# A Rhetorical Analysis of Figures of Speech of simile, analogy and metaphor in *Asrār al-Balāghah*, by *ᶜAbd al-Qāhir Al-Jurjānī*

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In any use of language parallels exist between what is uttered or written in its literal sense and what is meant figuratively. Figurative language comes in several categories; it includes diversity of images and literary devices such as metaphors, similes, analogy, irony, metonymies, synecdoche, personification, allegory and so on. This current study focuses upon identification and analysis of similie (*tashbīh*), analogy (*tamthīl*) and *metaphor* (*Isti ārah*) and its interpretation in Arabic literature through theoretical framework devised by the 11th/5th century grammarian *Abd al-Qāhir Al-Jurjānī* in his foundational work *Asrār al-Balāghah* (The Mysteries of Eloquence). This article explores the intellectual contribution of *Abd al-Qāhir Al-Jurjānī* in *Asrār al-Balāghah* and his codification of meaning of three terms of *tashbīh*, *tamthīl*, and *isti ārah* and its place in Arabic literature according to *Al-Jurjānī*.

**Key Words:** Figure of speech, *Al-Jurjānī*, isti ārah, tashbīh, tamthīl, Asrār al-Balāghah

## Introduction:

Few books in the history of Arabic grammar and semantic studies have earned such lasting recognition and fame as *Dalaᶜil al-Iᶜjāz (fī ᶜilm al-mᶜānī)* [illustrations of The Inimitability of the Qur'an (in the science of meaning)] by *ᶜAbd al-Qāhir Al-Jurjānī*, an eminent early Muslim scholar. *Al-Jurjānī* (400-471AH/1010-1078AD) was born, brought up, and educated in *Al-Jurjānī*, which is between *Tabaristān* and *Khurāsān*. His works include books on rhetoric, literary criticism, and Arabic grammar. But it was for *Dalaᶜil al-Iᶜjāz* and his other major work, *Asrār al-Balāghah* [The Secrets of Rhetoric] that *Al-Jurjānī* was named the founder of *ᶜilm al-mᶜānī* (the science of semantics) and *balāgha* (rhetoric) among the Arabs.1 It is to the credit of *Al-Jurjānī* that *ᶜilm al-mᶜānī* has enjoyed a permanent place as a branch of Arabic rhetoric.2 And with these valuable books, the Science of Rhetoric reached its zenith.3

*Al-Jurjānī* was not a literary critic in the modern sense; he is more appropriately described as a theologian, philosopher, and a master of Arabic grammar. However, in *Asrār al-Balāghah (The Mysteries of Eloquence) Al-Jurjānī* provides a framework for the identification, classification, and analysis of *tashbīh* and *istiᶜārah*

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which remains the foundational standard for the examination of comparative imagery in modern Arabic literary criticism. *Al-Jurjānī*'s work emerges during the fifth century of Islam. The centuries that preceded him witnessed dramatic changes in the Arabic language, including the refinement of the orthography inspired by the necessity to codify the message of the *Qur'ān*. In his own era, *Al-Jurjānī*'s writing represents a notable change in the history of Arabic literary theory because of his advocacy for the relevance of the written word in opposition to a tradition with deep pre-Islamic roots celebrating oral aspects of literary performance.

Definition of figures of speech ( *ᶜilm ul bayān)*

The best text is the one which can be heard with sustained interest and attention. Undoubtedly the most eloquent and expressive text is the one which combines brevity in diction with depth of meanings. These properties are such that all the excellence of the text is concentrated on the use of correct words and figures of speech. The Arabic language possesses the quality of compressing a range of meanings through the use of figurative language: similes (*tashbīh*), analogy (*tamthīl*) and metaphors *(istiᶜārah)*, oblique references and illustrations and explanations which greatly enhance the rhetorical quality of the texts. In the *Qur'an* this rhetorical quality is referred to as *ᶜilm ul bayān'*.

He has taught him speech (and intelligence).4

Some have defined "*Bayān*" as meaning one's mother tongue which is acquired from the environment and which is used for self-expression.5For explanatory purposes, the most straightforward rendering of the term *bayān* may be 'clearness' or 'distinctness.' The word is a verbal noun from the Form I verb *bāna* [to become clear, distinct, differentiated], whose root is B-Y-N. Edward Lane notes in his dictionary of classical Arabic that the term *bayān* conventionally refers to the "means by which one makes a thing [distinct,] apparent, manifest, evident, clear, plain, or perspicuous," which can either be "a thing indicating, or giving evidence of, a circumstance, or state, that is a result, or an effect, of a quality or an attribute," or the "language that discovers and shows the meaning that is intended."6 the word *bayān* is also used as part of a semantic field of words related to rhetorical excellence, such as eloquent *faṣāḥa* (*faṣāḥa*) and excellent rhetoric (*balāgha*)7.The literal meaning of "*bayān*" is to clarify the meaning, to bring to

light, to elaborate. *Al-Jāḥiẓ* (d. 255/ 868) says in his seminal work, "*Al Bayān al Tibiyīn*", that the property of rhetoric is the "pillar of knowledge", and goes on to explain that the word means to explain something without any ambiguity and clarifying by giving a lot of related meanings and explanation.8

The figurative language comes in several categories; it includes diversity of images and literary devices such as metaphors, similes, analogy, irony, metonymies, synecdoche, personification, and allegory. The most figures of speech that are frequent and useful are similes (*tashbīh*),l analogy (*tamthīl*) and metaphors *(isticārah)*. In *Asrār al-Balāghah ᶜAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī* codifies the meaning of three terms central to the process of creating comparative poetic imagery: *tashbīh, tamthīl,* and *isticārah* as they apply to Arabic literary theory. In *Al-Jurjānī's* framework, the terms *tashbīh* and *tamthīl* both refer to simile; however *tamthīl* is a distinct and more complex form of *tashbīh* and *isticārah* refers to metaphor. *Al-Jurjānī* uses the term *tamthīl or* complex simile/analogy to describe expressions which require as in depth analysis to determine meaning as compared to instances of *tashbīh*. As a result the term *tamthīl* is, therefore, more closely related to the English use of the term "extended metaphor"9 Finally, *Al-Jurjānī* uses the term *isticārah* to describe images where the expression includes an explicit reference to only one of the two (or more) units of comparison.

## Simile *(Tashbīh)*

Simile is another figure of speech described by the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary as "the use of an expression comparing one thing with another, always including the words as or like"10

*Al Askārī* describes about *tashbīh* that,

Simile is the state in which one of the two elements described substitute for the other through the use of simile particles'11

1."People are like the teeth of a comb in equality"- ( الناس كـأسنان المشط في الاستواء).

2."Tall as a mountain"- (طويل كـالجبل).

ᶜAli *Al-Jārim* defines the *tashbīh* as follows:

ʺSimile is the statement that one or more things share with another thing one or more attributes through a particle like /leaf/ or any similar particle be it verbal or deducible'. From the above

definition it can be seen that simile is of two types. The first is known as 'complete simile' and the second is known as 'elliptical simile'. The former is the case when the topic and the vehicle are mentioned. The latter is when only the topic is mentioned.12 In simile the terms involved refer to their conventionally known referents. A simile can he made up of as many as three constituents: vehicle, topic, and rotund (or common trait). Sometimes the simile particle is not mentioned but can be deduced. Consider the following example *:*

The horse (topic) is like lightning (vehicle) in speed (ground) (deducible)

"You (topic) arc like a star (vehicle) in highness" (deducible)

*Al-Jurjānī* account of simile is as follows:

"Know that of any two things if one of them is likened to another this could be done in two forms: the first is when the matter in question is clear and does not need interpretation and the other is that likening which is attained by means of interpretation". Al-Jurjānī means by this definition that simile is divided into two types; the first type, which has the above three constituents mentioned (available), whereas the second type is a deduced simile without the four constituents necessarily existing in the sentence. 13

*Al-Jurjānī* refers to comparisons involving both sensual and intellectual attributes. For instance, *Al-Jurjānī* cites the effort to describe a man's fluent use of language in the following expressions: "his words are smooth like water" or "gentle like the breeze" or "sweet like honey"14.In each of these expressions, the *tashbīh* is apparent in the comparison between an intellectual concept, eloquent speech, and sensual images like flowing water, a gentle breeze, and sweet honey. Although a slightly deeper cognitive analysis is necessary to discern meaning in this example, true to the form of a successful *tashbīh* the connection between the images is still relatively easy to understand without reflecting on the particular contextual moment in which the expression appears.

***According to Al-Jurjānī Difference between* simile *(tashbīh) and* metaphor *istiᶜārah***

One example *al-Jurjānī* returns to regularly, to demonstrate how the question of form applies to the difference between *tashbīh* and *istiᶜārah* is a comparison between *Zayd* and the lion. Depending

on how the expression explicitly appears, in its context, word choice and word order, it is classified as either an instance of *istiᶜārah or tashbīh*.  For example, in the sentence "I saw a lion" *(raʾaytū asadan)* which constitutes an instance of *istiᶜārah,* the context indicates a reference to a man.  In contrast, the sentence *"Zayd is* like the lion*" (Zayd ka-l-ᶜasad)* constitutes an instance of *tashbīh* because of the presence of both the referent and the borrowed term. Whether an *istiᶜārah or tashbīh,* the example is relatively straightforward in *al-Jurjānī's* analysis, and the comparison is clear because "the characteristic shared between the two *[Zayd* and the lion] is courage, and in reality it exists [both in lions and] in humans"15 The fundamental difference between these two examples is the presence of the borrowed term, "lion," and the referent, *"Zayd,"* in the *tashbīh* and the absence of the referent in the *istiᶜārah.*  In order to form an instance of *istiᶜārah,* only the borrowed term may explicitly appear in the expression. This is a simple distinction but it is operative in several of *al-*Jurjānī's elucidations on the nature of the potential for the presence of both simple and complex subtleties that differentiate these two comparative forms of expression.

In this regard, *Al Jurjānī* writes that *"tashbīh* is like the root for *istiᶜārah, istiᶜārah* being like a branch of *tashbīh"*16. While it is only the first step towards a comprehensive understanding of *AlJurjānī's* methodology for the study of figurative language in Arabic, the essential principles of *tashbīh* serve as the foundation for the creation of comparative imagery evident in instances of *tamthīl* and *istiᶜārah.*

### Analogy (Tamthīl)

*Tamthīl* is more appropriately classified as a branch of *tashbīh.* The primary difference in these two principle forms of comparison is that in *tamthīl,* understanding the meaning of the image requires a deeper reflection upon specific factors of composition beyond the expression itself.  These factors include word choice and order apparent in the expression in addition to the broader literary and cultural contexts in which the image appears.  This principle is, in part, related to the pretext that meaning in *tamthīl* is only comprehensible through a focused reflection on the context of "a sentence of discourse, or [perhaps] two or more sentences") and is not immediately apparent in the explicit expression alone.17

*Tamthīl* presents a similarity or comparison in the form of a whole incident. Therefore, it is a complete comparison between two things, qualities or two persons18.The following verse of Arabic is a wonderful example of analogy:

*'Wamā almarʾu illā kalhilālīwazūʾahu*
*Yūwāffi tamām al shahrī summa yaghību*

Here, the poet very dexterously compares all traits and characteristics of man with the light of the moon and its increasing and decreasing in size at different times in the above couplet.

*Amīn Aḥsan Iṣlāḥī* (d. 1997) describes that though an analogy is somewhat similar to a simile but there is a great difference between the two. In a simple simile, the real attention is on referent ( المشبه/*mushabah*: the thing that is compared to something else) and borrowed term *( المشبه به/mushaba bihī:* the thing to which that thing is compared) and their components are separated and compared with each other to find out how much similarity and compatibility is present in them according to which the beauty or otherwise of that simile is determined. On the other hand, in analogy, the components are not very important. If a situation is completely comparable to the other, and analogy is completely presenting its whole picture to the mind's eye, it is a complete analogy even if it does not meet all the criteria that rhetoricians suggest for a simile to be complete.19

*Al-Jurjānī* suggests that in *tamthīl,* the compared image is appreciated by the recipient if the entities which constitute a synthesis within the image were transferred from their original images to another image, they were covered in grandeur acquired excellence, and their value was raised; […] The image's strength increased in awakening the souls, it invited hearts [closer] to it, the remoteness [of the original images] aroused ardent love in the mind, and its natural qualities compelled you to give it  love and affection.20

In order to elucidate the necessity to reference both "units" being compared in *tamthīl, Al Jurjānī* scrutinizes the verse by the pre-Islamic poet *al-Nābighah al-Dhubyānī (c. 535-604), who said:* "you are like the night, which is aware of me, yet I imagine that I am at a great distance from you".*21*

*Al-Jurjānī's* analysis emphasizes the necessity to recognize the broader context in which this verse appears: the presence of both

the borrowed term, "night," in addition to the intended reference, "you" meaning the "king," are required because without both terms explicitly apparent, the expression would be meaningless.  With regards to this citation, *Al Jurjānī* writes that in *tamthīl* there is no way to know what is intended from the comparison except after referring to [several] sentences which are joined in *tamthīl,[…]*Regarding his words, 'you are like  the night, which overtakes me.'  If you tried to treat the night as the lion is treated in saying, 'I saw a lion,' [by that] I mean you omit mentioning the one praised from the expression, […] you will not find a way which would bring you to him [i.e. bring your thoughts to the one praised].22

***Difference between* analogy *(tamthīl) and* simile *(tashbīh)***

*Al-Jurjānī* concludes that, "if it has been established that an *istiᶜārah* is not *tashbīh* in its true sense, likewise neither would *tamthīl* occur in a true sense, because *tamthīl* is a special [kind of] *tashbīh,* every *tamthīl* being a *tashbīh,* without every *tashbīh* being a *tamthīl"23*The key point of emphasis remains in this distinction. Namely, that an *istiᶜārah* based on *tashbīh* is relatively easy to discern in contrast to an *istiᶜārah* based on *tamthīl* which requires a deeper reflection and even reference to a broader contextual moment in order to determine meaning.

***Difference between* analogy *(tamthīl) and* metaphor *(istiᶜārah)***

The differentiation between *tamthīl* and *istiᶜārah* in the two examples cited here distinguishes that in *tamthīl* the recipient's ability to comprehend the meaning of the expression relies on contextual information, and the expression itself requires the explicit presence of both the borrowed term and the intended referent.  *Al-Jurjānī* continues by saying if "you omit the characteristic and it is limited to referring to the night only and you say, 'I escaped yet the night overshadowed me,' this is unbelievable, because the meaning is not [found] in the night as a key to the clever expression"24.

Finally, it should be noted here, that *tamthīl* (analogy) was studied in Arabic rhetoric *(Bal āghah)* in terms of its relation to *tashbiih* (simile) on the one hand, and in terms of its relation to *istiᶜārah* (metaphor) on the other. This resulted in two types of anology: *tamthīl al- tashbīh* the complex simile, and *tamthīl al- istiᶜārah,* analogy proper. Complex simile can be defined as a kind of simile

teased from the complex of many things where the terms retain their original meaning as laid down in the language. Like simile, complex simile is always signaled by the simile particle.

### Metaphor (Isti'ārah)

*Al-Jāḥiẓ* maintains that: "Metaphor is the naming of a thing with the term for another thing if this thing stands in its place"25.

*Al-Sūkkākī* perceives of metaphor as "It [metaphor] is when you mention one element of the similarity and you intend the other one, claiming that the likened enters into the species of the likened to, and supporting this by attributing to the likened what actually pertains to the likened to. As when you say, "In the garden there is a 'lion'" when you intend to say the brave man is in the garden, claiming that he is of the species of lion's. So you assign to the brave man what actually pertains to the likened to, which is the name of its species and you block the way of a simile by singling out only the likened with".26

*Al-Jurjānī* says, that "All rhetoricians have agreed that implicitness is more eloquent than explicitness, that allusion is more effective than directness, and that metaphor has an advantage and merit, and that figurative language is always more rhetorical than literal language". He also explains that "It should be known that metaphor in the utterance is possible when the expression is originally rooted in the conventional use of the language to mean a particular thing and that all contextual evidence confirms that it was used to mean that particular thing when it was first used. Then this term is used by a poet or anyone else with a different meaning in such a way that the meaning has been temporarily transferred to that context so that it is deemed a borrowed item"27

### Nature of *Metaphor (isti'ārah)*

At the beginning of *Asrār al-Balāghah*, *Al-Jurjānī* describes the nature of *isti'ārah* as

"a transference of a name in a way that is not meant literally and becomes as something borrowed"28. In this definition *Al-Jurjānī* subscribes to the view of *isti'ārah* as a process of transference of a name from its original meaning to a new meaning for which it was not originally invented. In other words *isti'ārah* is a process of borrowing of a name, transferring its meaning and then applying it to a new referent. This view was common in Arabic rhetorical scholarship before *Al-Jurjānī*.29 He seems to be content with the

definition and it appears that the traditional view was quite satisfactory for him as far as his own purposes were concerned at that particular stage of writing. As we go along in his *Asrār al-Balāghah* and also *Dalaʾil al-Iʿjaz fī ʿilm-i maʿanī* 30, however, we find out that he was presenting this traditional view of *istiᶜārah* not in order to accept it but to argue it through and reject its theoretical basis. *Al-Jurjānī* later on rejects this view of *istiᶜārah* and proposes a new treatment of the trope based on psychological grounds related to the sender's intentions and the receiver's imagination.

*Al-Jurjānī* in this connection argues that *istiᶜārah* evokes in the imagination that the referent is a man and a 'lion' at one and the same time, both in image and in character'. In this way *Al-Jurjānī* rejects the conventional view of the borrowing of names and proposes that the borrowing is actually of meanings. Besides, he also rejects the view of meaning transference because it contradicts his fusion theory. If there is meaning transference then the name 'lion' becomes a name without a referent if we take it that its meaning is its referent.

*Al-Jurjānī* case of Zayd and the lion in the expression, "I saw a lion," (*(raʾaytū asadan)*) where the borrowed term "lion"*(al-mushabbah bihī* المشبه به *)* appears in reference to a courageous man Zayd *(al-mushabbah* المشبه*)*, is a clear example of this category and should not require further exploration here. The basic idea of the fusion theory in *Al-Jurjānī* thought is very important for a theory of metaphor. This is because the logic behind the process of fusion is that the transference is not a process of transference of names but a process of transference of meanings. Once we hold this view then we are bound to admit that there is a process of fusion of the meanings of both terms, the borrowed term (*mushabbah bihi*) and the referent (*mushabbah*) or what are known in western terms as "tenor" and "vehicle" in Richard's31 terminology or "topic" and "vehicle" in Goatly's32 terminology. As such, *istiᶜārah* according to *Al-Jurjānī* is nothing but the relation of similarity that we establish between certain characteristics and features of both terms and the fact that we make these characteristics more important or more cognitively dominant. A lion, for example, has several characteristics, among which is the characteristic of bravery. However, beside this feature a lion has the characteristic of being

ugly in complexion and perhaps cunning. If metaphor is not a process of interaction and selection of relevant attributes, then why do these other attributes of the lion not come to mind? The fact is that they do not come to mind because *isti^cārah* is a purposeful cognitive process and we tend to select what is more relevant to the context of the situation.

*Al-Jurjānī*'s contribution to Arabic literary theory represents of another tradition evolving from the dutiful religious obligation to better understand the *Qur'ān* by attempting to identify and appreciate the nuanced qualities of its composition. It is both "safer" and necessary in this context to regard examples of isti^cārah to be truthful specifically because they are prominently featured in the *Qur'ān*. Lakoff and Johnson explicitly reject the existence of an objective, absolute truth33 in favor of truth based on "understanding" the context of the individual and the collective experience. Lakoff and Johnson also diminish the relevance of truth in metaphor: "We should stress again that issues of truth are among the least relevant and interesting issues that arise in the study of metaphor"34. This is a position rejected by the theological sensibilities evident in *Al-Jurjānī* theory of metaphor. By contrast, *Al-Jurjānī* stresses the relevance of truth in metaphoric language because of the objectivist nature of his religious beliefs which renders the existence of such truth to be a fundamental distinguishing characteristic of his theory of metaphor.

**Types of *isti^cārah* according to *Al-Jurjānī***

*Abū Dīb* has said that, *Al-Jurjānī* proposes a three- level classification according to the three criteria he established for the discussion of the nature of *isti^cārah*. The first level of classification is that which relates to the feature of *isti^cārah* has being an interaction of meanings upon which aselection of one dominant trait is based.35 This according to *Abū Dīb* is an interesting aspect of *Al-Jurjānī* 's theory of *isti^cārah* and at the same time is the basis of the first- level classification of the trope into:

1. *isti^cārah mufīdah,* (the significant type metaphor)
2. *isti^cārah ghair mufīdah* (the non significant type metaphor)36

The first is the type of *isti^cārah*, which could be said to be purposeful or un purposeful on the grounds that the selection of the particular meaning feature intentional or unintentional. An example of an un purposeful *isti^cārah* is the movement between

subtle changes of meanings within the same domain. For example, the use of the word *al-jahfala*, which is the word for the camel's lips to refer to the lips of a human being which are called *shifah*, is according to *Al-Jurjānī* a transference of a limited scope and does not necessarily enrich the expressiveness of the linguistic form or add anything which would not have been conveyed by the original name or referent themselves.37

The second type of *istiᶜārah* according to this classification is the purposeful *istiᶜārah*. This takes place between two different domains and this double-unit interaction is what makes it purposeful because it opens paths for the imagination to work out the similarities between objects and it highlights the mental processes of selection of these similarities. The process of selection reveals the intentions and purposes underlying the choice of one particular semantic sense rather than another. *Al-Jurjānī* argues that this is the unmarked form of *istiᶜārah* which is not confined to Arabic. As for significant *istiᶜārah* is further classified in to three divisions which are explained below.

1**. perceptible objects for intellectual meanings**
     e.g. light borrowed for argument

The comparison is manifest between what is known or sensually perceptible and an intellectual concept.  The case cited above comparing the sensual nature of light, in its ability to illuminate darkness, with the *Qur'ān* in reference to the text as evidence of revealed truth is an example of this type of comparison.  In one case, the term "light" *(nūr)* appears to refer to the notion that the *Qur'ān* (*al-bayān*) illuminates the recipient with sacred knowledge.  Or with the other term, "proof" *(ḥujja),* a believer's possession of proof or evidence of revealed truth refers to the notion that the darkness of ignorance has been illuminated by revelation.  Finally, the term "path" *(ṣirāṭ)* is borrowed for the *Qur'ān* in reference to the text's role as the path to righteousness. Thus, the *Qur'ān* in this citation can be read as compared to light *(nūr)*, eloquence *(bayān),* evidence of revealed truth *(ḥujja),* and the path of righteousness *(al-ṣirāṭ almustaqīm).*

2**. Concrete for concrete**

The comparison is drawn between two sensually perceptible entities where the similarity apparent between the two is intellectual in nature.  For an example of this type of comparison,

*al-Jurjānī* cites a saying of the Prophet Muhammad in his advice to, "beware of the green on dung".38 About this expression, *al-Jurjānī* writes: the comparison derived from plants [referring to] a woman is apparent, both of them being objects, although what is not meant is to compare is the color of the plant and its greenness, nor its taste or smell, or its shape or appearance […] and nothing of this sort, rather the intention is an intellectual comparison between the beautiful woman born of an evil origin and the plant growing on dung, being beautiful in its exterior appearance as perceived by the eye with a corrupted core and a good offspring with an evil origin.39

In this comparison, a green plant growing in dung is beautiful as it represents vibrant life, but it is contaminated, reviled, like a beautiful woman of base origin. If one knows enough to avoid the plant grown in contaminated soil, one knows enough to avoid the crafty woman from the wrong side of the tracks. Thus, the comparison drawn between these two sensually perceptible entities, a woman and a green plant, is not sensual, but intellectual.

3. **Intellectual for intellectual** e.g. ignorance is death.
  Knowledge is life.

The comparison is drawn between two intellectual forms. As an example of this type of comparison, *Al-Jurjānī* uses the concept that an ignorant person experiences life in a state similar to death. Additionally, he explains that when sleeping the individual is similarly experiencing a state akin to death. Thus, the comparison is between two concepts perceptible only to the intellect. *Al-Jurjānī* suggests:

Your description of the ignorant man as being dead, and your deeming ignorance as if it were death [conveys] the meaning that the benefit and purpose of life is having knowledge and consciousness and that when the living being lacks these two characteristics it is as if he has excluded himself from this principle of the living. And in this way, sleep is represented as death when one sleeping does not feel what is in his presence, just as the deceased does not feel.40

In these examples, "death" is borrowed to mean "ignorance," "sleep," or a "difficult task," through the combination of similar intellectually comprehensible attributes shared within the meaning of each term. In one example, death as ignorance is rendered as a

state of living in denial of knowledge, the purpose of life.  In the other examples, death is akin to the inability to feel or sense one's surroundings when sleeping, and the difficult task rivals death in terms of the living mind's hatred for it.

**Another division proposed by *Al-Jurjānī*   for *isticārah* is between**

1. *isticārah lafẓīyyah*
2. *isticārah macnawīyyah*.

The former means that there is a linguistic transference between names without an aesthetic value added to the expression like the substitution of human's lip (*shifah)* for horse's lip(*jaḥfal)* when we use the former to describe a horse's lips. This kind of transference is not conveying any aesthetic value and hence is regarded as not significant. Therefore, later on *Al-Jurjānī* rejects *isticārah lafẓīyyah* as a form of *isticārah* proper because it involves nothing but a linguistic transfer which is on most occasions not purposively intended, and *isticārah  macnawīyyah* is regarded as *isticārah* proper because the process involves a cognitive process of transference which adds to the aesthetic value of the text in which the figure is used.

Metaphor provides the space for a "vision of the truth," opening new avenues for exploring

reality.  As it is evident in the current study that, "truth" is a fundamental aspect of  *Al-Jurjānī's* analysis of simile, analogy and metaphor.  *Adūnīs* goes on to suggest that the Arabic language, "in its metaphoric or poetic structure, is a language which arouses a desire to search, to know the unknown and to attain perfection. The purpose of simile and metaphor speaks to the human capacity to seek truth in the seemingly incomprehensible.  There are many possible meanings and paths to the evaluation of figurative language as *Adūnīs* has eloquently stated: Metaphor does not allow a final and definitive answer, because it is in itself a battleground of semantic contradictions.  It remains a begetter of questions, an agent of disruption, in contrast to the type of knowledge which aspires to certainty.  All this indicates that metaphor is linked to a vision of the truth.  It is not only an attitude to the truth, but also a way of thinking about it, exploring it and expressing it.41

In the field of literary criticism in Arabic, *Asrār al Balāghah* endures as the standard for any approach to evaluating the

linguistic phenomena related to the creation and interpretation of comparative imagery.  In his text, An Introduction to Arabic Poetics, the renowned contemporary Syrian poet *Adūnīs* describes *al-Jurjānī's* criticism as having been distinct in its own era because it "refutes almost completely the poetic criteria of pre-Islamic morality and establishes other criteria for a poetics of writing, taking inspiration from the horizons opened up for the written word by the text of the *Qur'ān*"42.

Conclusion

*Al Jurjānī's* work emerges during the fifth century of Islam.  The centuries that preceded him witnessed dramatic changes in the Arabic language, including the refinement of the orthography inspired by the necessity to codify the message of the *Qur'ān*.  In his own era, *Al-Jurjānī's* writing represents a notable change in the history of Arabic literary theory because of his advocacy for the relevance of the written word in opposition to a tradition with deep pre-Islamic roots celebrating oral aspects of literary performance. Furthermore, it is hoped that *Al-Jurjānī's* work has been shown to be of value for modern studies of poetic imagery in general and metaphor in Particular. Undoubtedly, his achievement in this field can be of benefit if put in the context of modern criticism, not only in Arabic literature, but also in European languages. This is an aspect of *Al-Jurjānī's* work which is hoped can be given further analysis.

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