that "we wanted the PPP opponents who had affiliations with GHQ to unite on one platform<sup>20</sup>. Surprisingly, religious parties failed to win the massive support of popular votes in elections. JI, as the part of the IJI managed to win only a few seats from NWFP and Punjab. JUI (F) succeeded to secure seven NA seats from Balochistan and NWFP. The party managed to attract only 2% voters in the election who favored their nominees. However, the party emerged as the single largest party in the provincial assembly of Balochistan securing 11 seats in the house of 44 members but failed to capture the CM ship. All other religio-political parties failed to be the part of NA. JUP met its ill fate as it split into groups. In elections 1988, the party reduced to almost non-entity. However, PAI succeeded to win three National Assembly slots, all from Punjab.

Table 4: Showing Electoral Performance Comparison Between the moderate and religio-political parties in Election 1988:<sup>21</sup>

Political			Muslim S	Seats		Reserved	l Seats	Tot
Party								al
	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Total	Non-	Women	
						Muslim		
IJI**	45		8	2	55	Nil	5	60
JUI (F)*			3	4	7	Nil	1	8
PAI*	3					Nil		3
PPP	53	31	9	1	94	10	12	11
								6
MQM		13			13	Nil	1	14
ANP			2			Nil		2
BNA				2		Nil		2
NPP		1				Nil		1
PDP	1					Nil		1

Independents	12	2	11	2	27	Nil	1	28
Vacant						Nil		2

<sup>\*</sup>Religio-political parties

In 1990, Pakistan electoral history witnessed the third consecutive elections in just eight years. JI contested the election as the component of IJI while Tehreek Nifaz-e Fiqa-e-Jafria was the part of PDA. However, JUI (F) and JUP (N) maintained their separate electoral entities. JUP (N) succeeded to enter the National Assembly, securing three NA slots. Comparatively, JUI(F) did not succeed to retain its election 1988's performance particularly in Balochistan. However, the party did well in NWFP and secured four NA seats. However, the overall electoral support which the nominees of JUI (F) attributed rose to 3%. All other religio-political parties failed to win the favors of electorates to be seated in assembly.

Table 5: Showing Electoral Performance Comparison Between the moderate and religio-political parties in Election 1990:<sup>22</sup>

Political Party			Mus	lim Seats		
	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	FATA	Total
PDA**	14	24	5	2	Nil	45
IJI <sup>**</sup>	91	3	8	2	Nil	104
JUI (F)*	Nil	Nil	4	2	Nil	6
ANP	Nil	Nil	6		Nil	6
PNP	Nil	Nil	Nil	2	Nil	2
JUP (N)	3	Nil	Nil		Nil	3
MQM	Nil	15	Nil	Nil	Nil	15
PKMAP	Nil	Nil	Nil	1	Nil	1
JWP	Nil	Nil	Nil	2	Nil	2
Independents	6	4	3	Nil	8	21
Vacant						

<sup>\*</sup>Religio-political parties

Election 1993 was the election of alliances. Except four political parties (Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan Muslim League-Qayyum PML(Q), Hazara Front (HF)&Pakistan National Party (PNP), remaining forty-five entered into different electoral alliances. IJI met with its ill fate quite before the election and PML (N) decided the contest the election without entering into any alliance. The religious parties expended most of their energies trying to form a workable electoral alliance rather than bolstering the candidacy of Nawaz Sharif. JUI(F) and JUP(N) succeeded to develop an electoral alliance in the name of Islami Jamhoori Mahaz (IJM) and agreed to formulate seat adjustment. Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the JI chief, developed Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF) to contest the election 1993. Sami ul Haq negotiated

<sup>\*\*</sup> Electoral alliance religio-political and liberal/moderate parties

<sup>\*\*</sup> Electoral alliance religio-political and liberal/moderate parties

with twenty four religio-political parties and succeeded to bring them close to develop an electoral alliance Muttahida Deeni Mahaz (MDM). During the course of the election, religio-political parties failed to attract the electoral support of electorates in good proportion and their share in the national assembly was not more than a dozen of seats. Surprisingly, all religio-political alliances failed to win a single National Assembly seat from Punjab province. These alliances confined to the NWFP and Balochistan provinces only. These alliances did not succeed to win the popular votes in sizeable proportion.

Table 6: Showing Electoral Performance Comparison Between the moderate

and religio-political parties in Election 1993:<sup>23</sup>

Political	Muslim						
Party	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Federal	FATA	Total
					Capital		
PIF*		1	2				3
MDM*							3
IJM <sup>*</sup>			4				
PPP	47	33	5	1			86
PML-N	52	10	9		1		72
PML-J	6						6
ANP			3				3
JWP							2
BNM-H				1			1
NDA							1
NPP		1					1
PKQP							1
Independent	5	1	1	1		7	15
Vacant							5

<sup>\*</sup> Electoral alliance of religio-political parties

In 1997, Pakistan experienced fifth successive elections in just twelve years as no elected government and assembly succeeded to complete its constitutional life. All these elected assemblies met their ill fate and struck down by the then President(s) with the consent of GHQ. The election found to be the big blow for the religious political parties. JI and JUP boycotted the election, alleging different allegation and pretexts. During the course of electoral campaign, religious parties tried their best to attract the electoral attention of voters in the name of Islam. They pledged that they would implement the Islam if they succeed to win the popular votes. Ironically, religio-political parties did not perform well in the election. JUI (F) was the party which managed to show its presence in the national assembly and limited to only two.

Table 7: Showing Electoral Performance Comparison Between the moderate and religio-political parties in Election 1997:<sup>24</sup>

Political Party		Muslim	Seats				
	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Federal	FATA	Tota
	-				Capital		1
JUI (F)*			2				2
PML-N	109	9	15	3			136
PPP		18					18
MQM (HPG)		12					12
ANP			10				10
JWP				2			2
PPP-SB		1					1
NPP		1					1
Independents	6	5	1	1		8	21

<sup>\*</sup>Religio-political parties

### Fifth Electoral Phase (2002 and onwards):

Before election 2002, scheduled to be held in February, six religio-political parties entered into an electoral alliance, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). JI, JUI (F), JUI (S), Jamiat-e-Ahle-Hadith and TI joined the alliance. The alliance appealed the voters in the name of Islam. The leaders of the alliance condemned the NATO action against Afghanistan after 9/11 and termed the election as a referendum between the pro and anti USA forces. Popatai believed that MMA was developed with the blessing of establishment to contain the electoral strength of liberal political forces<sup>25</sup>. It was the first time in the electoral history of Pakistan that religious parties managed to win significant National Assembly seats. The religio-political parties' alliance succeeded to attract 11% voters to cast their votes in its nominees. MMA performed well in provincial assembly elections and managed to emerge as the single largest party in NWFP (KPK). In Balochistan Assembly, it stood second and secured eighteen slots. All other religio-political forces did not perform well in the elections and could not manage to win a single constituency in the election except PAT.

Table 8: Showing Electoral Performance Comparison Between the moderate and religio-political parties in Election 2002:<sup>26</sup>

Political				Muslim Seats			
Party							
	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Federal Capital	FATA	Total
MMAP**		6	29	6	1		45
PAT*	1						1

PML-QA	72	8	4	2			86
PML-N							14
PPPP	36	27			1		62
MQM		13					14
NA							12
PML-F							4
PPP-S							2
NPP							
MQMP							1
PML-F							5
PML-J							3
BNP				1			1
JWP				1			1
PML-Z	1						1
PTI	1						1
PKMAP				1			1
Independents	14	1		1		12	28

<sup>\*</sup>Religio-political parties

Quite before the election 2008, MMA met its ill fate and disintegrated. Its constituent elements either contested the elections in an individual capacity or joined any electoral alliance. The differences emerged over the re-election of Musharraf as President of Pakistan. The major component of the alliance, JI, wanted to oppose the Musharraf to be re-elected and desired to quit the parliament. Qazi Hussain Ahmad wanted to dissolve the NWFP (KPK) provincial assembly to contain the presidential election. JI also joined APDM and decided to boycott the coming election. On the other hand, JUI(F) did not dissolve the provincial assembly and announced to contest the coming general election<sup>27</sup>. Internal differences forced the JUI (S) to quit the alliance in 2005. The JUP (N) lost its electoral and political significance after the death of Shah Ahmad Noorani in 2003. Azhar opined that unpredictable political

<sup>\*\*</sup> Electoral alliance religio-political parties

situation griped the whole electoral scenario. Both the major components of the alliance (JI and JUIF) failed to come close and contest the elections over MMA platform. Both the parties filed their candidates. Later on, JI along with PTI and PMAP boycotted the election and withdrew their nominees<sup>28</sup>. Mehdi observed that MMA lost its popularity and fell from grace. He stated "the bubble of MMA burst in 2008. It lost more than three quarters of its voters and 40 to 45 seats it had won in 2002; the religious party alliance's fall from grace was as phenomenal as its meteoric rise<sup>29</sup>".

Table 8: Showing Electoral Performance Comparison Between the moderate and religio-political parties in Election 2008<sup>30</sup>

Political			Musli	im Seats			Reserved	
Party							Seats	
	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochi	Federal	FATA	Wom	Mino
				stan	Capital		en	rities
JUI (F)			4	2			1	
/MMA*								
PPPP	50	32	10	5			23	4
PML-N	65		4		2		17	3
PML	28	5	5	4			10	2
ANP			10				3	
MQM		19					5	1
PML-F	1	3					1	
PPP-S			1					
NPP		1						
BNP				1				
Indepen dent	3	1	1	2		10		

<sup>\*</sup>Religio-political parties

In election 2013, religio-political parties severely failed to get public recognition. These parties hardly managed to win the favor of only five percent electoral. In a real sense the election was the triangular contest between liberal forces, PMLN, PTI and PPP. JUI(F) succeeded to some extent to retain its electoral popularity in its strongholds, KPK and some parts of Balochistan. The party managed to bag 2.09 percent votes and won eight general National Assembly seats. However, JI marked a poor show in election 2013. The Jamat which was contesting the election outside an electoral alliance for the first time since 1988, managed to bag only 1.1 percent votes and succeeded to win only 3 NA seats. The electoral performance of JI in provincial assembly elections was not well and their representation in these elected houses was quite marginalized<sup>31</sup>. The electoral trends show that voters in majority rejected the religio-political parties.

Table 9: Showing Electoral Performance Comparison Between the moderate and religio-political parties in Election 2013<sup>32</sup>

Political Party	Muslim	Seats					Reserved Seats		
	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Federal Capital	FATA	Women	Minoritie s	
JUI (F) *			4	4		1	3	1	
$\mathrm{JI}^*$			3				1		
PPPP	3	34	0	0	0	0	8	1	
PML-N	119	1	5	1	1	1	35	6	
PML	2								
PTI	7	1	17	0	1	1	6	1	
ANP			2						
MQM		19					4	1	
PML-F		4					1		
PMAP				3			1		
NPP		1							
BNP				1					
QWP-S			1						
PMLZ	1								
NP				1					
AMLP	1								
AJIP			1						
APML			1						
Independ ent	2					5			

<sup>\*</sup>Religio-political parties

#### **Conclusion:**

Despite the large number of religio-political parties in Pakistan, the electoral support in this regard they attributed in elections is quite low. The electoral phases manifest that JUI (F), the only religious political force managed to retain its identity in the parliament to some extent. However, the party failed to lengthen its electoral influence to the whole country. It managed to elect its nominees from the certain areas of NWFP/KPK and Balochistan. Punjab and Sindh provinces never be conducive for the electoral and political exposure of the party. JI, once the party claimed to be the national political party and played its political role as the components of different political and electoral alliances in different eras. The party known to be one of the most organized ideological political force in Pakistan. Nevertheless, its own policies and political strategies damaged its political and electoral exposure, resulted its failure. The party had to make some compromises that were against its ideology, including supporting Fatima Jinnah as presidential candidate and siding and working with Zia after sacking Bhutto. Later on, the party also welcomed the Musharraf's move to wrap the elected government of Nawaz Sharif. These moves developed an unfriendly relationship between the JI and other political forces. Moreover, the party's decision to boycott the general elections 1997 and 2008 put it in a stray.

Although the religious parties are facing a significant decline in their electoral support, yet they are well organized based on a brigade of committed workers. These have potential to influence the government beyond their numerical strength in the parliament.

There are many reasons behind the poor electoral performance of religio-political forces in Pakistan. These parties are not equipped with electable within their ranks. Electoral politics of Pakistan are known to be personality centric. Voters used to vote the candidate whom they believe to be beneficial for them if they face any problem from local police or civil administration. Such influential in religio-political parties are too rare to contest election. Moreover, the religious parties manifest particular sect/Maslak and used to contest election against one another. The candidates used to beat the drum of sect/Maslak during the campaign and resultantly fail to get the electoral support of voters of other sects. Furthermore, majority of electorates in Pakistan is of the opinion that leaders of the religio-political parties are not competent to run the affairs of the state due to their peculiar religious education and grooming. Moreover, these parties have failed to produce socio-economic agenda synchronized with the modern world.

To achieve their objectives, religio-political parties should come out from the boundaries of sects and develop consensus among them selves to contest the election over a single platform. The parties should develop the socio-economic agenda synchronized with the demands of modern world. Moreover, the parties should provide the space of modernization, under the ambit of Islam and let loose their conservative fences. The religio-political forces should move away from the traditional piecemeal electoral cum political approach to a more holistic approach orbit around what the masses need.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>i</sup> In 1970, all Pakistan Shia political parties merged into Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqa-e-Jafaria.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>II</sup> Jamat-i-Islami nominated 151 candidates in east and west Pakistan.

iiiJamiatUlema-i-islam led by Mufti Mehmood representing the DeobandiMaslak

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>iv</sup>J amiatUlema-I Pakistan led by PirOmaruddinSialvi representing the BaralveMaslak <sup>v</sup>Jammat-e-Ahle\_sunnat, Jamiat-e-Ahle-Hadees Pakistan, JUI (Darkhasti), JUI(F), Tehreek-e-ingilab-e-islam, Tehrk-e-Nafaz-e-Figa-e-Jafaria