Globalization, Issues For Muslim State and Need for The Moderation (*Wasatiyyah)*

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Abstract

Globalization has produced many concerns for Muslim societies and governments including growing lack of confidence among Muslims in institutions and administrative functionaries. This is creating a major crisis of legitimacyand challenging the "mainstream." This can be countered by strengthening religious authorities and new ways must be found to credential and empower religious authorities. The resolution of this crisis may depend less on ideas than on institutions, and in particular on those institutions which can convince large segments of the Muslim community. Muslims must be persuaded to follow the decisions of established official religious authorities. And people with inadequate credentials must be accorded a lesser standing. GettingMuslims to accept a new authority structure, however, will depend on whether that structure is responsive to today'spolitical, economic, technological, social and religious problems.

Keywords: Globalisation, Muslim Ummah, Neo Liberalism, Wasatiyyah.

Introduction

Today, globalization increasingly appears as the base for prevailing world order and a leading paradigm in promotion of neo-liberal capitalism. The hegemony, chaos and instability germinating out of globalization today, have generated a wide range of political, economic and cultural responses in the world particularly in the Muslim world. This not only has led to division of opinions in the Muslim world but has posed significant challenges to 'Muslim State' by influencing the structures of its political

power / decision making in particular and relationship between Islam and the state in general. At present, as per opinions of various scholars,writersand world leaders, globalization appears destined to bring many challenges, transformations, and instabilities for almost all world civilizations including Islamic civilization. Their remains a need for academic and intellectual emphasis on this issue in order to enlighten Muslim policy makers for better understanding of globalization in a way for preparing them for a careful adaptation and participation in processes of globalization.

State and Society in Muslim World

Historically, the Muslim world is troubled by power scramble, struggle, and the competition for authority between the state and society. The battle is always the crisis of authority between the state and society. With the bifurcation and separation of authority from one single entity the crisis became more profound and pronounced. The placement of political authority in the hand of the caliphs, while the religious elite (scholars) represented the society captures the crisis vividly. Even today, as some parts of the world are witnessing some forms of conflict that varies in degree of intensity and extensity, the Muslim world has not been inoculated from this plague of globally scattered socio-political, economic, and religious disturbances. Although most of the contemporaryconflicts in the Muslim world might share certain commonalities, yet they are distinctive and unique in perspective, locale, and the factors that informed their outbreak, intensity and extensity. Contemporary crisis in the Muslim world has equally impacted Muslim state. Muslim state faces many issues today including varied degrees of crisis of legitimacy and leadership in the Muslim societies. This directly is linked with globalization, polarized ideological streams, sectarianism, free scholarship, conflicting and competing authority of state and society, information technology, dichotomy between modernity and Islam and the dwindling intellectual effort and the failure of governance. This was even manifested in recent Arab Spring started in December 2010 with widespread protests and uprisings against Muslims governments across parts of Africa and Middle East. The crisis of authority prism does not simply delineate the recent Arab spring uprising across the Middle East, it simultaneously gave it a

perspective. The uprising recapitulated and reinforced the perennial competition between state and society over authority**.**

Tussle for Authority: from Historic to Contemporary

Islamic history is replete with heaps of records documenting the tussle for authority between the political and religious elites.[1] This was true for the controversial dispute between caliph Yazid (state) and Hussein (society), the dispute was a classical representation of authority crisis. While Yazid's claim of authority centred around Weber's notion of traditional authority,[2] Hussein's claims rested on his parentage, lineage,[3] divine right and not to mention the supposed supports garnered from the society. Tussle for authority originating from this historical episode continues to divide Muslims even today. The conflict and political trauma in the Muslims can be characterised as historical, ideological, cultural, religious, transnational, internationalised, sectarian, and insurgency, hence the necessity to place contemporary crisis in the Muslim world in perspective.

Sectarianism is one reasons for the plaguing religio-political instability in the Muslim world. Sectarian conflict draws inspiration from history as legitimation for contemporary fracas. The Sunni-Shia polarity begs explanation from history and religious legitimacy, in addition to the Sunni claim of religious majority and Shia's religiously significant minority. Sectarianism from the early and down the annals of Islamic history has always been the crisis of philosophical, religious and political legitimacy[4]Further, insurgency in the Muslim world drives home the thought the Muslim world shares certain similarity common to many part of the world. But the insurgent groups in the Muslim world are in a contestation with state over the political public sphere for many reasons.

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[1] Ira Lapidus, *The History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)

[2]Kai Hafez and Mary Ann Kenny, *The Islamic World and the West: An Introduction to Political Cultures and International Relations* (Leiden: Brill, 2000)

[3]S. Manzoor Rizvi,*Unique Sacrifice of Imam Hussain for Humanity* (Bloomfield, NJ: Message of Peace INC, 2014)

[4] Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought:The Response of the Shii and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke and *London*: Macmillan, 1982).

Foremost, the insurgent groups often claim to be people's representation and being the flag bearer of authentic Islam, hence their legitimate right to hold political authority if not rule the state. On the other hand, sovereign integrity and right does not only defines state's behaviour, but the latter also believes state only has the legitimacy to deciding state religion and doctrine. This contemporary scenario captures and recapitulates the charged climate of legitimacy between the caliphs and Islamic scholars in the heydays, characterised by religio-political tussle and the question of who has the prerogative to decide what bearing religion should take.[5] In contemporary scenario, the tussle has taken a new turn and form of extremism

Consequences of Colonialism, Globalization and Fourth Industrial Revolution

Plethora research exist on the multidimensional ramifications of colonialism, globalization and Fourth Industrial Revolution in the Muslim world. The impact of the latter is evidently enduring and impactful even in the post-independence of many Muslim societies. Polarisation of the Muslim societies was not just political, it was equally social and educational. The relegation of the traditional madrasah education system to a second-class schooling system further undercut the institution long revered for producing the elite and religious scholarship. The imposition of western-secular education system bifurcated the society as the products of the latter were considered and raised above the traditional institution. Interestingly, the polarisation generated competing scholarship and ideological streams, each claiming to be best informed on how well to conduct the society during and after colonial rule. The narratives of the rejectionist, obscurantist, accommodationist, reformist, and replacement-vanguard have punctuated the Muslim societies from the 20th century till date.[6] Most political and constitutional crisis in the contemporary Muslim society stems from the ideological crisis and streams. Be it Egypt,

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[5]Liyakat N. Takim*, Heirs of the Prophet, The: Charisma and Religious Authority in Shi'ite Islam* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2006).
[6] Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Revival Since 1988: A Critical Survey and Bibliography* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1997).

Indonesia, Tunisia, Pakistan, Sudan, Algeria, Syria, and other Muslim societies that were victims of colonialism. Each of this ideological stream arrogates legitimacy to itself and by extension believes in exclusive steering of the country at the detriment of others.

In a global world, there is a direct proportionality between, globalization, Information Communication and Technology (ICT), the cyber sphere and now Fourth Industrial Revolution, the growth in intensity and rapidity of the former directly sways the latter. The cyber sphere is the virtual space; increasingly complementing and supplanting the public sphere. This phenomenal change and redefinition of space has an undisputable influence on religion, religious affiliation and religious scholarship. Over the last two decades, the cyber sphere is growingly become the platform, where religious ideas and scholarship gets proliferated and reconstructed, reducing the traditional importance of house of worship. The cyber sphere upend the actuality and physicality that exist between the leader and followers. More provocatively, individual who understands the instrumentality of the cyber sphere uses it to challenge the traditional arena of scholarship and by extension the crisis of Interpretation of religious text. Radical extremism that recently inundate the Muslim societies also benefits from the globalization and cyber sphere as it provides them virtual associational allegiance and representation,[7] invariably these extremist groups have employed the cyber sphere to strengthen and consolidated global solidarity.[8] The places of worship (masjid) which is traditional used for galvanising sentiment is increasingly losing its purpose as the cyber sphere becomes the "battlefield of the media and electronic warfare"[9] propaganda and psychological warfare.The growing space of the cyber sphere complicate intra-Ummah crisis, traditional religious authority is either undermined or supplanted. Though as the worth of the cyber world grows, competing political and religious

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[7] Michael J. Brenner, "Functional Representation and Interest Group Theory: Some Notes on British Practice," *Comparative Politics,* Vol. 2, No. 1 (Oct., 1969)
[8] Otomar J. Bartos and Paul Wehr, *Using Conflict Theory*, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2002)
[9] Hiram Henderson, "US Public Diplomacy: Waiting for the War of Ideas," 2008*www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/.../iosphere_fall08_henderson2.pdf*

entities take their fight and competition shift from the actual public into the virtual cyber sphere. Arguably, the traditional scholars would argue that the cyber sphere has become the platform for the unqualified and uncertified, pronouncing religious ruling. The action of the unqualified is a disservice to Islam, challenging religious elites, and insulting to religious scholarship,[10] and at the same time enhances the proliferation of incompetency in religious scholarship, breeds more ignorant followers and incapable scholars,[11] hence greater possibility for misguided and misconceived views.

Crisis of Legitimacy in Muslim Societies

Borrowing from the argument of Castells, if the crisis of legitimacy of the nation-state was the result of corruption and other forms of bad governance, the crisis of legitimacy in the Muslim societies was the result of the inability of the state and constituent society to regenerate and re-establish functional Islamic state akin to that established by the prophet of Islam. That was though further complicated by the unreachable and failed modernisation.[12] In support of Castells, Azaniargues that the failure of the Muslim nation-states to deliver the goods of prosperity and economic wellbeing promised, the subsequent crisis of identity, and mounting sense of frustration and alienation, all contributed enormously to the development of the crisis of legitimacy (among the competing units) within the Muslim societies. Interestingly, the post-independence period was largely controlled by the nationalist leaders, championing either bequeathed ideologies liberal market system or borrowed value of socialism. The failure of both systems propelled the re-emergence of Islamic movements as an alternative to the existing system and the need for new legitimacy actor based on Islamic values and ideas.[13]Moghadamadded to the discourse, asserting that the crisis of legitimacy in the Muslim

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[10]Akil Awan, Andrew Hoskins, and Ben O'Loughlin, *Radicalisation and the Media: Connectivity and Terrorism in the New Media Ecology* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 34.
[11]Abdul QadirAwdah, *Islam: Between Ignorant followers and Incapable Scholars* (Beirut: The Holy Quran Publishing House, 1978).
[12] Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity* (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
[13]EitanAzani,*Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God: From Revolution to Institutionalisation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

societies is not just flamed up, but problematized and politicised due to the rise of extremist movement; yet the crisis has always been centred around the state and political order, an anomie in the Durkheimian language.[14]

Dessouki argues that the crisis of legitimacy in the Muslim societies has historically unfolded either 'from above or from below'. It is 'from above' when Islam is instrumentalised by the political (ruling) elites in collaboration with religious elite to legitimise their rule and policies. It was true for the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties and was equally true for the Ottoman, Egypt and Saudi authoritarian regimes in modern time. Riazdelineated the political landscape of Afghanistan under King Abdul Rahman Khan, whose rein employed and reinforced the 'from above' prism.[15]Islam becomes instrumentalised 'from below' when employed by radical and obstinate religious scholars, who do not want to be bracketed as the puppet of the ruling elites. The rise of Islamic opposition during the 1970s exemplified the crisis of legitimacy, given the effort of the Islamic groups, wanting to de-legitimise and replace the secular ideologies and failed system with traditional Islamic values, considered as the true legitimacy.[16]

The unfulfilled promises and failure of secular ideologies prompted the emergence of Islamic political parties across the Muslim societies, most of which were transformed from religious social movement. They became political party thinking that the platform of political party will enable them to legitimise their ideology, doctrinal, and political proclivity. With the rising trend of religious political parties, the competition over political space become inevitable. The conventional or non-religious political parties have to compete with the religious parties for political geography and electorates. Often times, the conventional political parties try to challenge the legitimacy and religious monopoly of the religious parties, by

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[14] Valentine M. Moghadam, "Islamist Movemnets and Women's Response in the Middle East" in *Women and Islam: Women's Movements in Muslim Societies*, ed. HaidehMoghissi, 264 (New York: Routledge, 2005).

[15]Ali Riaz, *Religion and Politics in South Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

[16]Gorm Rye Olsen, "Islam: What is its Political Significance? The Cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia" in *Islam: State and Society*, ed. Klaus Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari 129 (London: Routledge, 1988).

employing religious mantra during electoral process,[17] and same is true for the religious parties tapping into modern political language, a way to display their understanding of modernity, though few scholars argued that the notion of modern religious-political party was the brain-child of Mawdudi.[18] The propensity to legitimize political party through religious language and symbol transcends the Muslim societies, in fact Augusteijn et al,argue that similar trend characterized the Germany political landscape, for which political legitimacy and relevance was predicated by ability of political parties to meaningfully reconstruct their religious past.[19]Over the several decades, the legitimacy crisis has grown beyond the state and political order, rather expanded into being religious commotion among different doctrinal and ideological groupings compete for legitimacy within the larger and immediate Islamic community, hence what Fealyrefers to as intra-ummah scramble.[20]

Role of Civil Society, Modernity and Muslim Elite

To understand the discourse of legitimacy in the Muslim societies, Sharify Funk addresses the issue from the prism of civil society. According to Funk "If the traditional Muslim society generated and legitimated social norms through the agency of the ulama and their relationship with the Muslim state, contemporary Muslim societies are increasingly debating the legitimacy of social norms and political institutions within the context of an expanded "civil society" (mujtama al-madani). Interestingly and in addition to the debate of the civil society, the polarisation and tussle over legitimacy in the Muslim societies is exacerbated by the streams of scholars

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[17]Ali Riaz, *Religion and Politics in South Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2010), and JayshreeBajoria, "Islam and Politics in Pakistan," *Council on Foreign Relations*, April 2011, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/islam-and-politics-pakistan.

[18] Joshua White and Niloufer Siddiqui, "MawlanaMawdudi" in *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*, ed. John L. Esposito, Emad El-Din Shahi, 149 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[19]JoostAugusteijn, Patrick Dassen, and MaartjeJanse, *Political Religion Beyond Totalitarianism: The Sacralization of Politics in the Age of Democracy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

[20]Greg Fealy, "Divided Majority: Limits of Indonesian Political Islam" in Islam and Political Legitimacy, ed. ShahramAkbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, 166 (New York: Routledge, 2003).

clamouring and emphasising Islamic authority and traditions on one hand and on the other the 'modernist' championing the cause of moderating Islamic from the lens of modernity.[21]Islamisation of modernity has been one of the contentious issues in the Muslim societies since the dawn of the 19th century, although such effort of Islamisation unfolds simultaneously alongside the rejection of modernity. While states like Turkey, Tunisia, Indonesia, and Malaysia have struggled to sync and coalesce Islam and modernity, other Muslim states remain in the limbo grappling how best to mitigate the contentious crisis between rejection and accommodation of modernity.

During the 1960s the rejectionism and accommodation of modernity was carried out intellectually; Muslim scholars worked extensively and intensively on the several dimensions to integrate modernity with Islam, while at the same time filter the unnecessary. The effort of institutions like the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), the research arm of the OIC, and many others that have attempted to reconstruct Islamic narratives in the contemporary language and proffer answers to the challenges emanating from the west. But the recent obsession of Islamic political movements is a departure from such intellectual response. Hence, Khanargues, rather than offering intellectual response, Islamic political movements believes their legitimacy of the 'truth' can be established violently and that separates them from the tradition mainstream Muslim community.

If the Muslim ruling elites have either collaborated with the Western power or incapable to challenge the latter's socio-political and cultural intrusion in the Muslim societies, then it becomes the responsibility of the Muslim society to react. That reaction is though largely violent but captured by the narrative of Islamic movements towards globalisation otherwise considered as westernisation.Brooklierexplains that the Western powers have a long history of discrimination, prejudice and cultural imperialism that has led to a lot of struggles and negativity for

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[21] Sarah Yoon, Identity *Crisis: Standing Between Two Identities of Women Believers from Muslim Background in Jordan* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf& Stock, 2015), 147-148.

various religious groups. Bangashadds, 'the West's cultural imperialism is predicated on the same arrogant belief in the superiority of its value system that propelled colonialism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries… Western culture offers people an escape from reality, only if they have the financial resources to do so. Others, particularly Islamic culture, offer its adherents an opportunity to live in harmony with themselves, their neighbours and the environment.'Miasamialthough observes, 'Islam is not against the process of globalization per se, but rather … the tension is due to the process of Westernization.' With the emergence of globalization and more importantly, continuous Western double standards and interventions in Muslim countries, threat from Islamic political movement goes beyond state systems. Anxiety over presence of American military in the Middle East and the implications of US invasions and subsequent wars push a few Muslims to act with extreme violence as Muslim grievances against the West's invasions and exploitations are considered valid. Hence from the vantage point of the political Islamic movements they ascribe to themselves the custodian of Islamic value and culture, protecting Islamic societies from the adulterated and cultural decadence of the west.

Conclusion

In Islamic tradition, the legitimacy of the caliph is always predicated on the protection of the Islamic state from within against values detrimental to the fundamental of Islam and from external entity capable enough to decimate Islamic ideology and the structure of Islamic state. In the eyes of political Islamic movements, modern rulers in the Islamic societies have somewhat lost that legitimacy amid the intensity and rapidity of globalization. Hence, for them it is their legitimate duty to protect the faith from such menace. This narrative should be challenged effectively by religious authorities. The Andalusian jurist and theologian Ibn Hazm (d.1064 CE) held that defending Islam through non-militant, verbal and scholarly efforts qualified as a meritorious struggle in the path of God.[22]

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[22] Mohammad HashimKamali, (2016), "Peace in the Islami tradition: One Vision, multiple Pathways,"2016Retrieved 12 July 2017 from*www.icrjournal.org*

Such religious sentiments and more similar, should be propagated among Muslim masses.

New ways must be found to credential and empower religious authorities. Role the middle (Wasat) path of Islam can play a constructive role in bringing peace by containing religious extremism.

Moderation can be the balancing act and best approach based on religion to tackle the existing problem of extremism in Muslim societies. If *Wasatiyyah*concept is applied in everyday Muslim life, people may not resort to extreme actions in any sphere of human life.

The resolution of legitimacy crisis and challenges facing Muslim state may depend less on ideas than on institutions, and in particular on institutions that convince large segments of the Muslim community. Ordinary believers must he persuaded to follow the decisions of religious authorities. And people with inadequate credentials must be accorded a lesser standing. Getting ordinary Muslims to accept a new authority structure, however, will depend on whether that structure is responsive to today's moral, political and social problems. Resolving this crisis of legitimacy may take several generations as socio-religious developments tend to play out over decades and centuries.