

Islamic faith-based Organizations and the state during the first three decades of Pakistan: An appraisal of theory and practice

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ABSTRACT:

One central issue of the current civic-engagement debate is the role of religion in the growth and working of civil society. The fact that the modern concept of civil society emerged in the secular environment of enlightenment era in Europe has put question marks on the role of religious establishments and organizations as a part of civil society. However, history bears the evidence that religion has provided one main motive in the humanitarian, relief and social welfare initiatives around the world. In this context, this paper seeks to explore the role of Islamic faith-based organizations (FBOs) in the history of Pakistan from 1947 to 1977 with particular reference to their relations as a section of civil society with the state of Pakistan. The paper tends first to explore the theoretical underpinnings of the religion, state and civil society interaction and second to study this relationship in the history of Pakistan during the specified time period.

Key words: Religion, Islamic, Faith-based organizations, social welfare, relief, advocacy, civil society, Pakistan.

Introduction:

To the enlightenment thinkers, the development of civil society was premised on the concept of separation of state, religion and economy (Barnett, 2003). Yet the role of religion as a prime motive in social welfare and humanitarian work can never be underestimated. By the turn of the last century alternative views emerged around the world which not only recognized the role of religion in the mobilization of civil society but renewed the scholarly interest in religion, particularly the religious organizations as vanguards in the social welfare and service delivery operations around the world. One major stimulant was the ‘holy war’ against the so-called Communist ‘atheists’ in Afghanistan which raised the religious sentiments in the Muslim as well as the Christian world. Ronald Reagan (US President 1981-89) was often called the ‘born-again Christian’ and his long reign is known for a renewed interest in religion as a motivating force behind socio-political initiatives (Clark, 2006, p. 837). This trend continued in the new century whose initial years were marred with the tragic incident of 9/11. The role of religion was reassessed in the intellectual circles and its use for positive and negative purposes were discussed at length. The following events around the world highlighted the increased significance of religion and religious outfits as civil society organizations (CSOs). So much so that Wayne Hudson announced the entry of the global civil society in its ‘post-secular phase’ , pointing to the empirical evidence that presently religion is not declining or absenting itself from the public affairs but rather reasserting its role even in the western world (Hudson, 2007).

The modern western civil society discourse, since 1980s has placed substantial emphasis on the religious motive in social welfare and the role of religious organizations now termed as the ‘faith-based organizations’ or FBOs in the nonprofit

literature (Cadge & Wuthnow, 2006). The term ‘faith-based’ was first used in USA in nineties signifying five characteristics

- nonprofit organizations
- affiliated with one or the other religious congregation
- have their own board of directors
- provide at-least one social service (which may be advocacy), and
- identify themselves as ‘faith-based’ (Ebaugh, Chafetz, & Pipes, 2006, p. 383).

In the context of the changing global conditions, five different types of FBOs have been identified:

- faith-based representative organizations or apex bodies;
- faith-based charitable or development organizations;
- faith-based social-political organizations;
- faith-based missionary organizations; and
- faith-based radical, illegal or terrorist organizations (Clark, 2006, p. 840).

In this backdrop, this paper aims at exploring the role of various types of Islamic FBOs in Pakistan in a historical perspective during the first three decades. It particularly seeks to analyze the growth and sphere of activities of these organizations vis-à-vis the ‘Islamic Republic’ of Pakistan. However, a brief theoretical overview will be helpful in understanding the topic:

Section 1:

Religious Altruism and State-Civil Society Nexus – Concept and History

Since the earliest times religion has provided one main incentive for individual and collective efforts of social welfare and people mainly inspired by religious motives

have formed collectives to serve the fellow-beings. Scriptures from all religions insist on social service as a noble cause and a means to please the God (or gods) and earn rewards in the hereafter. Thus a variety of groups have emerged throughout history to fulfill the noble task of social service. Many of those groups can be called nonprofit or civil society organizations as they were at least to some extent organized, private, self-governed, not-for-profit and voluntary and thus more or less fulfill the criteria developed by the Johns Hopkins School of Civil Society Studies. (Salamon, Sakolowski, & Anheier, 2000). However, the enlightenment thinkers of Europe who are credited for developing the modern concept of civil society rather based their discourse on the rationalist paradigm of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which had little place for religion. Hence, to Karl Marx who was a product of enlightenment, religion was ‘an opiate that dulls the pain of poverty and inequality and therefore is socially regressive because it inhibits revolutionary change’; to Durkheim ‘religion potentially plays an integrative role in society, premised on the view that the objects of religious worship are the collective values of society’; while Max Weber saw religion ‘...potentially as a social change agent but also has a conservative and ideological role’ (Miller, 2011, p. 258). In this context, we come across two contradictory views that religion ‘prevents social change’ (Marx) and that ‘religion causes social change’ (Weber) which have been endlessly debated in sociological discourse. Between these two positions, Durkheim saw religion as ‘something eminently social’. To him religious representations ‘represent collective realities’ and hence ‘ought to participate’... ‘in social affairs’ while their efforts are ‘the product of collective thought’ (Durkheim, 1965, p. 22)

The last few decades have witnessed emergence of the post-modernist argument which places religion in a special niche, if not in the center of social-change debate and looks beyond the liberal-secular paradigm of civil society developed by enlightenment thinkers (Wenzel, 2011). Hence Ian Robertson asserts that religion has the potential to facilitate social change and instantiates his argument with the Civil Rights and Antiwar movements of 1960s which were substantially inspired by religious principles of universal brotherhood and peace. To him 'new religious movements are particularly likely to be critical of the social order and to encourage their adherents to criticize or challenge it'. (Robertson, 1983, p. 407)

Just like other religions, Islam also places much emphasis on the idea of 'collective good'. Welfare of fellow-beings has been emphasized as the best way to earn pleasure of *Allah* (God). Since the advent of Islam in India individual philanthropy and collective services for the needy have been considered important to please the God, the king as well as the multitudes of people and hence gave rise to an age-old tradition of charitable and educational institutions spread over the area. As the religion of a significant minority, that had also ruled a major part of the region before the British rule in South Asia, Islam shaped the political, cultural and social aspirations of its followers in which welfare and philanthropy played an important role not only as the source of *sawab* (promised reward in the hereafter) but also as the binding force in a vast heterogeneous Muslim Empire. Later, the British colonialism along with its modernizing mission posed serious challenges to the local Muslim as well as other societies which showed multiple responses to this western onslaught. Various religious movements of both revivalist and reformist character appeared in the Muslim majority and minority provinces signifying their respective relationship with the colonial state as well as the other communities of the region, particularly the Hindus and the Sikhs.

These developments highlighted the multiple roles assigned to religion during various phases of history.

In this context, Ayesha Jalal's work is helpful in understanding the motivational factors provided by the religion in the pre-partition South Asian society. In doing so she highlights the distinction that existed (and exists) between the perception of 'religion as a faith' and 'religion as a demarcator of difference' (Jalal, 2000, p. 577). In South Asia, just like other parts of the world, both of these perceptions have given rise to a vast array of nonprofit organizations most of which can be labeled as FBOs according to the above definition. These organizations have developed various kinds of relationship with the state in various time periods. The implications of this distinction between the FBOs and their relations with the state in Pakistan have a marked impact on the state-civil society nexus in Pakistan.

Apart from individual philanthropy, the role of organized religion and religious institutions in Islam has been phenomenal in promoting social welfare. However, through centuries in South Asia, the dichotomy of parallel perceptions of Islam as a faith and as a social demarcator has left far-reaching impacts on the organizational life of Muslim community in the post independent years. Here a brief retrospective overview will help understanding this dichotomy:

- Despite the insistence of some orthodox clerics on a strict enforcement of Islamic canon law and a stern treatment of the infidels, most of the Muslim rulers preferred a tolerant and often pluralistic policy which served them better in ruling a heterogeneous empire. Hence, despite the abhorrence of some clerics, tolerance and general welfare mostly remained an important element of

public policy while a more or less pluralistic environment prevailed in the society.

- Similarly, at the non-state level, egalitarianism was commonly practiced in the *khanqahs* (*sufi* shrines and abodes) and *madrassahs* (centers of religious learning) which emerged as vibrant nonprofit organizations of medieval India. This traditional tolerance and cosmopolitanism prevailed more in the rural India upto the 20th century where the pre-partition village presented a picture of ‘positive communalism’ as defined by Rajni Kothari (Kothari, 1989, p. 20). Thus most of the medieval Muslim FBOs seem to be inspired by ‘religion as a faith’ rather than ‘a demarcator of difference’.
- Since 18th century the decline of Muslim political and economic power and infiltration of western imperialistic concepts like utilitarianism (which discredited all local religions and knowledge as useless) along with the proselytizing Christian missions generated a sense of insecurity among the local communities wherein the use of religion as a ‘demarcator of difference’ gained currency as a part of their defense mechanism. For instance, the Hindu revivalist movements like ‘*shuddhi*’ and ‘*sanghatan*’ strove to reconvert the converted Muslims to Hinduism, while the Muslim revivalist movements asserted going back to the roots of Islam as a panacea against the declining Muslim conditions and generated a feeling of mistrust towards other communities. ‘Negative communalism’ was now deeply seated in the society (Kothari, 1989, p. 20). Development of revivalist movements and organizations reflected this defense mechanism. A number of Muslim FBOs emerged, both for charity and advocacy, aimed at serving the fellow people and countering the influence of non-Muslim organizations. For instance, one major catalyst in the

foundation of the famous *Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam* in Lahore in 1884 was the conversion of a poor Muslim widow to Christianity. Similarly, the religious activities of Bible Society in Baluchistan led to suspicions among the Muslim community and the eventual foundation of *Madrassah-e-Durkhani* near Quetta (Gohar, 1975, pp. 44-46).

- Despite their claims of non-interference in religious and cultural matters, the British administrators, for political reasons, were seriously concerned with the religious denominations of their subjects and many emerging social groupings had to assert their religious identities in order to gain the state's patronage. For those groups religion became a source of demarcation of difference. (Jalal, 2000, p. 40)
- In any case most of those organizations had developed good working relationship with the colonial state due to their welfare role. Clarke identifies the religious organizations in 19th and 20th centuries European colonial empires as 'FBOs' which "complimented the colonial state in the fields of health, education and social services (Clarke, 2005)

In this backdrop, the Muslim FBOs underwent a transformation from purely service-delivery organizations to advocacy outfits for the socio-political guidance of the community. Nevertheless, both of these roles continued in the post-independence period. Likewise religion continued to play the role of a faith as well as that of a demarcator of difference. How this transformed role figured out in the relationship of these FBOs with the state of Pakistan will be assessed in the light of two theories of state-nonprofit relations:

Conflict / Coordination theory seeks to explain the state-nonprofit nexus as a model of perpetual conflict wherein the nonprofit sector stands in conflict with the state (Richter, 1998, p. 35) or as a model of coordination where the state and nonprofits are interdependent on each other and hence each strives to support and facilitate the other. This concept can be traced to the enlightened thinkers who viewed civil society as a bulwark against the authoritarian state (Iqbal, Khan, & Javed, 2004)

Three Failures theory explains the role of nonprofit organizations as a consequence of failure of the state and the market in providing maximum quantity and quality of public goods and services to maximum number of citizens. In such conditions the civil society comes up to provide the necessary goods and services to the deprived sections of population. Yet, due to several reasons the civil society or nonprofit sector also fails to cater to the maximum numbers of the needy and hence the ‘three failures’ cycle continues (Steinberg, 2006).

Section 2:

Contributions of the Islamic FBOs in Pakistan (1947-1977)

Major fields of activity:

Since the beginning most of the Islam-motivated nonprofit activity remained divided on sectarian lines¹ and particularly focused on five major fields of action:

- a. Religious Service:** Including organization and facilitation of basic practices of Islam like *namaz* (or *salat* or compulsory daily prayers), fasting and fast-breaking during the month of *Ramazan*, arrangement for *zakat* and *sadaqat* (compulsory and optional alms to the poor), and assistance and training of the *hajis* (the annual pilgrims to the Holy Kaaba in Mecca, Saudi Arabia)², organizations of annual festivals, prayers and processions on the occasion of *Eid-ul- Fitr* (festival after the

month of *Ramazan*), *Eid-ul-Azha* (the festival commemorating the sacrifice of Prophet Abraham by animal sacrifice), *RabiulAwal* (the Islamic month in which the birthday of the Prophet Mohammad is celebrated), *Moharram* (the Islamic month of mourning of martyrdom of the Prophet Mohammad's grandson and his family in 680 AD) etc; Some organizations also arrange *nikah* and *talaq* (marriage and divorce in Islam) as well as funeral services;

b. Social Welfare: Including charitable endowments, trusts, orphanages, old houses, *DarulAmans* (hostels for lonely and destitute women) etc. There were scores of service-oriented FBOs which came forward to take up the common tasks of relief, rehabilitation, and general welfare of the Muslim lot.

c. Education: *DarulUlums* (large seminaries which offer religious education along with boarding and lodging facilities to a large number of students (boys) and award degrees in Quran (the Holy book of Muslims), tafseer (understanding and interpretation of Quran), *shariah* (the Islamic cannon law), *hadith* and *sunnah* (traditions of Prophet Mohammad), *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). In addition, smaller *madrassahs* and *maktabs* usually built within the vicinity of a mosque or sometimes in the house of the *qari* (one who recites the Holy Quran and teaches recitation and basic Islamic knowledge to children). Some *madrassahs* also cater to the need of secular knowledge like elementary sciences, mathematics, astronomy and languages etc (Farooq, pp. 80-83)³.

d. Health Care: Establishment and maintenance of dispensaries, infirmaries, maternity homes, hospitals and houses for the disabled or destitute persons etc.

e. **Advocacy:** In the wake of 18th and 19th century revivalism and reformism witnessed almost all over the Islamic world, several transnational and national religious movements and their affiliated organizations emerged in this region also which proved to be more assertive in character.⁴

The vigorous activities of FBOs at a glance:

Pakistan inherited a large number of pre-partition FBOs. Two prominent ones included *Idara-e-Tulu-e-Islam*, Lahore (estb. 1938) and *Idara-e-Islah-o-tableegh*, Lahore (estb. 1937). A good number of organizations also 'migrated' along with their administrators to the present Pakistan regions. For instance, *Anjuman-e-Islamia* (estb. 1923 in Agra) was shifted to Karachi by its founder *Munshi Riazuddin*, after the partition. *Anjuman-e-Khadimeen-e-Islam* (estb. 1908 in Jalundhar by Maulana Abdul Haq) was revived in Lahore in 1947. *Anjuman-e-Madrassatul-Binat* shifted from Jahandhar to Lahore in 1947 for the propagation and education of Islam to Muslim boys and girls. Similarly the *Majlis-e-Ilmi* (Committee of Knowledge) was established in pre-partition era by *Deobandi ulema* like Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani etc, and was shifted to Karachi in 1948 and run by Maulana Yusuf Binnori, Maulana Taseen etc (Shahjahanpuri, Pakistan ke falahi idare, 1975)

In addition, a wide array of newly emerged FBOs entered to serve in some or all the fields of activity mentioned above.⁵ For instance, *Anjuman-e-Muhajireen-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat*, Jalalpur Peeranwala Multan was established for the rehabilitation of the refugees pouring down from the eastern parts of Punjab after the bloody events of the partition. The *anjuman* (organization) also established and ran a *Bareilvi Madrassah, Jamia Mohammadia Darul Quran. Tadrees-e-Quran* Trust established by a Muslim trader of Lahore in 1949 was soon transformed into countrywide movement, a network of about 302 branches across Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. It also assumed

services of teaching Quran in schools, translation of Quran and training of *Qaris* (those who recite Quran in a prescribed way), *Imams* (those who lead the 'namaz' or daily prayer congregations at mosques and 'huffaz' (those who memorize Quran by heart, singular 'hafiz'). These institutions were and are mainly community-based with their 2/3rd expenses met by the local community and 1/3rd by the Trust.

Most of the organizations simultaneously served the purpose of religious education and advocacy. For instance *Jamia Chishtia* Trust, Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) established in 1951 for the research and publication of Islamic subjects as well as religious education with a good library. It's important publications include a survey of *madrassahs*, their history and curriculum titled '*Jaiza-e-Madaris-e-Arabia*' by Hafiz Nazar Ahmed originally published in 1960 (Ahmed, 1972). Another network, *Anjuman-e-Khuddam-e-Islam* Lahore, worked with a number of big and small centers and branches (Shahjahanpuri & Siddiqui, Idare, 1975). *Anjuman-e-Muhibban-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat (Barelvi)* with a *Dar-ul-Ulum Arabia Ghosia*, in Lala Moosa, *Anjuman-e-Rehmania Jehlum*, *Anjuman-e-Islah-ul-Muslimeen* Sahiwal and *Anjuman-e-Isha'at-e-Quran* (estb.1952-53) Karachi, also served a vast population. *Bazme Qurani* Lahore became popular for its seminars on current socio-economic issues and their solutions according to Quran and Islam. In 1950s the *Wafaq-ul-Alam DawatulIslamia* (World Federation of Islamic Mission) was established by Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddiqui which later was known as *Markaz-e-Islami* with more than 40 centers around the world (including Karachi and Lahore etc.) with an object of promoting religious as well as worldly disciplines among Muslim youth. In Pakistan it has a number of institutions including *Jamia Aleemia Islamia* Karachi, *Dar-ul-Tasneef* (for writers), *Dar-ul-Quran*, *Dar-ul-*

Iftah (religious decrees), *Dar-us-Sehat* (healthcare), Arabic and English language classes and vocational schools for women and youth etc.

Anjuman-e-Khuddam-ul-Quran, Lahore (estb.1960s) led by the renowned religious scholar Dr. Asrar Ahmed till his death remained a vibrant mouthpiece of orthodox Islam. *Idaara-e-Muarif-e-Islami*, Karachi, Lahore (and Dacca) was established in 1963 under *Jamaat-e-Islami* (a religio-political party) leadership but claimed to be a purely non-political organization established for the promotion and interpretation of Islam in modern terms. *Tarweej-e-Islam* Academy Lahore was established in 1973 by a number of *Deobandi* clerics and their followers to provide necessary Islamic knowledge as well as moralistic recreational literature to the youth. It worked for publication of books, and propagation of Islamic way of life through cassettes etc. Particularly it sought to counter the socialist ideology which was gaining popularity during the seventies. *Ulema* Academy Lahore emerged in 1970s as an intellectual institute established near Badshahi Mosque in a historical building that served as a hostel of a seminary during the Moghul Emperor Aurangzeb's era (1658-1707) The Academy is supported by the Auqaf Department Punjab and is equipped with a good library, and its most distinguished contribution is the translation compilation of scores of rare Islamic literature from Arabic, Persian, and some other languages to Urdu. (Shahjahanpuri & Siddiqui, Idare, 1975)

Further, several FBOs also emerged to serve the significant Shiite communities (*Asna' ashari*, *Ismaili* etc), facilitating and conducting Shiite rituals particularly in the Islamic month of Moharram. In the pre-partition politics though a number of *shias* were active members of the Muslim League, many disagreeing with its policies had later formed All Pakistan *Shia* Conference (APSC) to manage and safeguard the affairs of the *Shia* community. Another organization, *Idaara-e-Tahafuz-e-Huquq-e-Shia* (ITHS.

organization for the safeguard of the rights of the Shia) was established by 1950 to counter the anti Shia polemics of some dominating Sunni orthodox groups. These two organizations spread countrywide and often vied with each other as the spokesmen for the Shia community in Pakistan. The disagreement between the two was less of doctrinal and more of procedural issues. The APSC believed in safeguarding Shia interests through negotiating agreements with the government and other sects while the ITHS insisting on street-level agitation tactics. However, there was little coordination between the two Both of those organizations were financed by the Shia feudal and capitalist magnates from Sind and Punjab who had links with mainstream political parties and hence often criticized by the shia *ulema* of not particularly upholding the community's cause (Abbas, 2010, pp. 20-22). It must be noticed that though religion was playing the role of demarcator of difference during 1950s and 1960s, verbal arguments rarely degenerated into violent riots or acts of frenzy except for a couple of events including the killing of *Shias* in Thheri near Sukkar (Sind), in 1963. Such incidents led to the rise of another popular *Shia* group *Shia Mutalbaat* Committee, under Syed Mohammad Dahlavi but still the Shia leadership remained divided (ICG, 2005, p. 9).

Sect	Sub-sect (maslak)	Madrassa Board (wafaq)	Board established	Wafaq HQ
Sunni	Ahle e Sunnat (Barelvi)	Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Ahl-e Sunnat-wal-Jamaat	1959	Karachi
Sunni	Deobandi	Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al- Arabia	1959	Multan
Sunni	Ahl e Hadith	Wafaq-ul-Madaris	1955	Faisalabad
Islamist	Jamat e Islami	Rabta-ul-Madaris	1983	Mansoor,

		Al Islamia		Lahore
Shia	Fiqh-e-Jaffriah Twelwer Shia	Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Shia	1960	Lahore

Source: Kaja Borchgrevink, Pakistan's Madrassahs: Moderation or Militancy, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center- (NOREF) Report, June 2011, p. 2

Meanwhile, a new generation of FBOs took the lead in advocacy-oriented tasks. Some organizations established and run not by the clerics but by various civil-society personalities to fulfill the newly found mission of justifying the two-nation theory and the religious rationale for Pakistan (or the ideology of Pakistan) and also to inculcate this ideology into the minds of the new generations particularly those who had never experienced the threat of Hindu domination. *Idaara-e-Tulu-e-Islam Lahore* (Shahjahanpuri & Siddiqui, Idare, 1975, pp. 137-138) and *Anjuman-e-Islamia* mentioned above and Sindh Muslim *Adabi* (literary) Society (estb. 1930 Hyderabad) worked hard to promote the Islamic identity and the ideology of Pakistan to the young generations. Particularly, *Idaara-e-Tulu-e-Islam Lahore*, led by Ghulam Ahmed Pervaiz, has been mentioned by Hamza Alvi as one of a few 'small peripheral groupings' that have worked for the ideals of Islamic modernism in Pakistan (Alvi, 1988, p. 105).

Ayesha Bawani Academy Karachi though famous for its educational services, also worked for propagation of Islam around the world (Shahjahanpuri & Siddiqui, Idare, 1975, p. 147) *Idaara-e-Nashr-e-Uloom-e-Islami* (Institution for the broadcast of Islamic learning), Jhang (south-central Punjab later known for extremist outfits), was established in 1968 with the object of Islamic education as well as intellectual refutation (*radd*) of the rival faiths and atheism through speeches and publications.

Aalami Idaara-e-ashaat-e-uloom-e-Islamia (world institute of publication of Islamic disciplines), Multan served to propagate the Islamic ideology through publications (Shahjahanpuri & Siddiqui, Idare, 1975, p. 153).

Section 3:

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic FBOs – an uneasy nexus

Since Islam provided the basic rationale for the creation of Pakistan, it now became the basic tool in the state-building process. Hence more injections of faith were required to create a semblance of unity and discipline.⁶ Thus Islam formally became the state religion in 1949 while the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was formally proclaimed on 23 March, 1956. Ironically, the religious parties and groups most of which had vehemently opposed the idea of Pakistan were now embarked upon a mission to create a true Islamic state in Pakistan according to their own vision and under their own exclusive guidance (Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 2014, p. 112).

Pakistan was virtually minority-less (about 97% Muslims). But the sectarian fault-lines marred the nation-building process from the beginning. Heterogeneity did increase the numbers of FBOs but at times intolerance led to conflicts between them. However, there were two points of convergence of these religious groups and parties: their unanimous rejection of the Ahmadi sect; and their opposition to socialism. The anti-Ahmadi crusade continued after independence. This was the time of further strengthening of communal and ethnic identities. The Ahmadi's though live under constant condemnation, have developed an efficient system of philanthropy and like the Bahais in Iran see to it that "none of their number was (is) ever in serious need of food

or shelter” (Ali, 2008, p. 26). Nevertheless, the anti-Ahmadi sentiment led to the riots and break-down of law and order in 1953 resulting in the first Martial Law in Lahore. The activities of Ahrar since pre-partition period, and their extremist stance against the Ahmadya sect, later joined by Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam and almost all Muslim religious groups had become a norm since 1948. Every passing year claimed several lives with an increase in the magnitude and the vitriol of the fiery jalsas (rallies) across the country which finally culminated in the violent events of 1953 in which the feudal power-politics of Punjab played the role of a catalyst. On several occasions the term ‘jihad’ for the sake of ‘Khatm-e-Nubuwwat’ (finality of prophethood of Mohammad p.b.u.h.) was used and public sentiments were provoked for this cause. FBOs were used to disseminate those ideas. Press and the various religious organizations working across the country were involved in fanning the religious sentiments of the masses. Violence had entered the politics of religion. It was there to stay (Munir & Kiyani, 1954) .

Similarly, the opposition against the Progressive Movement inspired by the socialist ideology also remained a prominent feature of religious organizations. *Fatwas* (religious decrees) against socialism as being repugnant to Islam were vehemently issued by leaders of various sects who were seldom united on any other issue. Many civil society organizations towed this line of thought. For instance, in 1948 an organization named *Tameer Pasand Musannafeen* (pro-construction writers) was established by some religious minded intellectuals, such as Abu Saleh Islahi, Bashir Ahmed Bashir, Abdul Majeed Qureshi, Naeem Siddiqui and Zia Ahmed Zia, to counter the *Taraqqi Pasand Musannafeen* (progressive writers). With a similar zeal *Halqa-e-Adab-e-Islami* (circle of Islamic literature) was formed in Karachi (1948-9)) which included many *Jamaat-e-Islami* stalwarts, and like-minded writers from other cities and

later spread 54 branches across the country (Shahjahanpuri & Siddiqui, Idare, 1975, pp. 182-183).

The first constitution of Pakistan (1956) was considered a victory for the Islamist organizations and parties though some of their demands were still unfulfilled. It proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Pakistan with some Islamic provisions like those for a Muslim President, compulsory teaching of Holy Quran for all Muslims; bans on alcohol, narcotics and prostitution; an undertaking that no law to be passed 'repugnant to' the teachings of Quran and Sunnah and efforts to make the existing laws according to Islamic injunctions (Part 12, Chapter 1, Islamic Provisions, Article 198, Constitution of Pakistan 1956). According to the directive principles of state policy, steps were to be taken to enable the Muslims individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah; establishment of an organization of Islamic Research and instruction in advance studies to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim society on a truly Islamic basis (Article 197) and a foreign policy to pursue unity among Muslim countries. (Part 3 Articles 24-24) Nevertheless the Constitution survived only for two years till October 1968 when it was abrogated by the first Martial Law regime of Pakistan under Field Martial Ayub Khan.

Though Ayub posed to be a liberal he had to co-opt the religious groups and parties to gain legitimacy for his unrepresentative regime. His Presidential constitution of 1962 had to include the term 'Islamic Republic' through an amendment after strong protests. The climax came with the election campaign in 1964, when the incumbent president's sole rival the popular Fatima Jinnah (Mohammad Ali Jinnah's sister) was countered through a state-run propaganda from the co-opted religious organizations against the non-permissibility for a woman head-of-the-state in Islam (Pirbhai, 2017, p. 212). The

state was again using Islam and Islamic groups for its own ends. The democracy and tolerance were the casualties in this game.

Hence since the beginning the Islamic FBOs in Pakistan were ‘mirrors of the society’ (Riaz, 2008, p. 79), reflecting the general mindset where religion provided not only an inspiration for social service but also the basis of demarcation between the official ‘Islamic ideology’ and its so-called detractors. Unfortunately, this ideology could not keep Pakistan united.

The post- dismemberment (1971) government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had to accommodate religious schools of thought despite the apparent leftist tilt of the government (that proved to be rather superficial and ineffective in face of its feudal and authoritarian tendencies). The Islamic Republic, according to the new constitution of 1973 called for an Islamic Ideology Council to advise the government how to ‘order the lives of the citizens according to Islamic principles’ (Directive Principles of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973). An immediate impact was the increased vigor and advancement seen in the institutions of Islamic learning whose graduates were now in more demand to serve in various offices. However, the Bhutto regime could never gain the favor of the Islamic groups and parties, who despite being successful in getting some age-old demands fulfilled, could never trust him. For instance, the declaration of Ahmadis as ‘*kafirs*’ or infidels through the second constitutional amendment, bans on alcohol, and pronouncement of Friday as a weekly holiday instead of Sunday were some major successes of the religious groups. Despite these reforms Bhutto and his family remained the target of strict criticism from the religious groups so much so that the anti-Bhutto movement of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA, 1977) led mainly by the rightist parties was named as ‘*Tehreek-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa*’ (movement for the establishment of the system of the Prophet Mohammad Mustafa)⁷. The PNA

movement finally culminated in the third military coup staged on July 5, 1977, on the pretext of the opposition's movement for 'Nizam-e-Mustafa'. The imposition of the third Martial Law led by General Zia ul Haq underscored the role of armed forces of Pakistan as the 'defenders of geographical and the ideological borders of Pakistan'.

Relevance of State-Nonprofit Theories: Towards Conclusion

The civic-engagement debate in Pakistan has yet to arrive on a general understanding regarding the significance of civil society for the development and prosperity of a nation. However, the role of religiously inspired organizations, particularly the Islamic FBOs has been widely recognized. In fact Wayne Hudson's 'post-secular phase' did not appear in the civil society debates in Pakistan as the religion never declined or remained absent or even insignificant in the public space. With the help of the material developed in this paper, this section will tend to assess the relevance of theories mentioned in Section 1 to the growth and efficacy of Islamic FBOs in Pakistan:

Conflict or Coordination?

The above study shows that for the most part of the first three decades of Pakistan, faith based organizations have experienced rather a pro-coordination relationship with the state due to two main reasons:

- The grave problems faced by the new state led it to encourage the philanthropic and service delivery roles of civil society including the FBOs motivated by religious zeal to provide basic relief and support to the fellow Muslims and 'others' in need. This was the manifestation of religion as 'faith', an inspiration to the faithful.

- The ideological needs of the new state founded on the basis of ‘two-nation theory’ required a contingent of zealous volunteers to be the vanguards in the foundation of a ‘true’ Islamic State. This was the manifestation of religion as a demarcator of difference.

In both cases a good coordination was witnessed between the state and the service-delivery FBOs except for the organizations belonging to the Ahmadiyya sect. On the other hand many *ulema* and their *madrassah*-based organizations had adopted an advocacy role by constantly pursuing the various governments to adopt measures for the creation of a purely Islamic, more or less a theocratic state. The relationship between this type of organizations and the state marked a perpetual problematique wherein the state while remaining practically secular could never admit so for the fear of offending the masses and the religious elites and thus being labeled as a betrayer of the two-nation theory. Further, with the shrinking legitimacy of each consecutive government due to failure of democratic process, the best course available for those unrepresentative governments was to appease the religious sections and co-opt them in the social and political arenas to gain their support and achieve some popular legitimacy. In addition, the dirty power-politics as pointed out by the incidents of 1953 in Punjab, religion was invoked as a demarcator of difference to fulfill the petty interest of some politicians. (Munir & Kiyani, 1954).

However, the nexus tilted towards ‘conflict model’ during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto whose apparent inclination towards the left was never accepted by the religious sections as ‘legitimate’ in an Islamic state.

Three Failures?

The inherent insecurities prevalent in a society always lead to a reassertion of religion as a source of retribution and solace. In the newly independent state of Pakistan, political instability, uncertainty, governance failure, and myopic economic policies, together with foreign-policy shifts had severe impacts on the economic situation in the country. All these factors caused hopeless state and market failures resulting in continuously deteriorating living conditions. Even the ‘golden decade’ of Ayub could not bridge the gap between the haves and have-nots (in fact widened it) and led to a sense of deprivation to many under-developed regions. Under such conditions, the economic gap was naturally expected to be filled by the civil society. In this context the role of FBOs in poverty alleviation, education, healthcare, etc has been exemplary in Pakistan. The religious injunctions of serving the fellow beings in time of need provide continuous guidance to the religion-based nonprofits. Section 2 of this paper has elucidated the service delivery role of the FBOs in Pakistan, belonging to various religions and sects. Similarly religious organizations have been highly responsive in the times of natural calamities, wars, accidents or other human miseries. Almost all religious parties have active philanthropic networks and affiliated social welfare wings. Hence the role of FBOs in social welfare and service delivery projects has been appreciable. Though the lines between the role of religion as a faith and that as a demarcation of difference are often blurred, the FBOs not only contributed to provide efficient humanitarian relief and support, they also helped in promoting social mobility to the deprived sections of society. For instance the role of madrassahs in the rise of literacy in the classes (which could never afford to send their children to regular schools) has always been recognized. In this way it won't be wrong to state that religion in Pakistan though plays a ‘conservative role and ideological role’, has to some extent contributed to cause a social change as asserted by Max Weber. As far as Marx

argument of ‘opiate that dulls the pain of poverty and inequality’ is concerned there seems to be little doubt about it in the absence of a vibrant culture of agitation against stark inequalities. However, the argument that religious organizations, due to their humanitarian work perpetuate regression and parasitism in lower classes, has always been raised against the social welfare organization, religious or secular. The answer to this objection lies in more efforts towards poverty alleviation and empowerment rather than mere charity for sawab.

Nevertheless, the nonprofit failure in this case is also visible. The existing heterogeneity has led to the rise of FBOs belonging to every sect and school of Islam. For the most cases these organizations seldom face ‘philanthropic insufficiency’ as they are never short of donations thanks to the religious inclination towards ‘giving’ in Pakistani society. Further, many FBOs also receive funds from governments of some Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Gulf countries. However, at times their ‘particularism’ in supporting specific sectarian or ideological groups has retarded their scope of activity. Their inability to establish a tolerant environment has led to a perpetual conflict which turned more and more violent with the passage of time. In this context, rather playing an integrative role as suggested by Durkheim, religion and many religious organizations have been used as a disintegrative force – as demarcators of difference. The ability of some organizations to use violence with impunity especially in 1953 not only confirmed the state failure but also laid the foundations of the later waves of intolerance in the country. The coordination between the FBOs and the state, or some sections of the state, particularly the co-option of such organizations during different periods has encouraged inflexibility in some extremist organizations who have learnt to use violence and street power to get their demands accepted by other section of state and society particularly the secular sections of civil society including NGOs

and rights organizations have become an easy target of religious extremism coming to its heights from 1980s onwards.

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Endnotes:

¹ The two major Islamic sects *Ahl-e-Sunnat (Sunni)* and *Ahl-e-Tashee (Shia)* are further divided into a number of sub-sects including among *Sunnis* the *Deobandi*, *Barelvi*, *Ahl-e-Hadis*, *Wahabi*, etc. and among *Shias*, *Asnaa' Ashari*, *Ismaili*, *Bohri*, etc. In present Pakistan about 85% people belong to one or the other Sunni sects while about 15% are Shias.

² Haj is a fundamental obligation for healthy and well-to-do Muslims which includes once in a life-time pilgrimage to sacred places of Mecca and Medina (Saudi Arabia) in the last month of Islamic calendar.

³ These subjects are part of the curriculum called 'Dars-e-Nizami'.

⁴ Such initiatives included a wide variety from the Pan-Islamic Movement of Jamaluddin Afghani to the revivalist Deobandi Movement

⁵ Much of the information given in this section was also gathered through personal interviews with some religious scholars such as late Shah Turab-ul-Haq Qadri, some politicians from religious parties such as Jamaat e Islami and Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Pakistan, and government officials in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar during a research project conducted by the author (2003-2005) .

⁶ 'Unity, faith and discipline' were the watchwords of the freedom movement given by Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, and adopted by the Muslim League as its motto.

⁷ PNA's movement also had a support of commercial and industrial classes who were hit by Bhutto's nationalization and pro-trade union policies.