

Institutionalization of Islamic Political Parties in Pakistan: A Case Study of Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan

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Abstract

Islamic political parties (IPPs) have been a significant feature of the various Muslim states including Pakistan. There are around 25 registered IPPs in Pakistan and most of them are identified with a specific sectarian group or religious denominational. This research concerns Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) which has been a renowned Barelwi-based Islamic political party. The party had often been divided into several factions and all factions of JUP adhered to more or less same party constitution as well as organizational structure. Keeping in view all major factions, this study explores whether JUP had practiced influence in the political landscape of Pakistan. The scholarly circle agreeing role of political parties in democratic states largely agree that only institutionalized political parties can exercise influence in any democratic state. In the light of this view, the study primarily analyzes JUP's institutionalization as a party and its impacts on shaping its role in state's politics from 1947 to 2018. In the present research, party institutionalization is measured in the light of the internal and external determinants outlined on the basis of scholarly and semi-scholarly books, articles and policy papers. These determinants include autonomy in decision making, party organization, coherence and roots in the society. The paper concludes that JUP did not practice a notable influence in the political landscape of Pakistan particularly due to falling short of meeting criteria set for party institutionalization. Decision making regarding critical issues were monopolized mostly by influential internal leadership and/or external actors seeking their personal political interests. Similarly, the JUP had hardly framed any common grounds acceptable to all party leadership for practical implementation of party constitution and developing basic organizational structure such as party offices, nationwide organizational presence, personnel and material sources etc. In fact, lack of autonomy in decision making had often led to controversies among party leadership and due to disorganization, the

party had failed to accommodate those controversies. Consequently, the party had splintered into factions and had failed to strengthen its roots in the society.

Keywords: Islamic Political Parties (IPPs), Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), party institutionalization,

Introduction

Political parties form the core institution of democratic processes.¹ There are various types of political parties in the Muslim world and Islamic political parties (IPPs) form a part of them. Islamic political parties advocate diverse and at times contradictory ideological orientations and responses to major concerns in the contemporary Islamic world.² However, despite diversity and contradictions, IPPs like all other political parties, also strive for power and attempt to control the resources and political positions to form government for successful execution of their political programs and ideological visions.³ For the last more than a century, the IPPs have become a constant feature of the political landscape of the Muslim world.⁴ Their varied techniques of mobilization have helped them to retain their existence even under repressive regimes. Some recent developments such as capturing power by IPPs through democratic means in Turkey, Palestine, Egypt and Indonesia have enhanced their significance to become a subject of interest in the scholarly circles.⁵

In case of Pakistan, statistics show that the right-wing conservative parties such as Pakistan Peoples Party and Pakistan Muslim League-N have frequently got numerical strength in legislative assemblies' elections⁶ and have been quite dominant in political landscape of the state. IPPs have hardly performed well in the elections in Pakistan except in 2002 where their alliance Muttahida Majlis-e Aamal (MMA) appeared as the third majority group in the Parliament.

However, despite dismal electoral results, IPPs form a significant feature of political landscape of Pakistan. Their number has been proliferating since early years of post-independence period. Most of the Islamic political parties as well as groups are identified with a specific sectarian group or religious denominational. Moreover, there are multi-parties representing same sectarian identity.⁷

Around 25 Islamic political parties are registered under Election Commission of Pakistan.⁸ Some of the traditional IPPs include Jamat i Islami, (JI) Jamiat Ulema- e-Pakistan (JUP) and Jamiat-Ulema - Islam (JUI). Except JI (non-sectarian party), most of the IPPs in Pakistan have strong sectarian basis. For instance, JUI which has two major factions; JUI-F and JUI-S, represents Deobandi political aspirations. JUP influenced by the Sufi tendencies of the Barelvi School⁹ has been divided into many factions; two registered factions include Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Imam Noorani) and Jamiat Ulema-e-

Pakistan (Noorani). Markaz-e-Jamiat Ahle Hadith is a registered party protecting the interests of Ahle Hadith. Major IPPs of the Shia community include Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen Pakistan and Islami Tehreek-e-Pakistan (ITP). These traditional IPPs take part in state's electoral process and contest elections either independently or sometimes forming coalition with other political parties.

According to some scholarly circles,¹⁰ JUI-F and JI are the most significant traditional IPPs in Pakistan particularly due to their influence on public institutions including education institutions and their ability to mobilize street power. Moreover, JUI-F enjoys a substantial support in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's areas where Pashtuns are in majority. It is also accepted that despite lacking electoral constituency, JI also exercises influence over political landscape of Pakistan particularly due to Maulana Maududi's contribution in political discourse that is even drawn on by his opponents.¹¹ Furthermore, its committed workers often in the streets as well in educational institutions contribute in strongly presenting JI's stance over the debates on various contemporary political issues of the Muslim world such as political Islam, extremism, fundamentalism etc.¹² According to an estimate Barelwis constitute 50% to 60 % of the total population of Pakistan. The figures show that Barelwis are in majority in Pakistan¹³ and the researchers of this study are interested in exploring the influence of the largest sect Barelwis on the politics of Pakistan. JUP is taken as a case study particularly due to the fact it is the largest Barelwi representing Islamic Political Party having deep roots in history and presence across the state. The other Barelwi political groups or parties are confined to specific areas (such as Sunni Tehreek based in Karachi) or their emergence is just a recent phenomenon and have no deep roots in history (such as Tehreek-i-Labaik Pakistan, Sunni Ittehad Council etc.). JUP's presence in mainstream politics of Pakistan is evident ever since the inception of the state. The study argues that despite representing the largest group (Barelwis) and presence in mainstream politics, it has been observed that JUP had hardly played an influential role in the political landscape of Pakistan¹⁴ (not to ignore that the state was achieved on formative ideology strongly backed by Barelwis).

In the light of the above discussions, the primary aim of the paper is to find shortcomings preventing JUP to exercise notable influence over political landscape of Pakistan. The scholarly circle agreeing role of political parties in democratic states¹⁵ argue that only institutionalized parties are sustained and can exercise influence in any democratic system.¹⁶ Huntington defines institutionalization as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability."¹⁷ In the light of the stated definition of institutionalization, party institutionalization can be defined as a process in which individual political parties participating in elections experience an increase in organizational stability and value.

Based on the studies of Mainwaring 1998, Kuenzi and Lambright 2001,

Randall and Svasand 2002, Basedau 2007, Bendel and Grotz 2001, Huntington 1968 and Dix 1992,¹⁸ some of the common dimensions of institutionalization of party are given below:

Table 1: Dimensions of Party Institutionalization

| | Stability* | Value-Infusion** | Value-Infusion |
|-----------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| External | Roots in society | Autonomy (From external influence) | |
| Internal | Level of organization | Coherence | Autonomy (From internal influence) |

Source: Author's own compilation.

* Stability means that a party consistently maintains its strong existence for a long period of time.

** Value infusion refers to the extent to which party supporters and other stakeholders attach loyalty to and identification with the party.

The paper aims to find whether JUP had played a notable role in the politics of the state. On the basis of the above stated theoretical underpinnings of party institutionalization, the study primarily seeks to find potential of JUP to play a significant role in the politics of Pakistan.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section two discusses roots of JUP in pre-partition period in the subcontinent; Section three gives a brief overview of JUP's influence in political landscape of Pakistan; Section four makes a critical analysis of institutionalization of JUP as a political party. Last section concludes the study.

Tracing Roots of JUP in History

The origin of Ahle-Sunnat or Barelvi movement could be traced back in 1880's that attained widespread recognition in 1890's in the backdrop of its anti-Nadwa campaign. Nadwa-tul-ulema founded in 1893, at Cawnpore with Maulana Lutfullah as its president largely aimed to reformulate the madrassa syllabi keeping in view modern life developments specifically those made in the West. Moreover, Nadwa also aimed to create harmony among the Muslims on a single version of Islam.¹⁹

Ahmad Reza was the founder of Barelwi Movement, a staunch follower of Prophet's Sunnah and a Sufi of Qadiri order.²⁰ His followers referred to themselves as Ahl-e Sunnat wa Jama'at as they gave ascendancy to the Prophet in their lives.²¹ Barelwis considered themselves as true heirs and representatives of the earliest Muslim community of the Prophet Muhammad's time and they were against any such plans of reforming madrassa syllabi in the light of new developments across the world as proposed by the Nadwa-tul-ulema.²²

The Barelwis emphasize that personal devotion to Prophet Muhammad is a condition for being a good Muslim. Prophet Muhammad must be considered as not only a loving guide but also intercessor between Allah and the individual through a chain of pirs ending in the living pir to whom each Muslim must be associated through *bai'ah*, an oath of loyalty.²³ As soon as Ahmad Reza's followers spread across the state, their activities such as opening schools, publishing journals and holding disputations got impetus and the popularity of the movement grew rapidly from central states to the far-off backward areas.²⁴

Besides religious activities, Barelwis came up on the political landscape of the sub-continent in an organized form in 1925 when they established All India Sunni Conference which later turned out to be the sole representative of the Barelwis of the sub-continent. The role of Barelwi ulama in politics remained quite passive for few decades till All India Muslim League in an effort to re-organize itself decided to utilize the services of ulama after some disappointed results in 1936-37 elections. In this hour of need, Barelwis rendered services for All India Muslim League (AIML) when non-Barelwi Sunni ulama were either aligning the Indian National Congress or were opposing the All India Muslim League (AIML). The active participation of Barelwi ulama in politics could be observed during January 1938 to May 1939 when their renowned figures Pir Jamat Ali Shah, Mawlana Abdul Hamid Badayuni and Maulana Burhanul Haq Jabbal Puri along with the other Barelwi ulama visited North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab and UP to urge people to unite under the banner of AIML.²⁵ The Barelwi Press such as Faqiyyah, Amritsar, Sa'adat (Kamalia), also contributed productively in promoting the message of Pakistan Scheme. Barelwis supported AIML on all occasions including Simla Conference, 1945-46 elections and the referendum in NWFP. Shrines and mosques became central for launching a comprehensive campaign to mould public opinion of the Muslims of the sub-continent in favor of the AIML.²⁶

Barelwi ulama, after rendering some remarkable services for the establishment of Pakistan formed Markazi Jamiyyat Ulama-i- Pakistan (MJUP) in 1949 at Multan to strive for Islamic identity of the state.²⁷ Currently, the party is divided into several factions and two major of them JUP-Noorani and JUP-Imam Noorani have their head offices at Karachi and Lahore respectively.²⁸ Both major factions of JUP have more or less same constitution, organization and party structure.

Did JUP Exercise Influence in the Political Landscape of Pakistan?

Some Barelwi ulema and scholars²⁹ argue that JUP had played an active role in Pakistan's politics. According to them, JUP kept on striving for enforcement of Islamic constitution in the state as the party in collaboration with Jam'iyyat al-Masha'ikh observed Yaum-i-Shari'at on May 7, 1948 in defunct West Pakistan and demanded promulgation of Islamic constitution in the state.³⁰ MJUP supported the Objectives Resolution in 1949. The party rejected an interim report prepared by the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) adopted by the Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan on October 6, 1950 claiming the report as against the essence of Islamic injunctions and principles.

As a result of that strong reaction, the government withdrew its interim report on November 21, 1950³¹.

The leaders of JUP claimed that the final report of BPC was prepared in the light of twenty two points of the Ulama's conference held in 1951 where Maulana Abdul Hameed Badayuni and Mufti Muhammad Sahibdad Khan (1898-1965), representatives of MJUP also played a pivotal role. The report presented by Khawaja Nazimuddin (1894-1964) was also reviewed by the Barelwi ulama in a convention held on 11-18 January 1953 and they gave few recommendations demanding enhancing their official role in state affairs specifically in making constitution.³²

JUP members also argue that some suggestions in 1956 Constitution of Pakistan such as Muslim Head of the State, give Hanafi touch to the Constitution and build a society on Islamic norms and principles.³³ They claim that the 1956 Constitution enforced on 23 March dominantly contained suggestions of Ulama and Masha'ikh of MJUP. Barelwis of JUP also think that they must be credited for their contribution in framing Islamic provisions of 1973 Constitution recommended in the first and second all Pakistan Sunni Conferences attended by thousands of Barelwi ulema and *mashaikh* besides a huge participation of masses in 1970. The conferences held at several cities of Pakistan including Lahore, Karachi, Hyderabad, Multan, Toba TekSingh etc. demanded Islamic constitution for the state. The party also signed the Constitutional Accord, assuring addition of Islamic provisions in the Constitution, which was considered a milestone towards the upcoming constitution.³⁴ The party rejected the draft of constitution presented before the National Assembly by Abdul Hafeez Pirzada on December 31, 1972 and demanded to include Islamic provisions agreed in the Constitutional Accord.³⁵ As a result, the government had to include Islamic provisions in 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. Moreover, Barelwis played a notable role in anti-Ahmediyya Movement, 1974 that demanded declaration of Ahmedis as non-Muslims³⁶ as well as Tehreek-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa, 1977 launched for implementation of Sharia in the state.³⁷ The establishment of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's undemocratic measures was also a brain child of JUP. The PNA was formed on January 10, 1977 in a meeting held at the residence of Rafique Bajwa, the Vice President of the JUP attended by the leaders of JUP, Tehreek e Istaqlal and United Democratic Front (UDF).³⁸ It is argued that JUP's politics has always been on principles as the party never accepted General Zia-ul-Haq dictatorship from 1977-1988.³⁹ The party has been quite active in establishing several platforms in cooperation with other political parties. For instance Milli Yakjihiti Council established on March 24, 1995 by ulama of different schools of thought turned to be a reality due to efforts of JUP and Maulana Noorani.⁴⁰ JUP also played a major role in formation of the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) that declared violence in the name of religion and suicide attacks by Taliban as against Islamic teaching.⁴¹ Moreover, JUP was a part of MMA, a coalition of six religious parties, (headed

by Maulana Noorani of JUP) that ruled KPK and appeared as the biggest opposition party in the National Assembly in 2002 elections.⁴²

According to some analysts, the meetings, conferences and conventions which the Bareilvi ulama held from 1950s to 1970s for framing Constitution of Pakistan in the light of the Islamic injunctions had no legitimacy.⁴³ JUP's role in Tehreek-e-Nizam-e-Mustafa was also not like that of an organized political party as its party leadership without presenting a clear agenda propagated their goals of replacing PPP era. The JUP leadership projected their own world views without giving any proper plans, most of the time surrounding around hopes of egalitarian society.⁴⁴ The fact is that the role of JUP in general and Maulana Noorani in particular on PNA platform was not for promotion of democracy in the state rather it was an open invitation for martial law as Maulana Noorani was against negotiations with the government regarding solution for alleged rigging in 1977 election won by PPP.⁴⁵ Similarly, Milli Yekhjehti Council established over the behest of JUP was never actively functional and almost lost its importance in late 1990's. So, JUP's role was not so candidly illustrated on all above-stated occasions helpful enough to achieve stability and value for the party. Furthermore, in 2002 elections MMA managed to come up as a significant alliance by getting 53 seats but JUP, being a part of alliance got just one. Later, when Maulana Noorani decided to be a Senator, JUP's candidate could not win the National Assembly seat vacated by him. So, JUP's representation diminished from the National Assembly. After the death of Mulana Noorani in 2003, JUP withered away in the political landscape of Pakistan with no written positions on matters relevant to economic, domestic or foreign policies. Their involvement in Pakistan's politics is now limited to occasional statements on religious issue.⁴⁶

Briefly, JUP had hardly exercised influence over state's political landscape. The next section finds degree of party institutionalization of JUP and its impacts on shaping its role in politics of Pakistan.

Party Institutionalization and its Impacts on JUP Politics from 1947-2018

Before discussing JUP's institutionalization as a political party it is deemed necessary to give dimensions, criteria and indicators of party institutionalization.

Table 3: Dimensions, criteria and indicators of party institutionalization

| Dimensions of party institutionalization | Criteria | Indicators |
|--|--|---|
| Autonomy | Independent of too much influence of group or individuals within and groups or individuals outside | Frequency of change in party leadership Decision making autonomy from particular groups or individuals (within and |

| | | outside party) |
|------------------|---|--|
| Coherence | <p>Encourages intra-party debate to resolve differences</p> <p>Respects freedom of opinion</p> <p>Presents itself as unified organization in public</p> | <p>Unity in party's parliamentary group</p> <p>Relations between strong intra-party groups inside party</p> <p>No factionalism</p> |
| Organization | <p>An organizational apparatus active enough for the interests of party must be obvious at all levels</p> | <p>Party office, manifesto, capacity for solving problems, nationwide organizational presence, party conferences, personnel and material resources, Strong members</p> |
| Roots in society | <p>Deeply rooted in society</p> | <p>Party age in multi-party system</p> <p>Stable electoral support</p> <p>Links with civil society</p> |

Source: Author's own compilation

1. Autonomy

Autonomy as an important criteria for measuring party institutionalization is defined as independence of party in making decisions. The party must be independent of a single charismatic leader or a specific ethnic group or any outside actors while making decisions.⁴⁷

According to some indicators, change in party leadership is made on frequent basis and even after change electoral support for the party is not affected. JUP has never encouraged democratic practice of frequent change of party leadership. It can be observed that Maulana Noorani elected as the head of JUP in 1972 and remained the party head till his death in 2003. Similarly, Maulana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi became the head of JUP-Niazi in 1990 and remained the head of the faction till his death in 2001. This stated practice leaves a big question over the autonomy of the decision making body of the party.

JUP's leadership claim that their party did not receive foreign funding and hence had been independent in making all sorts of decisions.⁴⁸ However, some facts show that JUP as a party had hardly been independent in making decisions. It is perceived that JUP had often lost its autonomy to its charismatic leadership. For instance, it was Maulana Noorani's personal decision to meet Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman of Awami League after 1970 election crisis regarding transfer of power (that led to dismemberment of Pakistan). The party head Khawaja Sialwi deposed Maulana Noorani from JUP's parliamentary party's leadership. But Khawaja Sialvi faced extreme resistance from the party workers as they all accepted charisma of Maulana Noorani and as a result decision was not implemented.⁴⁹ It was Maulana Noorani's decision that JUP did not sign Constitution of Pakistan 1973 which was approved by all political parties unanimously.⁵⁰ Maulana Noorani gave justification in a press conference "I do not agree with all the provisions of the Bill" shows that his personal decision dominated the party.⁵¹ In Maulana Noorani's time period JUP launched protests on several occasions over the behest of its party head. Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani's attractive speeches had a key role in Nizam e Mustafa Movement. The JUP held a House of Islam Conference at Toba Tek Singh and Maulana Noorani raising the slogan "even if we were to suffer bullets, we will create the Muhammadan system" gave impetus to the movement. Maulana Noorani remained on political landscape of Pakistan for almost 33 years as opposition leader. Briefly, Maulana Noorani's personality was elevated by his followers to such an extent whether it was decision of launching anti-Ahmedi Movement or establishing Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) or Tehreek-e-Nizam e Mustafa or decision not to join Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) in Zia regime or joining Mutahida Majlis e Aamal in 2002 elections, the party members were bound to follow him as he was followed as *pir* and his claim to authority was accepted as based on a message from "the divine source — the Prophet himself, the source of light."⁵² He had such a strong *pir-murid* relationship with his workers that people used to kiss the vehicle carrying Noorani and the dresses he wore. To argue Maulana Noorani over any matter was considered as disrespect of *pir* which was unacceptable in Barelwi theology. In the party meetings, the party leaders without arguing always endorsed Maulana Noorani's decisions over all matters which gave impressions that they were bound to follow his decisions over all matters through the accord of *baiah*.⁵³ Soon after his death JUP –Noorani spilt into several factions and most of them still seeking Noorani's name for their identity. Furthermore, current factionalism in JUP is also consequence of struggle to retain monopoly by internal influential leadership of the party particularly Shahebzada Zubair, Maulana Awais Noorani, Pir Ijaz Hashimi and Qari Zawar Bahadur to impose their decisions over the entire party. There are less convincing arguments for external influence over the party; however these cannot be ruled out absolutely.

The Barelwi leader Pir Ijaz Hashmi in an interview said that the party

was quite active and influential but during General Zia era, military's interference in party matters led it to factions⁵⁴ as he offered ministries to JUP leaders who later left the party. Some critics also hold the opinion that MMA played a controversial role in General Musharraf era such as taking part in elections on anti-Musharraf stance and later kept a soft corner for him in assemblies. Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, the head of JUP and President of the Muttahida Majlis e Aamal never gave alluring speeches or logics or promoted politics of agitation against General Musharraf as he did during Bhutto era. The entire MMA including JUP came under military's influence as inside the parliament they accepted Legal Framework Order (LFO)⁵⁵, a part of 17th Amendment⁵⁶ that justified role of Army in politics.⁵⁷ So, JUP had hardly attained autonomy since establishment and hence institutionalization of party had never been achieved. Dominancy of internal influential leaders in decision making had protected the interests of the party leadership more than enhancing stature of JUP in state's politics.

2. Level of Organization

An institutionalized party extends organizational structure all across the state. The organizational apparatus must be like a chain connecting all levels and protecting the interests of the party.⁵⁸ In order to measure party organization it is important to take into account number and location of party offices serving to resolve issues at the local level and material and personnel resources used for strengthening party. A large number of party members also show strength of the party. In the constitution of JUP, sub-organizations were mentioned at Centre, provincial, district, tehsil and regional levels. The aims of these sub-organizations included searching for suitable candidates for party representation at national, provincial and local levels, taking interest in social works, organize Dars-i-Quran programs, establish libraries etc. The central organization of JUP aimed to keep check on federal government's performance, international developments etc. The two main organs of the each sub-divisions of Jamiat were: Majlis-i-Amilah and Majlis-i-Shura.⁵⁹ One can hardly find JUP's leadership involved in social works at the local levels or libraries established by JUP's members in the state. Moreover, Darse Quran classes were held in Barelwi madrassas in few areas for promotion of Barelwis religious ideals rather than propagation of JUP's political goals. The constitution of the party had its existence only in documents.

Similarly, JUP-Noorani contested 2018 National Assembly elections in five constituencies out of 272. Similarly in provincial assemblies JUP-N contested on 13 seats; seven from Sindh out of 130 constituencies, 3 from Punjab out of 297, one in KPK out of 99 constituencies, and 2 Balochistan out of 51 constituencies.⁶⁰ This shows that the party's sub-organizations are quite weak all over the state as the party was unable to represent Barelwis in most part of the country. JUP-Imam Noorani was a part of MMA in elections 2018 and did not contest elections on notable number of seats. All factions of JUP did not have offices in any other regions except in few areas where they

contested elections and there too mostly mosques had been used for political activities as well. Maulanana Abul khair Zubair, said that the party representatives at the higher level contribute Rs 1000, while at the lower level contribution is even less than this. According to him, in order to establish and maintain any offices the required minimum expenditures are 3 lac and due to shortage of party resources offices cannot be established all over Pakistan. The *madaris mohtamim* or incharge of *khanqas* represented JUP in various areas and organized meetings and conferences.⁶¹ They did not have regular members in the entire state and hence their leadership could not address problems in their own areas in the entire state. The local *Imams* of mosques serving also as JUP's representatives lacked competence to handle the issues existed at the local level. Moreover, the party lacked extensive organization which was quite vital for mobilizing voters. In order to be close to the citizens there must be different committees within the party handling different party affairs and chain of party command should extend from the top to bottom. Abdul Qudoos, President JUP-Noorani, Balochistan said that JUP had no funding sources and the party's sub-organizations were existed in constitution but they had no active role to conduct activities due to shortage of funds. The JUP leadership also blamed the local leaders for their lack of interest in party organization. The local leaders hardly interacted with the workers and that was the reason that many Union Councils remained unrepresented in local bodies' elections which damaged the party's roots at the local level in the entire state. For instance, Hyderabad had been the hub of JUP activities and Maulan Noorani won elections thrice from this city. The JUP has lost its control at Hyderabad as well as in other cities in recent local government elections as the party placed candidates in just eight union committees out of 52. The other faction of JUP led by Sahibzada Zubair placed candidates in 14 UCs only. And not to ignore both factions of JUP were contestants of each other in some UCs which also divided Barelwi vote.⁶² The damage of under representation at the local level dominantly effected party's representation at the national and provincial assemblies' elections.

Abdul Qudoos, President JUP-Noorani, Balochistan said that no doubt *Sufis* of Barelwi school of thought had plenty of sources in the form of alms, donation etc. These *Sufis* had maintained their monopoly over Barelwi followers and they kept themselves away from getting involved in JUP's politics and asked their followers to vote for other parties like PPP, PML-N, PTI etc. to get personal benefits. In Pakistan, elections have become a business and despite developing party's structure JUP lacked resources to perform activities such as conferences, meetings etc in all areas of Pakistan.⁶³ Earlier, before the emergence of Muhajir Quomi Movement (MQM), JUP was a strong representative of muhajirs and was receiving funds in abundance from local industrialists including Memon, Bohra, Gujrati, and also other capitalist communities of Sindh.⁶⁴ Later, these communities provided more funds to MQM and JUP started facing financial crisis. Now, if JUP has to organize any

events, the party members share nominal money, hardly meeting the expenses of the party and in some cases meetings and conferences are postponed several times due to fund shortage.

Syed Muhammad Safdar Shah, Secretary General, JUP-Noorani, also said *sajjada nasheens* and *mashaikhs* preferred their personal interests over the interests of Barelwi followers and hence did not cooperate with JUP. He argued that party is not very active at regional levels Chakwal, Peshawar, Hazara etc. He also accepted that party's organization was weak particularly due to the reason that JUP had not worked for implementation of the foreign agendas and hence did not receive foreign funding.⁶⁵

Similarly, party manifesto also reflects organizational strength of a party. Unimpressive manifestos in all the elections prevented JUP to retain identity in state's political setup and hence led to its exclusion from the state's political landscape. In all elections, the party's manifestos claimed to establish Islamic state where egalitarian society providing equal economic opportunities for the people and Islamic banking would prevail. In the manifestos of all political parties in Pakistan, it can be found that promotion of Islamic teaching and following Islamic values is depicted in one way or another. For example, Bhutto who emerged as the central figure of the democratic aspirations of the masses coined the term "Islamic Socialism" which tilted the new found Islamist constituency in his favor which the religious parties including JUP were expecting at that time.⁶⁶ Moreover, his slogans to raise jihad against the evils of feudalism and capitalism and against exploitation and injustice also grabbed the attention of the masses on a larger scale more than IPPs including JUP could anytime managed to do. PPP has kept its Islamic agenda alive in the manifestos of all elections from 1970 to 2018. Similarly, PML-N, without involving itself in theoretical abstraction, gave brief indication that it would strive for the establishment of a just society.⁶⁷ Therefore, the presences of Islam in the manifestos of other political parties made the manifesto of JUP devoid of appeal for the masses in all elections from 1970-2018. Additionally, for most of the times in its manifestos, their leadership used to speak for the rights of Palestinians and Kashmiris and criticized American policies which had trounced the weaker states. Taking example of 2013 elections when other major political parties claimed in their manifestos, education, energy and employment for the masses, JUP did not make such commitments to the people. Their leadership kept on promising intangible things such as curtailing American influence in the Muslim World, implementing Sharia and raised the slogans that were difficult to be met.⁶⁸ However, some addition was made in their manifesto recently including construction of dams, meeting power needs, elimination of terrorism, women's rights and reforms in bureaucracy and police.⁶⁹ Despite addition of these issues, there was no practicable program given for the achievements of the above mentioned objectives. In a nutshell, Maulana Noorani remained the head of a strong faction of JUP but he failed to organize the party and translate public support into electoral success.⁷⁰ Lack of

organization had served as hurdle for the party to organize regular meetings and conferences and hence prevented it to establish at the grassroots level. Additionally, disorganization had also led to lack of communication between highest command and local leaders. As a result the party kept on struggling for survival rather than playing any roles in politics of Pakistan.

3. Coherence

Internal unity and coherence is reflected at all levels in an institutionalized party. Generally, Intra-party conflicts occur in a party due to diversification of views on political issues or due to personal rivalries for influence and position.⁷¹ Intra-party conflicts and diversity of opinions are accommodated and resolved within an institutionalized party. Internal groups that are influential do not undermine party's coherence. JUP splintered into factions on several occasions due to intra-party conflicts which were not settled through dialogue within the party and hence fell short to be an institutionalized party. For instance, in General Ayub era the ulama of JUP were divided over Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, restricting polygamy, fixing age limit for marriage, inheritance laws introduced by the government considering them contrary to Quran, Sunna and Fiq-i-Hanafi and establishment of Auqaf Department which aimed to nationalize mosques, shrines and madrassas. Similarly, their differences over presidential elections 1965 also divided them over support of Miss Fatima Jinnah and General Ayub. A dissenting group under the leadership of Shabzada Syyid Mahmud Shah Gujrati (1920-87), vice President of West Pakistan Jam'iyat-ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan fully supported Fatima Jinnah while Pir Muhammad Abdul Majid Qadri of Dewal Sharif (1922-95) formed his Markazi Jam'iyat ul Mashaikh Pakistan and claimed Ayub as his murid.⁷² On some other occasions too, the rifts among party's influential leaders led the party to factions. For instance, differences between Maulana Abdus Sattar Niazi and Maulana Noorani over the issue of contesting or not the by-elections from Lahore in 1990 divided the party into two; JUP (Niazi) and JUP (Noorani). The JUP (Niazi) became ally of Nawaz Sharif but failed to convince him to implement Shari'at. As a result, two more groups Markazi-Jammiyat Ulama-i-Pakistan in 1997 and JUP (Nifad-i-Shariat Group) emerged out of JUP (Niazi Group).⁷³ After the death of Shah Ahmad Noorani in 2003, rifts among JUP-Noorani's members over party leadership got depth and consequently several groups over the name of JUP appeared in political landscape of Pakistan. Major among those were; JUP (Noorani), headed by Shah Anas Noorani, JUP (Nifadh-i-Shariat group) by Engineer Salimullah Khan, JUP (Niazi) Pir Anis Haider Shah and MJUP headed by Shabzada Muhammad Fazl-i-Karim⁷⁴. Later, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) Noorani split into two factions; one led by Awais Ahmed Noorani and the other headed by party's former president Sahibzada Abul Khair Mohammad Zubair due to intra-party differences over timings of elections for party head, and Awais Noorani's decision to take disciplinary action against few leaders of the party including Qazi Ahmed Noorani, Shabbir Abu Talib, Aqeel Anjum, Tahir

Rasheed Tanoli and Bashirul Qadir.⁷⁵ JUP had four major factions even in 2018; JUP-(Zawar), JUP (Imam Noorani), JUP (Noorani) and JUP- (Niazi). Extreme lack of coherence in party was obvious since its establishment in 1948. Their leadership instead of resolving differences through dialogue preferred to form their own factions and hence none of the group managed to get effective representation in the parliament. JUP-Imam Noorani formed alliance with MMA in 2018 elections while JUP-Noorani was a partner of Milli Yekjehti Council in 2018 elections. Although none of factions performed well and managed to win seats but factionalism divided the vote bank in areas where JUP had strong hold in the past such as Hyderabad, Karachi etc.⁷⁶ and diminished the prospects of party institutionalization under one tag JUP. Therefore, the party had lost even its existence in state's power structure as it failed to retain a uniform identity and none of its faction got a state-wide recognition and hence all failed to practice influence in state's political setup.

4. Roots in society

An institutionalized party should have strong roots in society. The strong roots of a party in the society can be measured by the total age of the party in a multi-party system. Moreover consistent performance in all elections is also an indicator to measure institutionalization of a party. One of the ways to establish links with the society are to establish women, students or labor wing etc in the party. Taking into account the total age of the party it can be seen that JUP established as MJUP in 1948 and had three major factions active in politics in 2018; JUP-Noorani--- 1990; JUP—Imam Noorani 2016; JUP-Niazi 1990. These factions showed that the party failed to retain a uniform identity for long. It established 71 years back but factionalism had damaged its presence as a unified political party and hence had fallen short of developing roots in the society. JUP had never addressed the problems of peasants, women and students. In order to get support of the students, the party established Anjumun-e-Taliba-e-Islam (ATI) that remained active for few years only till 1970's.⁷⁷ The party has no wing representing students, women or labors etc even in 2018.

JUP's performance in the elections remained largely below expectations of their leadership despite their involvement in political activities of the state. JUP could not become a significant political party for more than two decades. It was only in 1970 that the party obtained some political relevance in Pakistan when it managed to win few seats in Karachi and rural Punjab in the elections.⁷⁸ The party contested the elections for the National Assembly only from Punjab, NWFP (now KPK) and Sindh where fifty five candidates contested elections and seven of them won seats. The party contested provincial assemblies' elections from Punjab and Sindh where it put up seventy three and fifteen candidates respectively and out of these four candidates from Punjab and seven from Sindh won seats. The results were contrary to the expectations of Barelwi ulama as they were claiming that 80% of the population of Pakistan was Barelwi and a vast majority of ulama and

mashaikh were supporting the party.⁷⁹

Forming coalitions with other political and religious groups also did not enhance the party's popularity and vote bank across the state in all the elections from 1985 to 2013. The party under Maulana Noorani's leadership formed Pakistan Awami Ittehad with Tehrik-i-Istaqlal and won three seats in the National Assembly in the 1985 elections. The JUP, facing leadership crisis since 1988, splintered into dozens of rival groups which all failed to perform well in 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2008, 2013 and 2018 elections. The party could not get any seat in National Assembly in 1988 elections. In the 1990 elections, JUP (Noorani) contested independently while JUP (Niazi Group) made an electoral alliance with Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) which also had Nizam-i-Mustafa Group and Jam'iyat-ul Mashaikh Pakistan as its components. JUP-Noorani contested on 43 National Assembly seats and won 3. JUP (Noorani) contested elections in 1993 in alliance with JUI (F), a Deobandi party under the tag of Islami Jamhuri Mahaz while JUP (Niazi) contested elections under the IJI. In 1997 elections, JUP (Noorani) boycotted elections while JUP (Niazi) contested elections under the tickets and symbol of PML-N. Maulana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi was elected as Senator in the same year. In the elections 2002, JUP contested elections under the umbrella of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal which won 53 National Assembly seats, out of which JUP got just one seat. However, Maulana Noorani managed to become Senator and later became unofficial leader of the Opposition in the Senate.⁸⁰ In 2008 and 2013 elections JUP-N placed 48 and 1 candidates for National Assembly elections and all lost.⁸¹ In 2018 elections JUP-Imam Noorani was a part of MMA and JUP-Noorani contested on five National Assembly and 13 Provincial assemblies' seats. Both factions did not get access to national and provincial assemblies. JUP-Noorani which contested elections independently got 22145 votes in National Assembly constituencies. The party got 1372 votes from Sindh, 456 from Punjab, 23 from KPK and 82 from Balochistan.⁸² The statistics show that JUP did not have well developed roots in the society and hence was not in a position to practice influence in the political landscape of Pakistan.

Conclusion

Islamic political parties (IPPs) have been notable actors in the politics of the Muslim world. Their presence stretched from South Asia to Africa and to the Middle East. However, their influence in the political landscape varied from state to state. In some states they ruled and in some other states the IPPs struggled to retain even their existence. The IPPs in Pakistan fell under the latter case as most of the IPPs including JUP faced problems to retain their existence in the political landscape of the state. The study argued that party institutionalization is a pre-requisite for a party to attain stability and value infusion in any democratic state. The external determinants of party institutionalization such as roots in society as well as autonomy from external influence and internal determinants such as level of organization, coherence

and autonomy from internal influence showed that JUP lacked party institutionalization and hence had failed to exercise influence over the political landscape of Pakistan. All the external and internal determinants used to measure the degree of party institutionalization are inter-linked and inter-dependent. For instance, autonomy in decision making leads to party organization as freedom of opinion is expressed and respected and party members think for the larger interests of the party. They top as well as local leadership own the party equally and contribute in strengthening their party organization at the grassroots level. In an organized party when power is extended to all sub-organizations from top to bottom, the party appears as a unified organization. When party organization is strong and party manifesto is owned by all members, the party appears to be a strong coherent group with no rifts coming up before the public and hence no factions emerge. When a party appears as coherent group, its roots within the society are developed; the party's vote bank is always stable and respectable and the party extends its connections to other social groups and forms women, peasant and student unions and hence attains stability. In fact, ignoring any aspects of external and internal determinants, the party institutionalization process can be derailed. In case of JUP, it is found that most of the decisions of party were made by the heads of the factions whether it was JUP of Maulana Noorani's time period or JUP-Noorani or JUP-Imam Noorani after the death of Maulana Noorani. The party leadership had hardly left space for freedom of opinions and as a result members of the party did not extend loyalty to party required enough for its organization. The party leadership had never extended power to the local level and as a result faced problem in getting personnel resources. Moreover, its manifesto that hardly addressed real problems of masses was void of appeal on a larger scale. Their manifesto really exposed lack of communication with the people at the grassroots level which shows JUP's disorganization. The party had no active students, women or labor unions which are generally considered quite vital parts of a party. Briefly, due to lack of autonomy, coherence and organization, all factions of JUP including JUP-Noorani and JUP-Imam Noorani had failed to develop their roots in the society as reflected in all election results from 1970-2018 and hence fell short of attaining stability and value that institutionalized parties enjoy in democratic systems in various states all across the world. Consequently, the party's complete elimination from the national and provincial assemblies and local governments has led to diminishing its role in state's politics.



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